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Why publish the laws of England? What effects would printing
have? From the early sixteenth century through the Civil War, these
questions framed a debate among English lawyers over the propriety,
advantages, and risks of legal publication. Advocates of law printing,
in their soaring moments, prophesied national unity, godliness, and
social harmony flowing from the legal press as readily as quartos and
folios. The barrister William Hudson, by contrast, looked back with
"reverence" on the common lawyers who abstained from "publishing
their meditations and arguments.... holding it as a flag of their vain-

glory unworthy of their gravity."' Such laudable restraint was no more
in
, I have modernized spelling, punctuation, and capitalization in quotations from
primary sources (including titles of works listed in the text and footnotes). I consulted
manuscripts on microfilm or microfiche, except for works in the Harvard Law Library
Rare Book Room, Yale's Beinecke Library, andJohn Hales's Orationin Commendation of
Laws in the Free Library of Philadelphia, which I examined in person.
Because of the particular demands of early modern historical scholarship, the
author has requested waiver of several Bluebook citation rules. First, the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review has not been able to check all pre-1700 imprints and manuscripts. Mistakes are the sole responsibility of the author. Second, the author has
cited materials according to chronological order or according to his estimation of
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this cracking age, when all men in all professions quicquid subito crepant
omnino ii statu Apollinis credunt [believe that whatever they suddenly rattie forth entirely comes from an Apollonian state (e.g. authoritative
frenzy)]; who, for fear of burying their talent, post to the press to publish to others that which they well understand not themselves; it being
assuredly no matter of necessity to publish the reasons of thejudgment
of the law, or apices [tittles or small points] or fictiones juris [legal fictions] to the multitude, who are apt to furnish themselves with shifts to
cloak their wickedness, rather than to gain understanding to further the
government of the Commonwealth: for surely few men would be ruinated by dishonest means, if men knew not how to cover their dishon2
esty under some color of law or justice ....

Participating in the expansion of law publishing underway in Elizabethan and early Stuart England, lawyers questioned print's impact on a
profession heavily dependent on manuscripts and oral tradition and
on a nation reading lawbooks without the interpretive conventions
imbued by legal training.3
Print's effect on English legal culture has not received the sustained attention devoted to the history of the book in religion, statecraft, and science. But neither has it gone unnoticed. Historians of
communications have explored the social impact of law publishing,
and legal historians have examined the influence of printing on the
doctrinal and institutional development of the common law. To cite
only several of its various ramifications, print, historians say, helped
their relative importance. Bluebook rules governing citation order have not been followed. Third, places of publication and publishers for pre-1900 works have not been
supplied in conformity to historical citation practice and because of the difficulty of
ascertaining such information for some sixteenth-century imprints. Fourth, the rule
governing citation of material from microforms has been disregarded. Pre-1700 imprints on microfilm have been cited by author, title, and date of publication. Manuscripts have been cited by author, title, date of composition, and the manuscript identification number of the library holding the source.
The following abbreviations have been used throughout the Article: "MS" for
"manuscript," "MSS" for "manuscripts," and "c." for "circa."
2 William Hudson, A Treatise of the Court of Star Chamber (MS, c.1621), in
2
COLLEcTANEAJURIDICA 1, 1-2 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1792). Hudson (1577/78-1635)
was a bencher of Gray's Inn who practiced as a counsellor in Star Chamber. He wrote
the Treatise in the 1610s and presented it to newly appointed Lord Keeper John
William in 1621. The Treatise circulated widely in manuscript in the 1620s and 1630s
as the more than 20 surviving copies attest. See Thomas G. Barnes, Mr. Hudson's Star
Chamber, in TUDOR RULE AND REVOLUTION:

ESSAYS FOR G.R. ELTON FROM HIS

AMERICAN FRIENDS 285, 286-87, 296 (DelloydJ. Guth &John W. McKenna eds., 1982).
An "Apollonian state" is a reference to the Delphic oracle, implying an authoritative
pronouncement.
In the early modern period, "publication" meant to "make public," whether
through the press, through handwritten documents, or by speech. Unless otherwise
noted, I will use "to publish" in its modern sense as a synonym for "to print."
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along the recognition that law was made rather than found; facilitated
the formation of the modern notion of precedent, the solidification
of a group identity within the profession, and the breakdown of the
oral learning exercises in the Inns of Court; and both provoked
and
4
carried a common law apologetic and nationalist literature.
The legal press was a causal agent, and an important one. But law
printing was also an intellectual problem, its meaning and repercussions uncertain and divisive. It provoked attacks, called forth defenses, conjured aspiration and warning. That history has yet to be
written. This Article offers a contribution to recovering this lost debate, focusing on contemporaries' disagreements over the promises
and drawbacks of legal publishing, treating the political and social effects of books as contexts shaping the discussion. The first Part explores the initial justification of law printing offered in Henrician
England, an echo of humanist and Protestant advocacy of textual dissemination as an agent of godly order, solidifying obedience as it dissolved obscurantism. The second Part discusses the dispute that
broke into public view in the latter sixteenth century over the perceived threats and advantages of legal publishing, a controversy
pressed by an emerging group of skeptics such as Hudson, whom I
dub the "anti-publicists." Anti-publicist arguments were not confined
to a discernible circle, still less the program of a movement, but were
an idiom of disapproval employed selectively. The third Part explores
the context engendering the debate and making plausible the disputants' contrasting prophesies about the effects of lawbooks. Three interrelated developments stand out: the growing lay audience putting
lawbooks to political uses and undermining the tacit identification of
the reading public with the profession; increasing episcopal and absolutist suspicion of the unwitting dangers of licit printing; and the
gradual realization within the profession of how print reshaped the
control of knowledge (and hence of status and power) among themselves and between themselves and the nation. The fourth and final
Part reflects on how the controversy over law printing implicated a
larger change in English legal culture: the "commoning" of the
common law along the simultaneous dimensions of communication
See 1 ELIzABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE:
119
(1979); M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW
35-39, 215-18 (1989); 6 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 481-83
(7th ed. 1966); Peter Goodrich, PoorIlliterate Reason: History, Nationalism and Common
Law, 1 SOc. &LEGAL STUD. 7, 7-28 (1992).
4

COMMUNICATIONS AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN EARLY-MODERN EUROPE
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and ideology as the law evolved, in the realm of perception, from a
guild possession to a national inheritance.
In pursuing these topics, this Article has several aims. First, it
employs methods and asks questions characteristic of work on the
"history of the book"5 in order to enrich the received picture of the
common law's growing intellectual and social presence in Tudor and
5 The "history of the book" is an umbrella term used to describe scholarship concerned with the production, distribution, assimilation, and social effects of all manner
of texts, from manuscripts, to ephemeral print, to finely bound treatises and First Folios. Capacious in its choice of topics, it has studied such issues as how the medium of
print shaped cultural interactions among learned, middling, and plebeian groups in
society, how the constraints of economics, patronage, taste, and censorship affected
the content and presentation of works; and how authors and readers, authorities and
sundry dissidents perceived the proper uses and cultural meaning of different genres
of texts (Bibles, histories, chapbooks, almanacs) and different media of communications (print, manuscript, speech). On the scholarly ambitions and approaches of
"history of the book" scholarship, see, for example, ROGER CHARTIER, THE CULTURAL
USES OF PRINT IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 1987); Robert

Darnton, What Is the History of Books2, in BOOKS AND SOCIETY IN HISTORY 3, 3-26
(Kenneth E. Carpenter ed., 1983); Robert Darnton, History of Reading, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORICAL WRITING 140, 140-67 (Peter Burke ed., 1992); DAVID D.
HALL, CULTURES OF PRINT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK (1996); MICHAEL
WARNER, THE LErrERS OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLICATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN
EIGHTEENTH CENTURYAMERICA (1990).

As this Article will reveal, I have employed methods associated with "history of the
book" scholarship, such as: compilation of data on patterns of book ownership (based
on estate inventories) and longitudinal patterns of book production (based on bibliographies); attention to the mechanics of licensing; investigation of how books signal
their imagined or ideal readers; consideration of how manuscript and print as carriers
of information differentially allocate intellectual power; and exploration of changing
attitudes towards and cultural implications of print (as opposed to speech and manuscript) as a medium for disseminating knowledge.
It is worth noting, parenthetically, how seldom the methods and approaches of the
"history of the book" have been brought to bear on law, compared to their flourishing
application to religion, statecraft, literature, and science. Law is a promising candidate. Its doctrines and mores have been transmitted through precisely the sort of
fluid interactions among print, manuscript, and oral tradition that historians of the
book have done so much to illuminate. As simultaneously a mandarin intellectual system, a technique of governance, a protest ideal, and a generator of social and political
categories, law always had to bridge practitioner elites, government, and the various
strata of society, presenting the intellectual circulation that attracts historians of the
book. How to properly promulgate law has been a continuous problem in Western
legal history, since an unknown, hermetic law is ineffectual, yet what Weber called
"legal honoratiores" resist unveiling the inner reasons of their craft. See MAX WEBER,
The Legal Honoratiores and the Types of Legal Thought, in MAX WEBER ON LAW IN
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 198, 198 (Max Rheinstein & Edward Shils trans., 1967). Dissemination of law is at once unavoidable, politically dangerous, and potentially unpalatable to legal specialists, making the problem of communications-and hence the
value of "history of the book" approaches-even more pressing in law than in fields
that can pretend to esotericism or political neutrality such as, say, science or literature.
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early Stuart England. The flourishing of lawbooks around the turn
of the seventeenth century studied from within legal history under
the rubric of "legal literature" and from without as an agent of statebuilding and political argument was a more deeply controversial
process than generally supposed. Not only were the jurisprudential
content and organizational strategies of lawbooks contested, but more
fundamentally, so was the very wisdom of resorting to print as a communicative medium.7 Parts II and III delineate the costs of law printing and explore justificatory strategies that emerged in response.
Second, this Article portrays the anti-publicists as part of a larger late
Elizabethan and early Stuart backlash against "publicity" in statecraft
and nonconformist "popularity" in religion, as a legal correlate to
these latter two movements. The family resemblances among the
three testify to the breadth of Courtly ambivalence with printed tutelage. In particular, the overlap of anti-publicist and absolutist vocabulary hints at an absolutist concern with the pace and style of dissemination, a largely overlooked part of their legal agenda (to go along
with their well-known efforts to reshape constitutional norms).
Third, and most broadly, the debate over legal publishing identifies
as a historical problem the emergence of the idea, or ideal, that subjects ought to know the inner reasons as well as the commands of the
law at a time when print made this possible for the first time. Initially
serving Henrician solidification of the kingdom, this ideal of a justified rather than apodictic law later became a carrier of

6 The development, or "triumph," of the common law in Tudor-Stuart
England
was a process at once social, jurisprudential, doctrinal, political, and cultural. A selection of the leading works on the topic would include CHARLES OGILVIE, THE KING'S
GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMON LAW, 1471-1641 (1958); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNET,
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (5th ed. 1956); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
ANCIENT CONSTruTTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL
THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 30-69 (1987); WILFRID R. PREST, THE RISE
OF THE BARRISTERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR, 1590-1640 (1986); 1
CHARLES M. GRAY, THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION: JURISDICTION IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLISH LAw 22-38 (1994).
7 Students of English legal literature have explored contemporaries' praise for
and
objections against various early modern lawbooks-such as Coke's Reports, compilations of maxims, and the "methodized" treatises using Ramist logic as an organizing
system. They have not considered the advantages and drawbacks of print itself as a
communicative medium. See, e.g., LOUIS A. KNAFLA, LAW AND POLITICS IN JACOBEAN
ENGLAND: THE TRACTS OF LORD CHANCELLOR ELLESMERE 123-54 (1977); A.W.B.
Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatis4 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 632-79 (1981);
PETER STEIN, REGULAEJURIS: FROM JURISTIC RULES TO LEGAL MAXIMS (1966); PETER
GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC MASKS 15-52
(1990).
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"constitutionalist" politics under the challenge of a contrary absolutist
model of royal proprietorship of legal knowledge.
I. WHYWAS IT ACCEPTABLE TO PRINT LAW?

In the early sixteenth century, print was unusual, even a touch
anomalous among the law's manuscripts, orations, and memorial traditions. How could lawyers justify the legal press? The state's desire
for widespread promulgation of legal commands, the growth of legal
education and the profession, litigation and a legally literate lay readership, and the increasing importance of the common law in national
political argument expanded the book market. The lawyer's desire
for status, patronage, professional standing, and political advantage
motivated him to write for the press (when his work was not being stolen or posthumously appropriated). But neither the structural forces
driving the market nor the individual motivations of authors provided
an intellectually and politically satisfying rationale for legal publishing. Lawyers fashioned one out of the vocabulary of early- to midsixteenth-century English humanism and Protestantism, which favored them with well-recognized, polemically powerful idioms attached to a cultural politics supportive of law publishing.
A. Humanism
Building on Plato's concept of a res publica by way of Erasmus,
English humanists such as Thomas More and Thomas Starkey championed a vision of an ideal commonwealth. The public interest of the
community rather than the private interest of rulers or dominant factions was its end, the participation in governance of citizens tutored
in the virtues of honesty, public-spiritedness, and godliness its foundation. The Platonic model of sound knowledge expressing itself in
virtuous action made the proper education of the political nation an
especially salient concern. As Peter La Primaudaye would later put it
in The French Academy, sound knowledge was the "efficient cause of
prudence."" Cultivation of the citizenry's virtues through immersion
in the studia humanitatis and religion would contain aggression and
faction and encourage harmony and unity, the central ends of the
cooperative commonwealth. With a little ingenuity, the legal press

" PETER LA PRIMAUDAYE, THE FRENCH ACADEMY 69 (4th ed. 1602).
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could be cast as a brother educator, another prop for informed order.9
John Rastell (1475-1536) pioneered the argument. One of the
earliest important legal publishers, editors, and translators, he used
his English-language prefaces to the Liber Assisarum et Placitorum
Corone [Book of Assizes and Pleas of the Crown] (c.1511-1514), Abbrevia-

tion of the Statutes (1519), and Expositiones Terminorum Legum Anglorum
[Expositions of the Terms of the Laws of England] (c.1525)'o to place the
printer alongside the traditional trio of legislator, magistrate, and
lawyer as legal educators serving the commonwealth. Rastell constructed his argument out of humanist topoi about law popular in the
intellectual circle surrounding the early (pre-Reformation) Thomas
More, his brother-in-law. Well-made laws, not riches, power, or honors, were the foundation of the commonwealth, tutoring subjects in
good manners, respect for God, and the art of peaceful living among
neighbors. Wholesome law could only do its good work if conscientiously taught to subjects, who must know what they were bound to
obey and must have before them the models towards which to orient
their character. 2 Through legal publishing, "universally the people

See FRITZ CASPARI, HUMANISM AND THE SOCIAL ORDER IN TUDOR ENGLAND
(1968); ARTHUR B. FERGUSON, THE ARTICULATE CITIZEN AND THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE (1965); 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 101-12, 193-243 (1978).
t0 All of these books appeared in more than one edition, particularly the Expositiones, which was reprinted numerous times in the original law French and in translation
for over a century. In the second half of the sixteenth century, an anonymous lawyer
copied Rastell's preface to the Liber Assisarum into his commonplace book. See
COMMONPLACE, Harvard Law School Rare Book Room, MS 5021. This fortuitous survival suggests the continuing importance of Rastell's work a half-century after its publication.
1 JOHN RASTELL, Prologus, inLiberAssisarum &Placitoum Corone [Book ofAssizes and
Pleas of the Crown] (c.1511-1514), reprinted in THE THOUGHT AND CULTURE OF THE
ENGLISH RENAISSANCE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF TUDOR PROSE, 1481-1555, at 169, 169-73
(Elizabeth M. Nugent ed., 1956) [hereinafter THOUGHTAND CULTURE].
12 On Rastell's interaction with the humanists surrounding More, see ALBERT J.
GERITz & AMOS LEE LAINE, JOHN RASTELL 1-27, 92-105 (1983); A.W. REED, EARLY
TUDOR DRAMA: MEDWALL, THE RASTELLS, HEYWOOD, AND THE MORE CIRCLE (1926);
PEARL HOGREFE, THE SIR THOMAS MORE CIRCLE: A PROGRAM OF IDEAS AND THEIR
IMPACT ON SECULAR DRAMA (1959).
On the ideas of More and his circle, see
FERGUSON, supra note 9; RICHARD MARIUS, THOMAS MORE: A BIOGRAPHY (1984);
CASPARI, .supranote 9, at 50-75.
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of the realm might soon have the knowledge of the said statutes and
ordinances,... the better to live in tranquillity and peace."' s
Rastell's encomium to law printing followed and was part of humanist efforts to widen the conventionally acceptable boundaries of
scholarly and political audiences. Italian and Northern European
humanists impressed on their English followers a respect for the
press's diffusion of purified classical texts, which facilitated study of
philosophy and rhetoric. A handful of English political writers followed Italian civic humanists in addressing their appeals beyond the
prince, Court, and aristocracy to the class of "governors," as in
Thomas Elyot's The Book Named the Governor (1531), or to the whole
body of citizens (of appropriate social status), as in Thomas More's
Utopia (1516) and Thomas Starkey's DialogueBetween Reginald Pole and
Thomas Lupset (MS, 1535). In a sense they worked alongside Henry
VIII's government, which used printed pamphlets to mobilize edu14
cated opinion in favor of the royal divorce and the break with Rome.
Humanists generally encouraged, for want of a better term, a disseminationist bias, which favored legal publishing. 5 Law, wrote
Rastell, "kept secretly in the knowledge of a few persons and from the
knowledge of the great multitude may rather be called a trap and a
trouble than a good order to
net to bring the people to vexation and
6
bring them to peace and quietness."1
This disseminationist bias underlay the humanist commitment to
legal accessibility, a goal with three interrelated components: a manifest or unspoken approval of print; a preference for Latin or English
over law French in the hope of opening law to the learned or to all
,s SeeJOHN RASTELL, Prohemium, in THE ABBREVIATION OF THE STATUTES (1519),
reprintedin HowardJay Graham, "Our Tong MaternallMarvellously Amendyd and Augmentyd": The First Englishing and Printing of the Medieval Statutes at Large, 1530-1533, 12

UCLA L. BULL. 58, 97-98 (1965).
" See G.R. ELTON, POLICY AND POLICE: THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE REFORMNATION
IN THE AGE OF THOMAS CROMWELL 171-216 (1972); FRANKLIN LE VAN BAUMER, THE
EARLY TUDOR THEORY OF KINGSHIP 211-24 (1940).

"5This disseminationist bias was no more than a bias-by no means an unwavering
commitment. It was consistent with support for the suppression of "irresponsible"
publications and for revival at times of crisis of traditional disdain for the "multitude's"
political participation andjudgment. FERGUSON, supra note 9, at 156-59.
'6 JOHN RASTELL, Prohemium, in EXPOSMONES TERMINORUM LEGUM ANGLORUM
(c.1525), reprinted in THOUGHT AND CULTURE, supra note 11, at 176, 176-77. The humanist lawyer John Hales wrote around 1540 that "if law be a rule whereunto every
man should reduce his living me thinks it very necessary, to put it in writing, to the intent the people might know what they ought to do and not hang in one man or in few
learned men's heads." JOHN HALES, ORATION IN COMMENDATION OF LAWS (MS,
c.1540), Free Library of Philadelphia, Carson Collection, MS LC 14:32.1, fol. 14r.
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literates; and the direction of books to a broad rather than narrowly
professional readership, a matter of signaling an imagined target
audience. 7 Support for the legal press typically arose as a corollary of
this wider commitment to legal accessibility, manifesting itself
through calls, in print, for the broad diffusion of legal knowledge
among laypeople. Christopher St. German's second dialogue in Doctor and Student (1530) was among the broadest, appearing in English
rather than the Latin of the first dialogue, inviting in even illiterates:
[M]any can read English that understand no Latin and some that can
not read English by hearing it read may learn divers things by it they
should not have learned if it were in Latin. Therefore for the profit of
the multitude it is put into the English tongue .... To them therefore
that be19 not learned in the law of the realm this treatise is specially
made.

Thomas Phaer, Richard Taverner, and Ferdinand Pulton followed the
lead of St. German and Rastell.20
1 There was an affinity, but no necessary connection, among
the three forms of
accessibility. Thomas Elyot's The Book Named the Governor (1531) and Thomas Starkey's
A DialogueBetween Reginald Pole and Thomas Lupset (MS, c.1533), for example, two of
the leading humanist attacks on "barbarous," insular law French, did not address the
desirability of printed law. See THOMAS ELYOT, THE BOOK NAMED THE GOvERNOR 62-

64 (R.C. Alston ed., 1907) (1531); THOMAS STARKEY, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN REGINALD
POLE AND THOMAS LUPSET 117, 129 (Kathleen M. Burton ed., 1948) (MS, c.1533).

'8 1 do not wish to conflate the lawyers influenced by the humanism of More,
Starkey, Elyot, and the commonwealth ideal with the English "legal humanists" of the
latter sixteenth century, such as William Lambarde and Thomas Egerton, who adopted
a philologically inspired historicist approach to law pioneered on the Continent. On
this latter "legal humanism," see DONALD R KELLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN
HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP: LANGUAGE, LAW, AND HISTORY IN THE FRENCH RENAISSANCE (1970); DONALD R KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1990) [hereinafter KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE].
'9 CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 3, 176-77 (T.F.T. Plucknett &
J.L. Barton eds., 91 Selden Soc'y 1974) (1530). Note St. German's favorable reference
to the "multitude."
20 Thomas Phaer, lawyer and physician, translator of Vergil'sAeneid (1558) and
the
French medical text The Regiment of Life (1545), also published a formulary of legal instruments, the New Book of Presidents (1559 ed.), whose preface invited "every person
that can write and read and intends to have any thing to do among the common weal"
to "apply his mind unto this kind of learning." THOMAS PHAER, A NEW BOOK OF
PRESIDENTS (1559 ed.), quoted in H.S. BENNETT, ENGLISH BOOKS & READERS, 1558 TO
1603, at 162-63 (1965). The book appeared in 11 editions from 1543 to 1562 and was
republished continually through 1641.
The lawyer and translator of Erasmus, Richard Taverner, composed the Englishlanguage Institutions in the Laws of England (c.1540), a short book concerned mainly
with the land law. He aimed to set forth English law "plainly and simply" to teach
obedience to the prince and the laws while serving God and the commonwealth. See
RICHARD TAVERNER, Peroration, in INSTITUTIONS IN THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (c. 1540)
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The humanist case for law printing captured the imagination of
more than nationally prominent writers. The saga of the unfortunate
Essex-county practitioner William Barlee (1538-1610) testifies to its
appeal to provincial lawyers and suggests the breadth of its importance in English legal culture. Barlee pursued a rural Essex practice
without much financial success. Compelled to sell the family manors
in 1568, he watched his fortunes and reputation sink: "albeit I am
not worth ten groats, neither have I house to dwell in, ... nor power

to get meat for my self." To win reputation and office, he determined
to publish a treatise ("Concordance") of manorial law followed by
works on ecclesiastical law, last wills, and common officers (such as
sheriffs and bailiffs). 2' Difficulties arose. He needed money to finish
and publish the Concordance and endorsement of the project by a
prominent figure at Court, but he was not an important enough man
to approach a Privy Councilor or royal judge himself. So in 1578
Barlee recruited the Sheriff of Essex, Gabriel Poyntz, as an intermediary. Arming Poyntz with an outline of the half-begun Concordance as
a pr6cis of the larger project, Barlee aimed him in the direction of
Poyntz's friend Sir Thomas Heneage of the Privy Chamber.2 After
hearing nothing for several months, Barlee wrote to Lord Treasurer
William Cecil, who had also received a copy through Poyntz's efforts,
imploring him, unsuccessfully, to stand as a patron of the work.2 The
and preface to the 1542 edition of the work under the title, THE PRINCIPAL LAWS AND
STATUTES OF ENGLAND NEWLY RECOGNIZED AND AUGMENTED AT iib (1542). The Insti-

tutionswas anonymous. I have followedJohn Baker's identification of Taverner as the
author. See 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 3 (J.H. Baker ed., Selden Soc'y

1978). The book appeared in numerous editions under varying titles for almost 100
years. See also FERDINANDO PULTON, Preface to AN ABSTRACT OF ALL THE PENAL
STATUTES WHICH BE GENERAL, IN FORCE AND USE (1579 ed.) [hereinafter PULTON,

ABSTRACT]. Pulton's Abstract was reprinted on eight separate occasions between the
first edition of 1560 and the last of 1600. Pulton repeated his belief that printed law
furthered the "profit and quiet of the common-wealth" in the prefaces to his A
COLLECTION OF SUNDRY STATUTES, FREQUENT IN USE (1618) and A CALENDAR, OR
TABLE, COMPREHENDING THE EFFECT OF ALL THE STATUTES (1609).

The anonymous Elizabethan author of The Originof the Laws of England combined

approval of Edward III's 1362 statute mandating pleading in English with a call for
publishing the Readings delivered in the Inns of Court. See Origin, British Library,
Harleian MS 4317, fols. 2v and 4r-v.
21 See WILLIAM BARLEE, A CONCORDANCE OF ALL WRITTEN LAWS CONCERNING

LORDS OF MANORS, THEIR FREE TENANTS, AND COPYHOLDERS at i-iv, 49, 30-31

(Manorial Soc'y 1911) (MS, 1578).
22 See id. at 55, 61. Poyntz was to deliver the Concordance to Heneage as an inducement to bestow on Barlee an office and financial support.
23 See Letter from William Barlee to William Cecil (Nov. 7, 1578) (British Library,
Lansdowne MS 99 #45).
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Concordance ultimately came to rest in the State Papers Domestic,
where it appears to have slept undisturbed until the Manorial Society
roused it at long last for the press in 1911.24

To win over Poyntz and Cecil, Barlee composed one of the few
sixteenth-century reflections on the likely effects of published law.
Once printed and placed in "every manor by such subjects as desire to
buy wisdom, without any great cost," his Concordance would help
soothe the differences of religion, status, and class troubling Elizabethan England. Eager to deny that a published lawbook stirred up
trouble, he emphasized its influence on education rather than its impact on comparative resources in litigation. Its provision of a public
measure of legal duties and boundaries more standardized, readily
available and, hence, "disinterested" than manuscript or oral tradition
allowed informed tutelage in moments of conflict. Agents of
"righteousness," vernacular lawbooks taught rulers how to govern
fairly and gave inferiors the means to "instruct their lord's officers"
away from error; they led masters away from "cruel purposes" under
the "gracious admonishment of their servants"; they turned servants
away from "froward ways by the loving instructions of their learned
masters."2 Along with a projected work on ecclesiastical law, his Concordance would "make motions of exhortation unto the heads of papists and to these ringleaders of Protestants whereby they may bend
or bow each other to one peaceable rule and to one charitable concordance in matters touching religion," the better to "turn their
swords of contention into peaceable plowshares." 6 Barlee thus expanded to fantastic proportions the humanist trope that education
fostered social harmony, skirting close to the parodic as Catholic and
Protestant, lord and tenant, and master and servant found the
straight path in the lawbook's lines.
Viewing lawbooks as a foundation for informed obedience and
peacefulness was not simply a way of making the legal press the servant of widely shared values. It also hinted at how lawbooks could further the important Tudor political objective of strengthening royal
justice against local and seigniorial rivals. The sixteenth-century ex24 The

Manorial Society's 1911 imprint of Barlee's Concordanceis a reproduction of

the copy in the State Papers Domestic, Elizabeth 12/123/14.
25 Letter from William Barlee to William Cecil, supra note 23. Like other humanists, Barlee championed not print per se, but "common knowledge in laws," which
meant both translating and publishing rules "obscurely hid" in law French manuscripts.
BARLEE, supra note 21, at 38, 43.
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pansion of the common law and royal justice in the counties was a
cultural as well as ajurisdictional and administrative project. Lawyers,
humanist educators, and the Crown united in championing law as an
art proper to a gentleman, in part to appropriate the prestige of the
armigerous classes for the law and the lawyers, in part to refashion the
aristocracy as a governing rather than a military elite while the War of
the Roses haunted the Tudors' long memory, and in part to inspire
the local gentry to serve responsibly as justices of the peace and on
royal commissions. Sir Humphrey Gilbert's model academy for the
education of Queen Elizabeth's wards included legal lectures within
the curriculum of classical languages, philosophy, and rhetoric.
Gilbert charged the lawyer-tutor with reducing the law into maxims
"for the more facile teaching of his auditory" and publishing a book
on the common law every six years Humfrey Braham saw the legally
literate peer and gentleman upholding the cardinal virtue of justice
through wise governance as the successor to the chivalric knight. The
law became their weapon and shield, excellence in its study and use
an honor worth winning and a mark of the "true nobility" of merit
over lineage.28
In teaching peers and gentry the duties and political etiquette of
governance, legal publication promised to make them more willing to
subordinate local interests to the king's law. Rastell claimed that
knowledge of a "good reasonable common law" enforced by "one
good governor" could bring "divers and much people to one good
unity," restraining the "divers rulers and governors, and divers orders
and laws, one contrary to another" jostling throughout England. For
when "every governor will have the law after his mind," it "brings one
multitude of people to variance and division."2 Putting legal dissemination at the service of national authority in the localities was a
favorite tactic of Elizabethan and early Stuart would-be statutory redactors. Elizabeth's Lord Keeper Nicholas Bacon and James I's Attorney General Edward Coke, to pick two examples, both advocated a
trimmed-down and clarified printed compilation of the statutes on
the grounds that the obscurity encouraged lawbreaking and disregard
SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT, QUEEN ELIzABETH's ACADEMY 6, 9 (F.J. Furnivall ed.,

1869) (MS, between 1562 and 1583).
See HUMFREY BRAHAM, THE INSTITUTION OF A GENTLEMAN at Biiii, Civ-Ciii, Eiii
(1568) (1555). This theme continued into the early Stuart period. See JAMES
CLELAND, THE INSTRUCTION OF A YOUNG NOBLEMAN 95-97, 144-46 (1612) (lay legal
study as preparation for governance and attainment of "true nobility").
29 RAsTELL, supra note 16, reprinted in THOUGHT AND CULTURE, supra note 11, at
176, 176-78.
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for authority.Y Braham's defense of legal literacy among the gentry
included a reminder from Plato to "conserve and keep together all
the whole body of the commonwealth, not maintaining some part
thereof and to suffer the rest to fall to decay."3 ' So long as statute and
common law primarily signified agents of national authority against
local and seigneurial resistance, legal publication could represent itself as an agent of royal power and state-building (or more accurately,
kingdom-building). By the turn of the seventeenth century, when the
role of statute and common law as constraints on royal prerogative
came to the fore, the alliance became harder to maintain, particularly
when absolutists expanded the claims of secrecy over "publicity" in
statecraft (as we shall see in Parts III.B and IV).
Rastell, Taverner, Phaer, Pulton, and Barlee-for want of a better
term, the "Rastellians'---not only identified social and political values
that the legal press supposedly furthered. They inaugurated a style of
apologetic writing that hid artful assumptions and elisions under a
studied surface naivet6. The Rastellians legitimated the press by emphasizing its continuities with prior forms of legal communication.
Ferdinand Pulton's Abstract of all the Penal Statutes (1560) placed law

printing within an ongoing pedagogical tradition that ran from the
Romans' display of the tables of their law in the open places of their
cities, through the Israelites' writing of commandments on their gates
and doorposts, through the oral declamation of English ordinances at
assizes, sessions, and leets.32

This technically superior form of dis-

seminating law was not a particularly transformative, hopeful, or
Age-old rationales for popular legal
threatening development.3
Bacon engaged in a decades-long effort to eliminate redundancies, obsolete
provisions, and confusing partial repeals and amendments from the penal statutes,
hoping to set a well-organized, printed version of them before a confused public, lest
England close its "laws in fair books or rolls and.., lay them up safe without seeing
them executed." 1 PROCEEDINGS IN THE PARLIAMENTS OF ELIZABETH I, 1558-1581, at
191, 49, 464 (T.E. Hartley ed., 1981) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS 1558-1581]. For examples of Bacon's repeated appeals to Parliament to reorganize the statutes, see id. at
49,82-84, 111-12, 171,183, 189-93, 464-65. Coke declared that printing"one plain and
perspicuous law divided into articles" would teach subjects "how much is of them in
force, and how to obey them." EDWARD COKE, Prefaceto REPORTS, pt. 4, at ix-x (1826
ed.) (1604).
31 BRAHAM, supra note 28, at
Cii.
32 See PULTON, Prefaceto ABSTRACT, supra note 20.

'sI do not claim that the writers under discussion (Rastell, Taverner, St. German,
Pulton, Barlee, and so forth) stood together as a group in other contexts, for instance,
in the polemical contests over the Henrician Reformation. I gather them here only as
advocates of legal publication.
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pedagogy justified the new mechanical voice. Subjects could not obey
rules they did not know; they could not live peacefully without legal
boundaries; they improved character as they learned law and directed
conduct towards its demands. 1 These were arguments that in large
part could be, and were, used in medieval and classical manuscript
legal cultures.
In large part, but not entirely. For the Rastellian appeal for the
legal press displayed some emphases and inflections particular to its
time and purpose. To begin with, it understood legal publication
more as an unveiling than a promulgation. The difference is subtle,
but revealing. One promulgates a law made for the first time, or imposed in a new place, or perhaps taught to a new generation. The
Rastellians, by contrast, imagined print unlocking a law hidden away,
continually driving back the boundaries of ignorance-a familiar
humanist and early Protestant image.35 Calling for emulation, they
saw themselves as part of an ongoing and accelerating program of legal education for the public. Taverner hoped that his Institutions
would encourage skilled writers to instruct the "whole community of
this land" in the law. 6 St. German offered Doctor and Student "not
merely for instruction, but still more to incite others to collect and
put into writing additional cases in English law." 7
Yet unlike the humanists and Protestants whose rhetoric of disclosure they borrowed, the Rastellians lacked a reformist temper. Thomas Starkey, Thomas Elyot, the young Thomas More, and the early
As with much Renaissance thought, one can find classical and medieval antecedents for most elements, if not for the overall configuration. That subjects must know
the rules they are supposed to obey, for example, was an ancient theme, one forcefully
expressed in the medieval Statute of Pleading of 1362. The statute mandated English
as the language of pleading and argument in the King's courts on the grounds that
the laws and customs "shall be perceived and known, and better understood in the
tongue used in the said [English] realm, and by so much every man of the said realm
may the better govern himself without offending of the law." DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE
LANGUAGE OF THE LAw 111 (1963) (citing 36 Edw. III, Stat. I, ch. 15 (1362)). Written
law (as opposed to custom, oral tradition, or the whim of princes) had long been cast
as a guardian of social peace, a role that printed law could appropriate with only a minor rhetorical sleight of hand. See JOHN BRITTON, BRITTON: AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES 1 (Francis Morgan Nichols trans., 1901) (MS, c.1300).
- On the importance humanists attached to the dissemination of "sound knowledge," see FERGUSON, supra note 9, at 169; 1 SKINNER, supra note 9, at 195-96; MARGO
34

TODD, CHRISTIAN HUMANISM AND THE PURITAN SOCIAL ORDER 43-52 (1987).
See TAVERNER, Peroration,in INSTITUTION IN THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note
20; TAVERNER, Preface to THE PRINCIPAL LAWS AND STATUTES OF ENGLAND NEWLY

RECOGNIZED AND AUGMENTED, supra note 20, at iiv.
s%ST. GERMAN, supra note 19, at 3.
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English Protestants had married tutelage in philosophy, arts, and
Scripture to programs of social or spiritual amelioration.ss Legal publication, as the Rastellians advocated it, was not intended to help subjects diagnose social ills and offer remedies. It beckoned no challenge to the pretensions of power or to economic exploitation. It
promised no betterment of the law itself according to a progressive
model (a push toward a higher state) or a restorative model (a stripping away of impurities and return to a lost excellence). Lawbooks
might improve society by restraining overreaching as subjects became
better aware of their appointed boundaries and duties, knowledge
breeding the virtuous action requisite for harmony. But this was education into a preexisting, preemptively good order-the stratified
harmony longed for by Barlee and the public pronouncements of
Tudor authorities-not education as a precondition to reform of that
order. In so doing, the Rastellians avoided the characteristic humanist challenge of squaring reform with social stability."
Casting legal dissemination as a friend to order was no invention
of the print age, but the notoriety of the press in stoking sixteenthcentury religious and political strife made the task essential to the
Rastellians. 40 To be sure, lawbooks posed less of a danger than the re38This is, of course, a question of degree. I exclude St. German from the generalization.
3' On the commonwealth ideal and the importance to English humanists of the
educated citizen offering reforms, see FERGUSON,supra note 9; 1 SKINNER, supra note
9, at 213-28; CASPARI, supra note 9, at 32-49; J. W. ALLEN, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL
THOUGHT IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 134-56 (1941). On the importance of reconciling simultaneous commitments to reform, stability, and obedience to constituted
authority, see 1 SKINNER, supranote 9, at 229, 235-36; FERGUSON, supra note 9, at 36768.
0 Rastell's generation watched printed propaganda fuel the Continental
Protestant Reformation, the German Peasants' War, and the Henrician Reformation. Their
successors experienced the polemical campaigns accompanying the risings of 1536
and 1549, and the regime changes from the Protestant Edward VI to the Catholic Mary
to the Protestant Elizabeth. The power of print to undermine hierarchy and inflame
dissension as readily as reinforce order had become commonplace by the middle sixteenth century. Englishmen ironically linked two great Renaissance inventions, print
and gunpowder, in their shared explosiveness. "And, better to effect a speedy
end,/Let there be found two fatal Instruments,/The one to publish, th'other to defend/Impious Contention, and proud Discontents." SAMUEL DANIEL, THE CIVIL WARS
bk.6, 216 1 37 (Laurence Michel ed., 1958) (1609); see also GABRIEL HARVEY'S
MARGINALIA 109 (G.C. Moore Smith ed., 1913); William Camden, Printing (MS,
c.1590s), reprintedin R. D. Dunn, Fragmentof an Unpublished Essay on Printingby William
Camden, 12 BRIT. LIBR. J. 145, 147 (1986). Statutes, royal proclamations, and the Tudor homilies rued and rebuked the disputatiousness and schism unleashed by Scriptural publication. See, e.g., An Act for Abolishing of Diversity of Opinions in Certain
Articles Concerning Christian Religion, 31 Henry VIII, ch. 14 (1539); Proclamation
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ligious printing tearing apart Europe. Unlike the bishops, the lawyers
faced no foreign or underground press. No dissident translations of
the statutes set sail from Worms and Geneva; no nonconformist yearbooks and treatises slid off presses hidden in London basements and
country homes, vying with the official books for influence. The Bible
and religious pamphlets engaged a larger stratum of the population
with emotional urgency than legal works masked by French, Latin,
and terms of art. Still, printed lawbooks made dissent more formidable. They did not so much create social cleavages as provide intellectual and political resources to local magnates and other rivals of royal
justice, enabling them to mount more sophisticated legal challenges.4 '
The Rastellians relied on three question-begging forensic strategies to reassure Courtly and professional readers suspicious of the
press. First, they attributed to consumers of lawbooks a particular
psychology of reading to obscure how legal publication could bring
critical appraisal and tactical manipulation. By making the hiddenness of law the deprivation that the legal press overcame, they could
covertly appropriate the Erasmian and early Protestant trope that the
disclosure of Scripture (and by implication law) pulled the soul toLimiting Exposition and Reading of Scripture (1539), in 1 TUDOR ROYAL PROCLA ATIONS 1485-1603, at 284, 284-86 (Paul L. Hughes & James F. Larkin eds., 1964)
(contrasting the "virtuous living and godliness" expected from vernacular Scriptural
publication with the ensuing unrest and factions); Hugh Latimer, A Sermon Against
Contention and Brawling (1547), in CERTAIN SERMONS OR HOMILIES APPOINTED TO BE
READ IN CHURCHES IN THE TIME OF QUEEN ELIZABETH I, at 89, 89-98 (1968)
[hereinafter CERTAIN SERMONS OR HOMILIES].

Rastell himself began suggesting how legal publishing helped political stability and
national unity in the middle 1520s in his Expositiones Terminorum Legum Anglorum (c.

1525), published as the dissension unleashed by Continental religious pamphleteering
and Scriptural translation preoccupied Henry VIII's government. Throughout the
1520s, Henry's government fought to seal off England from Lutheran tracts imported
from Europe, seizing and burning them. William Tyndale's English translation of the
New Testament (1525), a work heavily influenced by Luther's German text, set off a new
round of confiscations and public conflagrations. The pressure continued to build for
the next two years as Wolsey strained to demonstrate English orthodoxy while his negotiations with Rome over Henry's divorce entered a delicate phase. Rastell had personal or professional connections with several of the principals involved in the suppression of books. He served as one of the, lawyers evaluating Chancery bills for
Chancellor Wolsey; he knew Wolsey's aide Thomas Cromwell from the late 1510s,
when Cromwell played bowls at his house; and he was the brother-in-law of Thomas
More. See CHRISTOPHER HAIGH, ENGLISH REFORMATIONS:

RELIGION, POLITICS, AND

SOCIETY UNDER THE TUDORS 57-67 (1993); REED, supra note 12, at 160-85; GERITZ &
LAINE, supra note 12, at 19-21;JOHN GUY, TUDOR ENGLAND 154 (1988).
41

On Henry VIII's conflicts with the church and "overmighty subjects," see 2 THE

REPORTS OF SIRJOHN SPELMAN, supra note 20, at 64-68; G.R. ELTON, ENGLAND UNDER

THE TUDORS 82, 102-07 (1974).
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wards godliness and virtuous living-vernacular publication as a lesser
form of personal revelation. The echo was faint, but the theme was
there, audible in Barlee's almost evangelical phrasing: to put printed
law before the multitude's "own eyes" will suffuse them with "loving
obedience" and "subdue their hearts... to one accord."2 This profoundly evasive strategy tacitly figured the reader, to continue the religious metaphor, as in a state of grace rather than sin. Forjust as the
elect's understanding of the Word brought not localist politics or
pursuit of individual advantage but unity in the universal Christ, so
legal publication promised inculcation into the pedeia of the national
commonwealth.
Second, with this psychology of reading in the background,
Rastellians labored to show fusions, not trade-offs, among the various
ends served by legal publication. Might legal publishing reduce lawyers' income by draining away profitable counseling resting on con-

trol of legal knowledge? Might it heighten rather than reduce strife
by providing the lawyer with better tools for serving his client at the

expense of truth and neighborliness? Rastell addressed both worries
by depicting lawbooks as an introductory tutor to the conscientious

reader, a starting point. But when uncertainties or lawsuits arose, the
good subject should
resort to some man, that is learned in the laws of this realm, to have his
counsel in such points, which he thinks doubtful concerning these said
statutes, by the knowledge whereof, and by the diligent observing of the
same, he may the better do his duty to his prince and sovereign, and
also live in tranquillity and peace with his neighbor, according to the
pleasure and commandment of almighty God.4
Publication, Rastell assured his readers, furthered professional and
lay legal education, loyalty to God's word, obedience to the prince,
neighborliness, social peace, and political unity. The deep sixteenth-

42 BARLEE,

supra note 21, at 30. This rhetoric was also popular among statutes,

proclamations, homilies, and book prefacesjustifying Scriptural and religious publica-

tion under government auspices, a matter of speaking in a voice of aspiration while
averting the eyes from other statutes, proclamations, and prefaces condemning the
interpretive discord, murmuring, and railing unleashed by printed Bibles and sermons. See, e.g., An Act for the Translating of the Bible and Divine Service into the
Welsh Tongue, 5 Eliz., ch. 28 (1562) (translating the Bible and Book of Common

Prayer into Welsh will teach that land to "better learn to love and fear God, to serve
and obey their prince, and to know their duties towards their neighbors"); Preface to
CERTAIN SERMONS OR HOMILIEs APPOINTED TO BE READ IN CHURCHES [xv] (1562 ed.),
rep7inted in CERTAIN SERMONS OR HOMILIES, supranote 40.

'sRASTELL,supranote

13, reprintedin Graham, supranote 13, at 97, 97-98.
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century conflicts between God's word and the prince's, between the
prosperity of the bar and neighborly aversion to litigation, between
the drive for national unification and the preservation of local order,
faded from view as Rastell's anodyne prefaces placed law printing in a
unified-field theorem of harmony.
Third, the widely-shared Renaissance assumption of an imperfect
correspondence between heavenly and earthly governance tacitly enlisted the lawbook on the side of order. Rastell assumed that chaos,
an undirected multiplicity, impended in both nature and human society unless kept at bay by law, which brought and sustained harmony.
Just as the natural world depended on the "law of nature which compels every thing to do his kind," so the commonwealth, teeming with
multitudes of people "fragile and prone and ready to vice," could not
"continue in unity and peace" without positive law. 4 Since promulgation and dissemination were necessary conditions to the operation of
law, legal publication appeared order-reinforcing. Not logic, but
connotation made the argument work. The emotional impact of linking law so strongly to both cosmic and political order mitigated
against seeing the dangers of faction and litigiousness that publication threatened.
The humanist defense of legal publishing that the Rastellians
pioneered, with its characteristic emphases and elisions, recurred into
the early seventeenth century. Lawbook prefaces, governmental publication programs, even poetry continued to support widespread vernacular legal publication directed at an educated populace in order
to tutor subjects in virtue and advance the common good of the realm
or the "commonweal" (usually gestured at without further elaboration).45 The Rastellian influence survived in the inflection of these
" The c.1525 and 1527 versions of Rastell's preface to the Expositiones differ
slightly. I have drawn quotations from both. The c.1525 version is reproduced in
THOUGHT AND CULTURE, supra note 11, at 176, 176-78; the 1527 version can be found
in 1JOSEPH AMES, TYPOGRAPHICALANTIQUmES 331, 331-32 (1785).
45 See, e.g., R.F. & J.D., Preface to JAMES DYER, LES REPORTS DES DIVERS SELECT
MATTERS & RESOLUTIONS DES REVEREND JUDGES & SAGES DEL LEY (1672 ed.) (1585);
JOHN MANWOOD, To the Reader, in A TREATISE AND DIsCOURSE OF THE LAWS OF THE
FOREST [5] (1598); RICHARD CROMPTON, L'AUTHORITIE ETJURISDICTION DES COURTES
(1594); FULKE GREVIJ.E, A Treatise ofMonarchy, verses 259-61 (MS c.1600-1610), in THE
REMAINS: BEING POEMS OF MONARCHY AND RELIGION 100 (G.A. Wilkes ed., 1965);
EDWARD COKE, Prefaceto REPORTS, pt 1, at xxix (1826 ed.) (1600); Printerto the Reader,
in NICHOLAS FULLER, THE ARGUMENT OF MASTER NICHOLAS FULLER IN THE CASE OF
THOMAS LAD AND RICHARD MAUNSELL [2] (1607); THOMAS POWELL, To the Reader, in
THE ATTORNEY'S ACADEMY [11] (1623) [hereinafter POWELL, THE ATTORNEY'S
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appeals: their support for a continuing and expanding publication
program; their lack of overt reformist ambition; their linkage of law
printing to national unity and social harmony; and their unwillingness to consider the countervailing social consequences of the legal
press. The humanist celebration of the political vita activa and the
Crown's need to recruit "governors" in the counties enforcing national law-the context that gave rise to the Rastellian defense of law
printing-continued into the early Stuart years.46 But as Parts II, III,
and IV of this Article will suggest, however, the latter sixteenth century's episcopal campaign against nonconformity, "politique" suspicion of the compatibility of learning and order, and stirrings of absolutism wore away at the optimism about printed legal pedagogy that
the Rastellians expressed.
B. Protestantism

Protestants' celebration of themselves as the party of enlightenment against Catholic darkness and their respect for print's role in
advancing the Reformation provided the legal press important, but
indirect and qualified, support. However much Protestant ministers
joined government officials in complaining about printers' poor
judgment, "licentiousness," and unseemly profit-seeking, the press enjoyed in their eyes a lasting prestige won in disseminating vernacular
Bibles and religious tracts through decades of confessional struggle.
ACADEMY]; T.N., Commendation, in POWELL, THE ATTORNEY'S ACADEMY, supra, at [10];
I.L., Prefaceto THE LAW'S RESOLUTIONS OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS [AS] (1632); R. PoWELL,
Epistle Dedicatory, in A TREATISE OF THE ANTIQUITY, AUTHORITY, USES AND JURISDICTION OF THE ANCIENT COURTS OF LEET (1641). Two other popular justifications
for printing law should be noted. First, it allowed men and women to avoid penalties,
since ignorance of the law was no excuse. See, e.g., To theReader,inMANWOOD, supra, at
[5]; EDWARD COKE, Proemium, in THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 2 (1628) [hereinafter COKE, FIRST INSITUTE]; William Hughes, The Translator to the Reader, in THE BOOK CALLED, THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES: MADE BY ANDREW
HORNE at A3 (William Hughes trans., 1646) [hereinafter MIRROR OF JUSTICES]. Second, it instructed officials and subjects in their duties. See, e.g., To the Reader, in A
COLLECTION OF THE LAWs ... CONCERNING LIVERIES OF COMPANIES AND RETAINERS
[3]-[4] (1571); K- POWELL, Epistle Dedicatory, supra. Manuals for local legal officials,
who were often laymen, commonly stressed this theme. See, e.g., WILLIAM LAMBARDE,
Epistle to EIRENARCHA: OR THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICES OF PEACE (1970) (1581);
MICHAEL DALTON, Epistle to THE COUNTRYJUSTICE (1618); MICHAEL DALTON, Preface
to OFFICIUM VICECOMrrUM (1623); WILLIAM SHEPPARD, THE OFFICES AND DUTIES OF
CONSTABLES (1641).
46 On the continuities of and challenges to humanism in Elizabethan and early
Stuart England, see, respectively, MARKKU PELTONEN, CLASSICAL HUMANISM AND
REPUBLICANISM IN ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1570-1640 (1995); TODD, supra note
35.
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The Bible translator William Tyndale and John Foxe's immensely influential Acts and Monuments [The Book of Martyrs] (1563) offered
two of the most famous testaments to the "divine and miraculous invention of printing" for carrying forward God's true word against Papal resistance, convincing "darkness by light, error by truth, ignorance by learning."47 Elizabeth Eisenstein has aptly observed that
Protestant ministers viewed "printing as a providential device which
ended forever a priestly monopoly of learning,. . . pushed back the

evil forces commanded by Italian popes, and, in general, brought
Europe out of the dark ages." The partly real, partly stereotyped
Catholic suspicion of the press offered a convenient foil for Protestant
self-congratulation. For in comparison to the Tridentine Catholic
Church, reformed religion did exercise a lighter hand in censorship
literacy,
and offered greater support for vernacular Bibles, 4popular
8
and unsupervised lay study of Scripture and theology.

Lawyers turned to their own purposes the series of stark contrasts
that Protestants drew between their reforms and supposed Catholic
reaction. To its friends, the Protestant faith stood for an open vernacular Scripture, knowledge, light, informed liberty, and rationality;
Catholicism meant a hidden, Latin Scripture, ignorance, darkness,
tyranny, mystification, and superstition.49 This habit of seeing the
"bright beams of heavenly truth" driving back the "mists and clouds"
of popish darkness and superstition migrated from religious to legal

" 3 JOHN FoxE, ACTS AND MONUMENTs 718-19 (1965) (1563) ("How many printing presses there be in the world, so many block-houses there be against the high castle of St. Angelo, so that either the pope must abolish knowledge and printing or
printing at length will root him out."). See generally id. at 718-22; 4 id. at 252-53.
William Tyndale claimed that Catholics
be all agreed, to drive you from the knowledge of the scripture, and that ye
shall not have the text thereof in the mother-tongue, and to keep the world
still in darkness, to the intent they might sit in the consciences of the people,
through vain superstition and false doctrine.
William Tyndaie, The Prefaceof Master William Tyndale, That He Made Before the Five Books
of Moses, Called Genesis (1530), in DOCTRINAL TREATISES AND INTRODUCTIONS TO
DIFFERENT PORTIONS OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES 390-93 (Henry Waiter ed., 43 Parker
Soc'y Publications 1848). On the widespread influence of Foxe, see WILLIAM HALER,
THE ELECT NATION: THE MEANING AND RELEVANCE OF FoxE's BOOK OF MARTRS 220-

27 (1963).
4s See EISENSEIN, supra note 4, at 305, 355, 426; Paul F. Grendler, Printingand Censorship, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY 25, 45-51 (Charles B.
Schmitt et al. eds., 1988).
4 See Peter Lake, Anti-popery:
The Structure of a Prudice, in CONFLICT IN EARLY
STUART ENGLAND: STUDIES IN RELIGION AND POLITICS, 1603-1642, at 72, 75-77
(Richard Cust & Ann Hughes eds., 1989).
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polemic.s Abraham Fraunce of Gray's Inn praised seekers of the
"reason of law," opposing them to Catholics who "believed as the
Church believed, but why the church believed so, it never came
within the compass of their cogitation."1 Were not Catholics to
blame for obscurantism in law? John Hales's "Oration in Commendation of Laws" (MS, c.1540) asked why
if it be so necessary to have the principles and maxims of the law gathered together and written, then will you say why has it not been done
this many years? ... Master Dunce [that is, the schoolman] and his disciples in all sermons and exhortations that they had in times past to the
people, used to outcry upon [the] lawyer and to blaspheme and condemn man's law as a thing most execrable .... By this.., they alienated
divers good wits from the study of the law .... This Ijudge to be one of
the causes that the laws of this realm be not so set forth as the civil laws
must be. 2

In reinforcing the disseminationist bias generated by humanism

and creating an intellectual climate favorable to legal publishing,
Protestantism was a symbolic more than a confessional category. Proponents of making law accessible through translation and printing
styled their opponents as Papists irrespective of actual religious professions. In the 1530s, for example, Thomas Starkey likened legal to
Scriptural translation, implicitly denigrating law French as a form of
Roman mystification. 3 Forty-five years later, William Barlee compared the arguments against printing law in the vernacular to those
" 4
advanced "by old men for the suppressing of the English Scriptures. 5

'0 The lawyer Henry Finch, in the heat of his youthful puritanism, traced the
.corruptions" of English law to the pre-Reformation "popish and Antichristian" tyranny, adding:
So the Lord having in mercy dispersed those mists and clouds of darkness by
the bright beams of his heavenly truth, it were to be desired that together with
the banishment of their [the Catholic hierarchy's] superstitions, the very
names and remembrance of them were also defaced and sent back into the
bottomless pit of hell.
HENRY FINCH, A CONFERENCE AND REFORMATION OF THE SAME LAW BY THE LAWv OF

GOD (MS, before 1586) (Bodleian Library, Rawlinson MS C 43, fols. 2-3 (bound with
Nomotexnia)). On Finch's religious views, see Wilfrid Prest, The Dialectical Origins of
Finch's Law, 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 326 (1977); Wilfrid R_ Prest, The Art of Law and the Law
of God: Sir Henry Finch, in PURITANS AND REVOLUTIONARIES: ESSAYS IN SEVENTEENTHCENTURY HISTORY PRESENTED TO CHRISTOPHER HILL 94, 94 (Donald Pennington &

Keith Thomas eds., 1978).
5' Abraham Fraunce, Dedication to THE LAWYER'S LOGIC

1 2 (1969) (1588).
supranote 16, at MS LC 14:32.1, fol. 16v-17r.
5" See STARKEY, supra note 17, at 129.
" Letter from William Barlee to William Cecil, supra note 23.
52 HALES,
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In the midst of the Civil War, over 120 years after Starkey, William
Sheppard and Bulstrode Whitelocke were still tilting with the useful if
shadowy Papists. "It was Romish policy," said Whitelocke in the 1650
Parliament, to keep the English people "in ignorance of matters pertaining to their souls' health; let them not be in ignorance of matters
pertaining to their bodies, estates, and all their worldly comfort."5
Lawyers pushed the trope so far as to find ersatz popes in unlikely
places. The anonymous author of Directionsfor the Orderly Reading of
the Law of England (MS, c.1648) linked King Henry III's suppression
of law study in London with the "Pope's prohibiting the Bible much
to the same end, to keep men ignorant and wholly depend[ent] on
them for knowledge." 6
In a more roundabout way, reformed religion supported legal
publication by generating interest in the pedagogical "method" of
French logician Peter Ramus, popular among hot Protestants in the
Elizabethan universities. Ramus offered a system for organizing
knowledge in epitomes proceeding from the most general propositions of an art down to the most particular via a process of bipartite
division. Of the numerous Renaissance peddlers of organizational
schemes for teaching and remembering, Ramus made the greatest

5 Bulstrode Whitelocke, Speech to Parliament in Support of the Bill Turning
Lawbooks andJudicial Proceedings into English (1650), in 3 BULSTRODEWHITELOCKE,
MEMORIALS OF THE ENGLISH AFFAIRS 260, 272 (1853); see WILLIAM SHEPPARD, THE
TOUCHSTONE OF COMMON ASSURANCES A5 (1648). The identification of opponents of

translation with Catholics was a common trope. In the 1614 comedy Ignoramus, the
bumbling, pretentious common lawyer Sir Ignoramus enjoyed speaking in the
"unknown tongue" of his broken Latin rather than in English. Another character likened him to a "popish priest." R. RUGGLE, IGNORAMUS 54, act 2, sc. 6 (Robert
Coddrington trans., 1662). Translators of medical texts also tarred opponents as
"Papists." See, e.g., EISENSTEIN, supra note 4, at 362.
DIRECnoNS FOR THE ORDERLY READING OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND (MS, c.1648)
(Bodleian Library, Rawlinson MS C 207, fols. 245-46).
In the spirit of reformed religion's eagerness to find Scriptural precedent for current policies, lawyers also cited Biblical verses in support of vernacular publication.
"Moses read all the laws openly before the people in their mother tongue," noted
Whitelocke. "God directed him to write it, and to expound it to the people in their
own native language; that what concerned their lives, liberties, and estates, might be
made known unto them in the most perspicuous way." Whitelocke, supra note 55, in 3
WHITELOCKE, supra note 55, at 272-73. Balee reasoned that the Scriptural injunction
to magistrates to "make plain paths for their people to walk in" meant that the
"express word of God" required "common knowledge in law" through English law
printing. Letter from William Barlee to William Cecil, supra note 23. Such Scripturalist arguments were, of course, no monopoly of Protestants.
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impact on the English universities and the study of English law.57 He
particularly appealed to the more determined and vigorous English
Protestants. His celebrated death in the St. Bartholomew massacre of
1572-in the Protestant view, his martyrdom-recommended him.
So did his stripped-down dialectical system. It promised to reduce
any body of knowledge to an easily taught and memorized epitome
capable of reproduction on the printed page without the visually arresting, irreverent, or even pornographic images that the classical
"Art of Memory" used to fix information in the mind. By relying on
an "imageless dialectical order," Ramus promised, in Frances Yates's
telling phrase, an "inner iconoclasm" of the mind compatible with
Protestant "outer iconoclasm," their sweeping away of religious pageantry and Scholastic clutter.!
Ramist logic spread through the English universities in the latter
sixteenth century and continued with somewhat less vigor into the
next, touching lawyers and students en route to the Inns of Court 5 9
Three generations of English legal writers drew on it from Abraham
Fraunce's The Lawyer's Logic (1588), through the pedagogical works of
William Fulbecke, A Direction or Preparative to the Study of the Law
(1600), and John Dodderidge, The English Lawyer (1631), through
synoptic overviews of the law by Henry Finch, Law or a Discourse Thereof
(1627), and Edmund Wingate, The Body of the Common Law of England
(1655), through the numerous publications of William Sheppard
from the 1640s to the 1670s.
Ramists were generally leery of confining knowledge within mysteries and behind walls of contempt for the intellectual capacities of
readers. A pedagogic tool born in the academic classroom, Ramist

17 See NEAL W. GILBERT, RENAISSANCE CONCEPTS OF METHOD 72-73,
95-96, 129-44
(1960); KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE, supra note 18, at 209-13.
See FRANCES A. YATES, THE ART OF MEMORY 231-41, 234-35, 237 (1966); see also
WILBUR SAMUEL HOWELL, LOGIC AND RHETORIC IN ENGLAND, 1500-1700, at 146-233
(1956); WALTERJ. ONG, RAMUS: METHOD, AND THE DECAY OF DIALOGUE 167-68, 194-

95, 227-28 (1958).
'9 See HOWELL, supranote 58, at 7, 146-233; WILFRID R. PREST, THE INNS OF COURT
UNDER ELIZABETH I AND THE EARLY STUARTS, 1590-1640, at 137-49 (1972); Louis A.
Knafla, Ramism and the English Renaissance, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND CULTURE IN
HISTORICAL PERSPEcIVE 26, 26-50 (Louis A. Knafla et al. eds., 1976); Louis A. Knafla,
The Influence of Continental Humanists and Jurists on English Common Law in the Renaissance, in ACrA CONVENTUS NEO-LATINI BONONIENSIS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF NEO-LATIN STUDIES 60, 60-71 (R.J. Schoeck ed., 1985);
David J. Seipp, The Structure of English Common Law in the Seventeenth Century, in LEGAL
HISTORY IN THE MAKING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY
CONFERENCE GLASGOW 1989, at 61, 61-83 (W.M. Gordon & T.D. Fergus eds., 1991).
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method promised the rapid and effective imparting of any art or science to unspecialized audiences.0 Its practitioners appropriated the
Protestant and humanist championing of enlightenment over ignorance as part of its appeal. Roland MacIlmaine's 1574 translation of
Ramus's logic invoked "the duty of all Christians... to labor by all
means, that they may profit and aid their brethren, and to hide or
keep secret nothing, which they know may bring great utility to the
commonwealth." The "envious... think it not decent to write any
liberal art in the vulgar tongue," a "mischievous opinion" that did
"great hurt... to the Church of God." 6' Abraham Fraunce, expounding on Ramus's logic through the use of legal materials in The Lawyer's Logic (1588), depicted the resentments of academics who had
come to look upon philosophy as a proprietary guardianship bestowed on only a select few. His vehicle was a "raging and fireyfaced
Aristotelian":
Hereby it comes to pass that every cobbler can cog a syllogism, every carter crake of propositions. Hereby is logic profaned, and lies prostitute,
removed out of her sanctuary, robbed of her honor, left of her lovers,
ravished of strangers, and made common to all, which before was
proper to schoolmen, and only consecrated to philosophers.62

Fraunce replied to his foe: "Cobblers be men, why therefore not logicians? And carters have reason, why therefore not logic?" Logic does
not become "less commendable, because it is more common," and it
should not be locked up in "secret comers."3 Historians' concentration on Ramism's impact on the structure of legal literature perhaps
obscured the social values Ramism conveyed that favored legal publication in the first place: in particular, its blurring of the boundary between "professional" and "lay" knowledges through its self-promotion
as a universal teaching method applicable to any art or discipline; its
mitigation of traditional disdain for the "vulgar" mind; and its humanist confidence in the social consequences of broad dissemination
of the arts and philosophy. Lawbooks touched by Ramism tended
disproportionately to be written in English and to envision a broad
audience of laymen as well as lawyers.

See HoWELL, supra note 58, at 192, 201; ONG, supranote 58, at 167, 171, 194-96,
228.

"1Epistle to the Reader, in THE LOGIC OF THE Mosr EXCELLENT PHILOSOPHER P.
RAiuS MARTMR 7, 15 (Roland MacIlmaine trans., 1574).
62 FRAUNCE,Prefac4 supranote
63 Id.

51, 11 2b-3a.
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Yet the relationship of Protestantism to the legal press was not direct and untroubled and calls out for cautions and reservations. First,
some skepticism is in order about treating Protestant polemic as a
meaningful cause-as opposed to justification-of increasing legal
publication. In Continental Europe, the period from 1500 to 1630
saw a surge of law printing in both Catholic and Protestant areas
alike, as in England. Lawbooks offered in the biennial catalogues of
the Frankfurt Book Fair doubled in absolute numbers between 15701590 and 1600-1620. The growth in the population of law students,
in the size of state bureaucracies, in lay literacy, and in the number of
lawsuits heard by national courts (in England) and courts applying
learned law (in Europe) drove up demand for printed lawbooks.
These were forces operating across confessional boundaries. In Germany, for example, both Reformation Protestants and CounterReformation Catholics opened universities that took in the swelling
mass of law students. 6' Within England, the depiction of Catholicism
as a proxy for ignorance and darkness in Protestant diatribes suggests
little about the relative support of Catholic and Protestant lawyers for
the legal press. In particular, one is hard-pressed to correlate Catholic lawyers with resistance to law printing and Protestant lawyers with
enthusiasm. Some of the most distinguished figures responsible for
legal publishing were Catholics, including the printer William Rastell,
the statutory compiler Ferdinand Pulton, and the reporter Edmund
Plowden. Most of the critics of law printing around the turn of the
seventeenth century were Protestants.'
Second, English lawyers seldom pointed to the edification of conscience, a staple of Protestant argumentation, as a reason for printing
law. Barlee provides a rare counterexample. He thought that printed

See IAN MACLEAN, INTERPRETATION AND MEANING IN THE RENAISSANCE: THE
CASE OF LAW 19-20 (1992); Steven Rowan,Juristsand the PrintingPress in Germany: The

First Centuy, in PRINT AND CULTURE IN THE RENAISSANCE 74, 74-77 (Gerald P. Tyson &
Sylvia S. Wagonheim eds., 1986).
For identification of Rastell, Pulton, and Plowden as Catholics, see, respectively,
HowardJay Graham, The Rastells and the PrintedEnglish Law Book of the Renaissance,47L.
LIBR.J. 6, 12-13 (1954); PREST, supra note 59, at 179; 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at
309 (7th ed. 1956).
Most English lawyers, of course, were Protestants. A government survey commissioned by Lord Keeper Nicholas Bacon in 1577 found 180 Catholics within the Inns of
Court, about 20% of the membership, though most of these eventually demonstrated
their orthodoxy. Repression by the Inns and the government in the latter sixteenth
century reduced the numbers and visibility of Catholics within the law. By century's
end, they were a small minority with little influence on the governance of the Inns. See
PREST, supra note 59, at 175-76, 186.
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lawbooks cultivated an informed conscience, the foundation of social
order, thereby fusing his Protestant and humanist sympathies by highlighting a structural similarity: Both enlisted education in the service
of stability through the intermediaries, respectively, of conscience and
virtue.& Yet Barlee was atypical. Perhaps by the 1570s "conscience"
savored too much of the Puritans and separatists that the bishops,
Privy Councilors, and assize judges were trying to suppress. Indeed,
deradicalizing conscience by setting strict boundaries to its right to
challenge positive law was a favorite exercise of royalist preachers and
assize sermons. 67 Lawyers seeking career preferment and publication
licenses would have been ill-advised to invoke a code word annoying
to the Erastian and conformist outlook increasingly ascendant at
Court from the latter third of the sixteenth century.
Third, Protestantism could heighten resistance as well as openness to legal publication, an outgrowth of the ambivalences surrounding the concept of "law" in Calvinist thought. Reformed Protestantism reliant on Calvin assigned great importance to positive law, like
government necessary and divinely instituted. It identified three
purposes, or "uses," of the law. The civic or political use of the law restrained the violence and rapacity of fallen man. The theological use
revealed humanity's depravity and inability to fulfill the burdens of
the Old Law, teaching that only Gospel offered a path to salvation
("[tihe law first killeth, that Christ may make alive; it condemneth,
that Christ may justify").6 The normative use cast law as a guide to
charitable conduct among neighbors and as a model of the lineaments of the proper church and state. Law tutored the believer in
God's will, so that the Gospel could be termed the fulfillment of Law
rather than its antithesis. This third, normative use of the law helped
account for the relative importance of "legalism" within Calvinist
thought (as compared to the Lutheran tradition). The normative use
recommended pursuit of moral reformation through legal regulation
under official auspices and treatment of Scripture as a fund of precedents, with attendant disputes over the proper fashioning of analogy

The Protestant, and particularly Puritan, desire to see the rightly instructed conscience as a prop of social order is discussed in TODD, supranote 35, at 118-75.
6

SeeJOHN BUCKERIDGE, A SERMON PREACHED AT HAMPTON COURT BEFORE THE

KING'S MAJESTY 5-8 (1606); PATRICK SCOT, Vox VERA 25-27 (1625); ROBERT HARRIS,
SAINT PAUL'S EXERCISE 14-16 (1628).
"'ROGER HUTCHINSON, The Image of God (1550), in THE WORKS OF ROGER

HUTCHINSON 11, 15 (Joseph Bruce ed., 22 Parker Soc'y Publications 1842).
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and over the continuing relevance, if any, of Mosaic judicial legislation.
Yet law also evoked troubling connotations. John Hales's Oration
dismissively thought that Catholics condemned "man's law as a thing
most execrable."69 But a touch of this distaste traveled through
Pauline and Augustinian thought into Lutheranism and, with more
qualifications, into Calvinism. First, the political use of the law was a
necessary evil, always evoking the original sin that made it imperative.
In Luther's vivid phrasing, the legal "'rope'" held back "'a furious and
untamed beast."'70 Second, the theological premise of "Christian liberty," the abrogation of the "curse" of the Law as an impossible route
to salvation and its replacement with justification through faith, could
be misunderstood as the dissolution of legal restraint on the elect
saint. Protestant ministers labored hard to contain the latent antinomian possibilities of the doctrine, squaring the theological implications of Christian liberty with a strong duty of obedience to the
positive laws of the Christian polity. This was a central theme in treatises and sermons.7 ' But the tensions inherent in the positioning of
Gospel and Law-Gospel as both abrogation of Law's curse and fulfillment of Law-meant that valorization of Gospel often led to disparagement of Law. Protestants pressing a radical polarization of Law
and Gospel directed some of their distaste for Law as Gospel's antithetical theological category toward the prosaic doings of earthly
courts and lawyers. Luther gave heightened prominence to the slur
"bonus jurista malus Christa," a jibe aimed at lawyers but touching by

implication those too absorbed in legal study or litigation. For overattentiveness to law, what Englishmen disdainfully called "lawing,"
stoked unChristian selfishness and aggression. 3 It also invited theoHALES, supra note 16, at MS LC 14:32.1, fol. 16v.
70

See Edward A. Dowey, Law in Luther and Calvin, 41 THEOLOGY TODAY 146, 150

(1984).
71

See, e.g., WILLIAM PERKINS, A Discourse of Conscience, in THE WORKS OF THAT

FAMOUS AND WORTHY MINISTER OF CHRIST IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE,

WILLIAM PERKINS 645-46 (1605) [hereinafter THE WORKS OF WILLIAM PERKINS]
(arguing that Christian liberty is a spiritual freedom, not a civil liberty, which confutes
the "libertines, who think that by the death of Christ they have liberty to live" as they
wish); SAMUEL BURTON, A SERMON PREACHED AT THE GENERAL ASSizES IN WARWICK 2

(1620); ROBERT SIBTHORPE, APOSTOLIC OBEDIENCE 33 (1627) (high royalist gloss);
HENRY VALENTINE, GOD SAVE THE KING (1639).
73

See Courtney Kenny, BonusJuristaMalus Christa, 19 L.Q. REV. 326, 330-32 (1903).
In the anonymous A Dialogue Concerning the Strife
of Our Church (1584), the

bishop's chaplain Philochrematos charged that the Puritans interested in preaching
the law-here understood as the Ten Commandments and the moral law of God as
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logical confusion through category slippage, concern for earthly law
compromising the purity of the believer's understanding that faith
alone, not adherence to Law, marked the path to salvation.
In these various senses, the Protestant revival of Pauline and
Augustinian theology reinvigorated Saint Paul's admonition against
Christians that "go to law one with another."74 Only peripheral Protestant sects took Paul's dictum to its extreme, forbidding true Christians from serving as magistrates or suing their spiritual brethren.
Mainstream English Protestant ministers cabined off an uncomfortable number of New Testaments to defend the privilege of a Christian
to go to law, but portrayed lawsuits as an unfortunate last resort, permissible if brought without malice or desire for revenge, after the
failure of compromise, and in defense of important interests. Indeed,
imposing restrictions on when the Christian mightjustly sue was a favorite exercise in the cases of conscience literature, paralleling the
preference for mediation and arbitration rooted in the localist ethos
of neighborliness.75 The strong respect Calvinists afforded law as a divinely ordained instrument of order, social regulation, and moral improvement and their consequent stress on popular legal instruction
uneasily coexisted, then, with disdain for "lawing," with a suspicion
that overeager, too precise interest in positive law could undermine
charitable living and unwittingly aid Law against Gospel on the theorevealed in the Bible-stir up "contention and part-taking" as men and women rush to
reprove each other for neglecting their duties. See id. at 56. "For one is ready in everything to control another, you may not do this, you may not do that." Id. Better to
preach the "glad tidings of the gospel to comfort men." Id. The German lawyer
Henry Agrippa's polemic against the canon law in THE VANITY AND UNCERTAINTY OF
ARTS AND SCIENCES (1569, English trans.) (1531, Latin ed.) depicted this as reminiscent of Jewish "legalism," pointedly observing that "Christians are enforced to live

rather after the order of the canons, than after the gospel." Id. at 164r.
7' 1 Cofinthians6:7.
See, e.g., ROGER HUTCHINSON, The Second Sermon of Oppression, Affliction, and Patience (1550), in HUTCHINSON, supranote 68, at 313, 322-32; HUGH LATIMER, The Fourth
Sermon upon the Lord's Prayer (1552), in SERMONS BY HUGH LATIMER 368, 481-82
(George Corrie ed., 27 Parker Soc'y Publications 1844);JOHNJEWEL, Defense of the Apol-

og of the Church ofEngland (1567), in 2 THE WORKS OFJOHNJEWEL 863 (John Ayre ed.,
24 Parker Soc'y Publications 1847); WILLIAM PERKINS, An Exposition of the Lord's Prayer,
in THE WORKS OF WILLIAM PERKINS, supra note 71, at 412 (explaining that one Chris-

tian may sue another if: he is not motivated by revenge, the suit is not scandalous to
the church, the purpose of the action is to maintain godly peace, the offender is
thereby chastized and brought to repentance, and the law was the last remedy); 3
WILLIAM PERKINS, CASES OF CONSCIENCE 289-92 (1642). On English Protestant ambivalence towards litigation, see RICHARD L. GREAVES, SOCIETY AND RELIGION IN
ELIzABETHAN ENGLAND 651-57 (1982). On the ethic and characteristics of neighborliness, see KEITH WRIGHTSON, ENG1ISH SOCIETY, 1580-1680, at 51-57 (1982).
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logical plane. These ambivalences compromised the ideological support Protestantism lent legal publishing. 6
Compromised, but not erased. For on balance, Protestantism did
legal publicists important service. It supplied them with an emotionally resonant vocabulary for tainting and delegitimating critics. And

Tyndale's and Foxe's heroic narrative of Protestant Biblical publication driving back Catholic obscurantism became a trope for programs
of textual disclosure in literature, history, science, and medicine, furthering efforts to make knowledge more widely available in the
printed vernacular, which in turn fostered a climate of opinion favorable to similar efforts in the law. 7 Through its celebration of the
press as the vehicle for bringing the hitherto hidden word of God
into the light and through the mediation of the Ramists, Protestantism overlaid and reinforced the humanists' support for accessible law.
II. THE DEBATE OVER THE RISKS AND ADVANTAGES OF PUBLISHING LAW:
PUBLICISTS AND ANTI-PUBLICISTS

The formulation of a humanist and Protestant idiom for justifying
legal publication was the work of the second quarter of the sixteenth
century. By the latter third of the century, the skepticism about law
printing that these idioms addressed and reassured broke into public
view, engendering a debate among lawyers over the perceived risks
and advantages of legal publishing. As William Hudson lambasted
the crafty evasion and factiousness flowing from the legal press,
friends of print such as Ferdinando Pulton composed arguments
against "opinative persons" who "by disputes encounter [i.e., "go
counter to"] the publishing or reading" of English law. 78 What to call
these two positions? I shall borrow a term from Christopher Brooks's

76

The preceding paragraphs have relied on P.D.L. Avis, Moses and the Magistrate: A

Study in the Rise of ProtestantLegalism, 26J. ECCLESIASTICAL HIST. 149, 158-59 (1975)
(discussing the concept of Lutheran "polarization" of Law and Gospel); Kenny, supra
note 72, at 330-32; Dowey, supra note 70, at 146-53; AG. ROEBER, PALATINES, LIBERTY,
AND PROPERTY: GERMAN LUTHERANS IN COLONIAL BRITISH AMERICA 72-74 (1993);
JOHN S. COOLIDGE, THE PAULINE RENAISSANCE IN ENGLAND: PURITANISM AND THE
BIBLE 23-54 (1970); GERHARD EBELING, On the Doctrine of the Triplex Usus Legis in the

Theology of the Reformation, in WORD AND FAITH 62, 62 (James W. Leitch trans., 1963);
WERNER ELERT, LAW AND GOSPEL 7-13, 38-48 (Edward H. Schroeder trans., 1967).

I am indebted to Prof. Charles Donahue for suggesting that I think about this issue.

See CHRISTOPHER HILL, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 28
(1965); EISENSTEIN, supra note 4, at 361-62.
78 FERDINANDO PULTON, Prefaceto DE PACE REGIS
(1609).
7
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recent articles on sixteenth-century legal thought and label advocates
of printed dissemination of law the "publicists," an apt term suggesting its opposite, the anti-publicists.7
It is important to remember that the publication of sedition, error, and heresy did not divide the bar; all disapproved in theory. The
anti-publicists differed from the publicists in expressing unease about
the unexceptional lawbook that passed muster with the censors. The
licensed and licit, not the underground book, was Hudson's target.
A. ForensicBoundaries

Neither the publicists nor anti-publicists pressed their position to
its fullest possible theoretical extension, towards removal of regulation and censorship of lawbooks in the name of intellectual liberty or
a "free" market, or towards a ban upon law printing. The publicists'
support for printed dissemination of law, for example, respected the
government's licensing and censorship regime. From 1553 through
the Civil War, a royally appointed law patentee held the monopoly
privilege of publishing common-law books, with the Queen's or
King's printer enjoying the right to print statutes and proclamations.
The Crown enforced a system of pre-publication licensing, reserving
to the Privy Council, Archbishop of Canterbury, and Bishop of London the power of approving most works for the press, while the justices (and for some decades the serjeants) passed on common law
books s0 While printers attacked the law patentee's monopoly for
driving up prices and lowering quality, a claim likely to win lawyers'
sympathy, the principle of legal censorship itself went unchallenged.
Like other Englishmen before the Civil War, lawyers supposed a free

See Christopher W. Brooks, ThePlace of Magna Carta and the Ancient Constitution in
Sixteenth-CnturyEnglish Legal Thought [hereinafter Brooks, The Placeof Magna Carta], in
THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY.

MAGNA CARTA, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, AND THE ANGLO-

AMERICAN TRADITION OF THE RULE OF LAW 62, 67 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1993); Christopher Brooks, Professions, Ideology and the Middling Sort in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuy, in THE MIDDLING SORT OF PEOPLE: CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS
IN ENGLAND, 1550-1800, at 113, 121-22 (Jonathan Barry & Christopher Brooks eds.,

1994).
To be sure, opinions about the press did not split lawyers into contending camps.
Support for and concern about printing intermingled within the profession and
within individual members, and judgments about the wisdom and effects of using the
press were sensitive to context, in particular to the type of work printed and the political situation. Yet, for the sake of clarity bought at the cost of some abstraction, it is
possible to ask how lawyersjustified legal publishing or warned of its consequences.
goFor details on the licensing and censorship system, see infra Part IlI.B.
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press would bring slipshod inaccuracies, the propagation of error,
and licentiousness. Their debates centered around the terms, methods, and targets of censorship. 1
The anti-publicists, for their part, did not call for the suppression
of law printing, however vigorous their warnings about its effects.
Opposition to publication per se was not a fanciful position. Had
they adopted it, they would not have lacked for company in early
modern England, where hard anti-publicists fought a losing battle in
many fields of learning. There were physicians, mathematicians,
chemists, university scholars of classics, and royalist guardians of the
arcana of statecraft unwilling to let their "high" knowledge, elevated
above common capacity, come out among the vulgar; there were artisans eager to conceal their trade secrets out of economic interest; and
there were occultists, alchemists, and hermeticists plying, hammering,
burning, and incanting their mysteries beyond the public eye.8 Why
did the legal anti-publicists accept at least some publication of the
law, even as they echoed the characteristic arguments of the press's
learned enemies (more on this later)? The social role of law provided
8' Complaints that the patent system's monopolies artificially drove up prices can
be found from the latter 1570s through the Long Parliament. See, e.g., The Griefs of the
Printers, Glass Sellers and Cutlers Sustained by Reason of Piviliges Granted to PrivatePersons
(MS, c.1577), in 1 A TRANsCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS
OF LONDON, 1554-1640, at 111, 111 (Edward Arber ed., 1875) [hereinafterTRANSCRlPT
OF THE REGISTERS]; MICHAEL SPARKE, SCINTILLA, OR LIGHT BROKEN INTO DARK
WAREHOUSES (1641) ("The monopolist[s] have not only gotten all the Gospel, but
also the Law."); WILLIAM PRYNE, BRIEF ON THE ORIGIN OF PRINTING IN ENGLAND ON
THE ISSUE OF THE PRINTERS' PETITION (MS, 1642), Inner Temple Library, Petyt Collection, MS 511, vol. 23, fol. 14 (argument before the committee on printing in the Long
Parliament).
See Carlo Ginzburg, High and Low: The Theme of ForbiddenKnowledge in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, PAST & PRESENT, Nov. 1976, at 28; C.H. CONLEY, THE
FIRST ENGLISH TRANSLATORS OF THE CLASSICS 89-90, 102-03 (1927); RICHARD FOSTER
JONES, THE TRIUMPH OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: A SURVEY OF OPINIONS CONCERNING THE VERNACULAR FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF PRINTING TO THE RESTORATION 47-50 (1953); William Eamon, From the Secrets of Nature to Public Knowledge, in
REAPPRAISALS OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 333, 333 (David C. Lindberg & Robert
S. Westman eds., 1990); WILLIAM R. NEWMAN, GEHENNICAL FIRE: THE LIVES OF
GEORGE STARKEY, AN AMERICAN ALCHEMIST IN THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 115-18
(1994); FRANCIS BACON, The Advancement of Learning (1605), in 3 THE WORKS OF
FRANCIS BACON 253, 289 (James Spedding et al. eds., 1870) (noting the affinity of magicians and alchemists for "enigmatic writings" and "auricular traditions"). The closemouthed artisan proved a barrier to the Royal Society's efforts to compile a history of
trades after the Restoration. Thomas Sprat observed that the Society's investigations
might "afright private men, from imparting many profitable secrets to them; lest they
should thereby become common, and so they be deprived of the gain, which else they
might be sure of, if they kept them to themselves." THOMAS SPRAT, HISTORY OF THE
ROYAL SOCIETY 71 (1959 ed.) (1667), quoted in Eamon, supra, at 355.
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the first of many constraints. In a society lacking a standing army,
professional police force, and bureaucracy exercising effective local
control, law was a central means of setting priorities and of coordinating action, whether regulating trade, agriculture, or enclosure, controlling amateur officials in the counties and parishes, suppressing
crime and dissent, or solidifying a national Protestant church. The
value of print to administrative efficacy went hand in hand with widespread belief that public promulgation underlay the legitimacy of
law.' The humanist depiction of law as tutoring subjects in virtue and
as binding together a polity and society ever-threatened by the centrifugal forces of localism and faction supposed vigorous promulgation.8 Legal anti-publicists could not portray their knowledge as recondite and capable of confinement among trustworthy initiates as
readily as could students of Seneca, Euclid, Vulcan, or Hermes
Trismegistus. To be sure, the bar's reliance on law French as a private language and their immersion in a "common erudition" never
fully captured in any set of texts and always diffusely circulating in
oral tradition bore a passing resemblance to the secretive transmission of lore. But the guildlike teaching of legal tradition among generations of lawyers never obscured the necessarily public role of law,
precluding the anti-publicists from making an esotericist case for nonpublication.
Indeed, a thoroughgoing anti-publicist position, had one been in
the offing, would have also needed to set itself against the bar's and
printers' economic interests, the state's communications machinery,
and the royal prerogative. The law patentee and the Queen's and
King's printer profited from the sale of statutes and common law
books.& The transfer of common law titles from the patentee to the

partners of the "English stock" of the Stationer's Company in 1603
only increased the number of printers gaining from legal publish-

St. Thomas Aquinas was a popular cite for this proposition.

See THOMIAS

AQUINAS, Summa Theologia in SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS: THE TREATISE ON LAW 113,
140-45 (R.J. Henle ed., 1993) (Question 90, Article 4).
" See Greville, supranote 45, verses 259-62; Brooks, The Place ofMagna Carta,supra
note 79, at 64-68; PELTONEN, supra note 46, at 18-118.
They profited, but they griped about the burdens they shouldered and the decline of their patents' return in the latter sixteenth century. See Christopher Barker, A
Note of the Offices, and Other Special Licenses for Pfinting, Granted by Her Majesty to Diverse
Persons, with a Conjectureof the Valuation (MS, 1582), in 1 TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS,
supra note 81, at 115-16.
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ing.86 Consumers benefited also. An expanding market of law students, barristers, attorneys, justices of the peace, clerks, constables,
and other local officials relied on printed books that were cheaper
and more readily available than manuscripts.
Meanwhile, the government's licensing regime and appointment
of a royal printer and law patentee facilitated and directed law publishing in the process of confining it, insuring that the Crown had a
permanent communications network. From the early sixteenth century, the government had been cooperating with publishers of statutes and proclamations, incorporating printing into long-standing
patterns of scribal and oral promulgation.
By the 1530s, Henry
VIII's secretary, Thomas Cromwell, brought to the fore the propagandistic power of legal texts, taking advantage of how proclamations
and statutes identified national problems, presented stylized historical
accounts, and articulated values and standards of conduct in the
course of issuing commands. He supported the vernacular publication of the statutes, planning to use a more widely known Magna
Carta and statute of praemunire to rally support for the Henrician
Reformation, and ordered the distribution in proclamation form of
Parliament's Act in Restraint of Appeals (1533).8 Special, separate
printings of important statutes continued into the seventeenth century along with texts of less dramatic importance, such as pardons and
subsidies. 9 Elizabethan and early Stuart Privy Councilors and lawyers
held up legal printing as a partial antidote to the persistent underenforcement or nonenforcement of governmental policy at the local
level, arguing that a redacted compilation of the statutes, particularly
the penal statutes, would reduce the ignorance of the law at the heart
of noncompliance. 90 The importance of statutes and proclamations
86 See CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERs' COMPANY: A HISTORY, 1403-1959,
at 93

(1960).
87

See Katharine F. Pantzer, Printing the English Statutes, 1484-1640: Some Historical

Implications,in BOOKS AND SOCIETY IN HISTORY, supra note 5, at 69, 69; G.R. Elton, The
Sessional Printingof Statutes, 1484-1547, in WEALTH AND POWER IN TUDOR ENGLAND 68,
68 (E.W. Ives et al. eds., 1978).
88 See Graham, supra note 13, at 7-75.
89 See Elton, supra note 87, at 77-79.
'0 On Elizabeth's Lord Keeper Nicholas Bacon's efforts for a reorganized printed
compilation of statutes, see PROCEEDINGS 1558-1581, supra note 30, at 49, 82-84, 11112, 171, 183, 189-93, 464-65. Bacon's many successors in advocating abortive schemes
to redact the statutes included King James I, the royal counselors Francis Bacon and
Lord Ellesmere, and leaders of the legal profession in Parliament such as Edward
Coke, William Noy, and Heneage Finch. See Barbara Shapiro, Codificationof the Laws in
Seuenteenth-Centuiy England,1974 WIS. L. REV. 428.
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gives them pride of place in assessing the government's use of the legal press, but there were other texts, episodic but significant, in setting administrative priorities: royal speeches, articles of religion, the
Book of Sports, and the Book of Orders directed to the justices of the
91

peace.
Attacking legal publishing in its entirety would have also offended
the royal prerogative. The Crown argued that its power to enforce licensing, censorship, and monopoly rights in the law patentee flowed
from the prerogative, which had admitted and nurtured printing in
its infancy as it guided the press in the present. To disapprove of
what the Crown allowed was to second-guess, even affront the prerogative.9
B. ContrastingPredictions

If the anti-publicists, like the publicists, faced and at least implicitly accepted an expanding market for printed lawbooks regulated
and censored by the government, what was the difference between
them? To what, in particular, did the anti-publicists object? These
are plain enough questions, but with elusive answers. Early modem
lawyers did not write essays about the political and cultural effects of
the legal press. Their opinions survive in a handful of sentences in
the midst of a preface or tucked within a letter. The anti-publicists'
habit of disdaining publication of the laws without providing the reasons and distinctions the modem reader wants lends an unfortunate,
if unavoidable, imprecision to the reconstruction of their thought.

"' See ANTHONY FLETCHER, REFORM IN THE PROVINCES:

THE GOVERNMENT OF

STUART ENGLAND 56-59, 215-16, 269-70 (1986).
9 In 1583 the bishops proposed concentrating power over press licensing in the
Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop of London to the implied detriment of the
Queen and Privy Counsel, who had shared the right of licensing with the bishops under Elizabeth's Injunctions of 1559. A puritan critic of the proposal argued that "it
robs and spoils her Majesty's own royal person ... to discern what writings may be
fruitful or commendable." The Copy of a Letter Written by a Gentleman in the Country unto
a Londoner, Touching an Answer to the Archbishops' Articles (MS, c. middle 1580s)
[hereinafter The Copy of a Letter], in A PART OF A REGISTER, CONTAINING SUNDRY

MEMORABLE MATTERS 143, 143 (1593). On prerogative as the basis of press regulation, see The Arguments of the Patentees in Favor of Pivilegesfor Books (May 4, 1586), in 2
TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS, supranote 81, at 804 (Edward Arber ed., 1875); Argument Before the Committee on Printing in the 1642 Parliament, in A True Diurnal of
the Passagesin Parliament(March 7-14, 1642), in MAKING THE NEWS: AN ANTHOLOGY
OF THE NEWSBOOKS OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION (Joan Raymond ed., 1994)
[hereinafter MAKING THE NEWS]. See generally HAROLD M. WEBER, PAPER BULLETS:
PRINT AND KINGSHIP UNDER CHARLES 11 (1996).
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Critics of printing focused on publication of national law-of the
common law, Chancery, and royal prerogative courts (such as Requests and Star Chamber). Publication of local law posed less of a
threat to the professional and Courtly interests that the anti-publicists
spoke for and spoke to. Knowledge of national law was the bar's stock
in trade. It also stood as a resource for contesting royal and ecclesiastical policies in a way that local law did not, however much manorial
lords and town oligarchies that relied on control of charters and legal
records would have been discomforted by publication. The charge of
"commoning" or of improper disclosure that the anti-publicists aimed
at national law printing ill-fit local law. Although royal officials and
the bar styled themselves the repositories of the unwritten common
law and the legal folkways of the various national courts, the
"multitude" could better describe the particularities of law obtaining
in the thousands of towns, manors, and parishes. The Londontrained lawyers did not embody local law so much as oversee the machinery for collecting and authenticating that law as it became relevant in the national courts (e.g., what was the immemorial custom of
Groton manor or the town of Dorchester?). In any event, publication
of the content of local law was largely a hypothetical danger since the
London-based presses avoided it, concentrating on printing primers
usable in any location, such as books on the duties of constables, justices of the peace, and manorial court keepers. The law of Groton
manor or the town of Dorchester interested too few readers to justify
printing for a national market. 93
As for national law, the danger lay not in printing per se but in
the wrong style of publication. Hudson provided a hint: It was
"assuredly no matter of necessity to publish the reasons of the judgment of the law, or apices [tittles or small points] or fictiones juris
[legal fictions] to the multitude."9 4 His dislike of disclosing the reasons and tittles of the law implied a two-tier model of legal knowledge. Lawyers and the state should present to the multitude, indeed,
should hammer into them, a surface layer of commands while reserv95
ing to professionals the deeper stratum of fictions and judgments.
93The county histories popular from the latter sixteenth century stand as a qualification to this generalization as they sometimes discussed shire custom. See, for example, William Lambarde's explication of gavelkind in WILLIAM LAMBARDE, A PERAMBULATION OF KENT 475-531 (3rd ed., c.1596) (1970).
94Hudson, supra note 2, at 1.

95Publicists recognized, as readily as anti-publicists, the difference between the
lineaments of the law appropriate to state officials and justices of the peace and the

"cunning points of law" taught in the Inns of Court. GILBERT, supra note 27, at 7. But
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Distinctions between public knowledge and the more profound lore
reserved for initiates were common if contested in learned culture,
among scientists, statesmen, and magicians no less than lawyers.
Francis Bacon, himself no anti-publicist and rather more generous
than Hudson in revealing to the public legal craft, recognized what
was at stake. Bacon's typology of methods for teaching arts and bodies of knowledge acknowledged the occasional value of
publishing part, and reserving part to a private succession, and of publishing in a manner whereby it shall not be to the capacity nor taste of
all, but shall as it were single and adopt his reader,... both for the
avoiding of abuse in the excluded, and the strengthening of affection in
the admitted.s
Not just the content, but the psychological "framing" of printed
lawbooks could irk the anti-publicists. In what style should legal literature speak? As the Athenian dialogist in Plato's immensely influential Laws asked: "How should we imagine the rightful position of a
written law in a society? Should its statutes disclose the lineaments of
wise and affectionate parents, or should they wear the semblance of
an autocratic despot-issue a menacing order, post it on the walls,
and so have done?" 97 Publicists outside as well as within the law read
Plato to advocate "persuasion" as "a more winning, and more manlike
whereas publicists characteristically argued that reasons, fictions, and tittles need not
be taught to laymen acquiring rudimentary knowledge of law, anti-publicists suggested
it should not be taught, focusing on the dangers of so doing.
FRANCIS BACON, Valerius Terminus of the Interpretation of Nature: With the Annotations ofHermes Stella, in 3 THE WORxS OF FRANCIS BACON, supranote 82, at 215, 248. In
the New Atlantis (1627), Bacon gave his scientists in the utopian research institute,
Salomon's House, the discretion to withhold discoveries from publication. He disdained, however, use of an "enigmatical" method, whose purpose was to "remove the
vulgar capacities from being admitted to the secrets of knowledges, and to reserve
them to selected auditors, or wits of such sharpness as can pierce the veil." BACON,
supra note 82, at 404-05. His prejudice against enigma informed the preface of his
Maxims of the Law (MS, 1597), which preferred the use of law French "for excluding
any others than professed lawyers." The alternative of writing in obscure conceits invited the danger of laymen thinking they understood the law when they did not. In
the end, he composed the commentary upon his Latin maxims in English rather than
law French. See FRANCIS BACON, Maxims of the Law [hereinafter Bacon, Maxims of the
Law], in 7 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 307, 322 (James Spedding et al. eds., 1872).
See generally Frances A. Yates, The Hermetic Tradition in Renaissance Science, in ART,
SCIENCE AND HISTORY IN THE RENAISSANCE 255, 264 (Charles S. Singleton ed., 1967);

Eamon, supra note 82, at 333-65.

Plato, 9 Laws 859a-b, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 1419 (Edith

Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961) [hereinafter DIALOGUES OF PLATO].
Seneca also posed the dichotomy between threat and persuasion, arguing in favor of
the latter. SeeSENECA, Epistle 94, in 3 SENECAAD LUCILIUM EPISTULUAE MORALES 35-37
(Richard M. Gummere trans., 1925).
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way to keep men in obedience than fear." These were the words of
John Milton, urging printed discussion of the purposes of church
government as well as human laws. Had not Plato followed the
precedent of Moses, who as God's amanuensis had written Genesis as
historical and moral prologue to legislation? Milton's commonplace
book recorded the other side of Plato's dichotomy-that the "lawgiver
who gives the reason for his law diminishes his authority"98attributing the opinion to the Council of Trent, the symbol among
hot Protestants of reaction.9
But disdain for the voice of "lordly command" seemed naive to
the Recorder of London Anthony Benn. Persuasion invited popular
contempt, a growing problem over the years as the law had progressively disarmed in the process of explaining itself: "It was wont to be
jubeat non suadeat lex [that law commanded not persuaded], but now
our laws must come forth ushered with a luminary oration or preamble as though they had not in themselves and of their own presence a
sufficient majesty and grace."'00 A disadvantage of strategies of persuasion, as Francis Bacon observed of parliamentary preambles, was
that they "represent laws disputing and not commanding." The official and assured tone of parliamentary preambles seemed to discourage scrutiny and rebuttal. But the very use of a language ofjustification rather than of prescription and sanction was implicitly dialogic,

JOHNMILTON, CommonplaceBook in 18 THE WORKS OFJOHN MILTON 128, 165-66
(Frank Allen Patterson ed., 1939).

SeeJOHN MILTON, The Reason of Church-Government UrgedAgainst Prelaty (1641), in
3 THE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON, supra note 98, at 180, 181-82. Theologians argued

over whether civil law should persuade or command, the former view correlating
roughly with support for limited monarchy, the latter with absolute monarchy. Compare Richard Hooker, A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pide (1612), in 3 OF THE LAWS
OF EccLESIASTICAL POLrIY AND OTHER WORKS 597, 597 (John Keble et al. eds., 1994)
("The nature of man, being much more delighted to be led than drawn, does many
times stubbornly resist authority, when to persuasion it easily yields.... A law simply
commanding or forbidding, is but dead in comparison of that which expresses the
reason wherefore it does the one or the other."), withJAMES USSHER, The Power Communicated ly God to the Pince (MS, during Charles I's reign), in 11 THE WHOLE WORKS
OF THE MOST REv. JAMES USSHER 223, 349-50 (Charles Richard Elrington ed., Dublin
1864) ("And who sees not what confusion would be brought, as well into a family as a
state, if a son or servant might have liberty to stand upon terms and chop logic with his
father[,] master, or prince, and refuse to yield obedience to their commands until he
should see some reason for it?" Ussher said the law "should be accepted 'as a voice
from God, that should command and not dispute.'").
"o ANTHONY BENN, Lawyers, in ESSAYS WRITTEN BY ANTHONY BENN (MS, c.1616-

1618) (Bedford Record Office, L28/46, fol. 43v).
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allowing or, worse, teaching disputation in the guise of persuasion.' °
This feature of lawbooks-the way they "represent" law in the course
of disclosing it-dismayed anti-publicists. At some level, of course,
the very promulgation of legal texts unleashed the contrasting interpretations latent within them. Creativity knew few limits: The Puritan pamphleteer Martin Marprelate twisted a 1571 act protecting the
legitimacy of Elizabeth's royal title into an implied abolition of the
English bishops, the very accessibility of the printed statute beckoning
the mischief.'2 But there was better and worse here. Insofar as critics
of legal printing made distinctions among types of objectionable lawbooks-and often they did not, questioning publication of the laws
per se-they aimed less at texts detailing the content of the law (such
as statutes and manuals for lay legal officials) and more at monographs opening the "judgments" and "fictions" of the law. For no
matter how resolutely lawbooks preached obedience and deference to
professional skill, publication of the law's reasons unwittingly summoned popular disputation
by presenting law as riven with multiple
0 3
argumentative possibilities.

The anti-publicists resembled the publicists in relying less on
"empirical" information, well-wrought arguments, or telling anecdotes than on contrasting prophesies about the social effects of legal
publishing. Four major objections to vernacular law printing structured the debate.
1. The Law's "Mystery"; Publicist Appropriations of Law Printing
for Professional Self-Defense
Critics denounced the legal profession as monopolists of the law,
hiding away a public good in the jargon of law French and in private

'0' Bacon advised the crown to avoid parliamentary preambles that savored of
"disputing," rather letting "the law commence with the enactment." FRANCIS BACON,
Aphorism 69, in DeAugmentis Scientiarum,in 5 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note
82, at 102, 102. He recognized that preambles were "necessarily used in most cases,

not so much to explain the law, as to persuade Parliament to pass it, and also to satisfy
the people." Id- I cite Bacon here not as an anti-publicist, but as one who articulated
assumptions implicit in their thought.
"oSee THE MARPRELATE TRACTS: 1588-1589, at 39, 50, 314 (William Pierce ed.,
1911). The statute in question was 13 Eliz., ch. 1 (1571).

,sLawbooks acknowledging the political costs of legal publication or responding
to such critiques tended, disproportionately, to be those opening the "reasons and fictions" of the law to lay audiences. See, e.g., HENRY FINCH, LAW, OR A DISCOURSE
THEREOF (1627); COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE, supra note 45; SHEPPARD, supra note 55;
PULTON, supra note 78.
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manuscripts and oral traditions, the better to cultivate a politically
useful appearance of mystery and to maintain income and status.
The law was not masked, said lawyer-apologists such as John Davies
and Edward Coke. They offered a valiant, if strained, defense of law
French as an easily learned tool of unequaled linguistic precision,
necessary to fix the precise meaning of legal terms securing property
and liberty.' 4 Yet the publicists' appeals suggest that at least some
lawyers agreed with the critics' premise, if not their conclusion, seeing
the law's opacity as a positive good for the profession rather than
grounds for reform. The anti-publicist attachment to mystery called
forth the publicist reassurances. "[S] ome monks in elder times, and
some clerks and officers, might have a cunning, for their private
honor and profit.., to have as much as they could of our laws to be
in a kind of mystery to the vulgar, to be the less understood by them,"
said the champion of vernacular publication Bulstrode Whitelocke, at
once answering lawyers' fears of losing income and respect while diplomatically and disingenuously making Catholics and attorneys, not
barristers, the friends of obscurity.'0 5 Printing the law in English does
not make it "despised" and the lawyer "less regarded and used,"
William Sheppard insisted. 0 6 Ferdinand Pulton concurred, assuring
readers that "divulging" the criminal law did not "impeach [its]
credit."' 7
Thomas Powell's prefaces to his Attorney's Academy (1623) testify to
the power of the barristers' sense of proprietary control over legal
mysteries, an attitude Powell slyly mocks. 08 The epistle dedicatory
casts Lord Keeper John Williams as Neptune presiding over a storming sea as the waterlogged Powell, harried by lawyers, protests he
never sought "to rob the Sea-gods bed of Corall, I mean Law's mysteries, (for that's the Moral.)" In an epistle to the reader, Powell implores the public's aid against the "privy malice of those who are only
studious of private profit." Powell sets forth the scoffers' bill of in-

"" See JOHN DAVIES, Preface to Irish Reports (1615), in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
JOHN DAVIES 257, 257 (Alexander B. Grosart ed., 1876) ("[C]ritics object that 'the professors of our law... write their reports and books of the law in a strange and unknown tongue which none can understand but themselves, to the end that the people
being kept in ignorance of the law, may the more admire their skill and knowledge,
and esteem and value it a higher price.'"); see also COKE, Proemium, in FIRST INSTITUTE,
supra note 45.
105 3 WHITELOCKE, supra note 55, at 272.
'06 SHEPPARD, supra note 55, at AS.
10' PULTON, Preface, supra note 78.
108 See POWELL, THE ATTORNEY'S ACADEMY, supra note 45,
at [7]-[15].
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dictment against him: "I have waded thus far, without calling of those
of the mystery to my guidance" and "I have slept beside the common
causeway and trespassed pedibus ambulando upon some men's Inclosure." Admitting that no book can reduce the infinite particulars of
the law to clarity on the first try, and that some "few imperfect
quidlibets" were the price of "many useful quodlibets," Powell turns on
his pursuers in a remarkable passage:
Surely, whatsoever you be that shall do it [attack the crafter of law-

books], I must tell you, that the million multitude will repute and report
you for a second Alexander, not the conqueror, but the copper-smith;
not famous for triumph, but for trade: Not Alexander, who in his
greatness would be worshipped as a god himself, but Alexander who in
his leather apron would have the very puppets which his hand
rough1
hewed, draw an adoration and reverence among the people. 09

This is cultural jujitsu of a high order, smoothly turning the barristers' conceits against them. In moments of high self-regard, Elizabethan and early Stuart barristers dismissed attorneys, Powell's core
audience, as apprentice-trained "mechanics" knowing the craft of the
law but not its science and deeper principles, familiar with forms but
not with humane studies and learned languages. But how different
are the barristers, Powell asks. Are they not also leather-aproned artisans fashioning puppets for the marketplace, but expecting reverence
as well as gain? Are not their vaunted mysteries an enclosure of what
ought to be common? Indeed, Powell intensifies the class-tensions
underneath the mock by imagining himself as the sort of man who
does not trespass into an enclosure on horseback, but is reduced to
traveling on foot."0 Even the words he chooses to describe his footsore trespasser-pedibus ambulando-drive the stiletto down another
inch. For here and in the other two places in the epistle where Powell
uses Latin, he does so ironically, highlighting its pretentiousness
(quidlibets dwelling in the "company and fellowship" of quodlibets).,I
His invocation of Latin as gibe rather than ornament at once defends
readers with slight command of the language and suggests the intellectual shallowness of resistance to vernacular publication of the law.
109 Id.

"0 Powell plays off the opposition of common and private in another place as well:
"Beyond the Pole of property, I care not in what stream my Keel leaves her dinted impression." Id. at [13]. Impression was a pun suggesting both the physical mark left by
the keel and publication (for example, the press makes a work common by impression).
..His third use of Latin was: "For my faults of insufficience, I do not blush at

them: Baraardusnon videt omnia." Id. at [14].
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But if Powell did not think much of the anti-publicist barristers' position, the length and warmth of his retort suggests the importance of
their attitudes.
The publicists' response to their fellow lawyers' reluctance to part
with mystery went beyond reassurance and well-turned mocks. By the
latter sixteenth century, they began to argue that legal publication
was not only consistent with the bar's status, but essential to maintaining it. The printing press brought forth criticisms of English law and
lawyers, and calls for reform far faster than it produced lawbooks.
Could the lawbook be enlisted in defense?
The streams of criticism of common law and lawyers flowing from
the Elizabethan and early Stuart presses mostly recycled Biblical, classical, and medieval formulae of abuse kept alive in sermons, literature, and popular lore. The complaints were familiar: lawyers corrupted the equity of law with false glosses, twisting words in search of
payment; dishonest, greedy, they stirred up strife for gain, preying off
opponents and their own clients alike; judges and advocates manipulated technicality in favor of local notables and the rich against the
honest, the simple, and the poor; lawsuits moved slowly and cost
much, the path smoothed by bribes. Satire and drama figured lawyers
as associates of the devil. As managers of litigation, that is, conflict,
for those who could pay, the lawyer remained a symbol for disruptions of the ideal of social harmony and a target for class resentments
in both directions, by the powerful upset at being called to account at
law, and by artisans, small farmers, and workingmen
perceiving law2
yers as the enforcement arm of their betters.1
To this legacy, Elizabethan and early Stuart critics added refinements, elaborating criticisms long present in a more inchoate form.
The rapid growth of the Elizabethan legal profession, particularly attorneys, bred complaints of lack-learned lawyers bungling clients'
cases. Satire and character books filled with stories of Inns of Court
men gaming and dancing while Littleton's Tenures sat unread, the
112

See C.W. BROOKS, PET1YFOGGERS AND VIPERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 132-36

(1986); E.W. IvEs, THE
KEBELL:

COMMON LAWYERS OF PRE-REFORMATION ENGLAND: THOMAS
A CASE STUDY 190-94 (1983); G.R. OWST, LITERATURE AND PULPIT IN

MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: A NEGLECTED CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF ENGISH LETTERS &

OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE 338-49 (1966); PREST, supra note 6, at 283-312; E.F.J. TUCxER,
INTRUDER INTO EDEN:

REPRESENTATIONS OF THE COMMON LAWYER IN ENGLISH

LITERATURE, 1350-1750 (1984); E.W. Ives, The Reputation of the Common Lawyers in English Society, 1450-1550, 7 U. BIRMINGHAM HIST. J. 130 (1959); Edward F.J. Tucker, Ignoramus and Seventeenth-Centuiy Satire oftheLaw, 19 HARv. LIBR. BULL. 314 (1971).
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apprenticeship-trained attorneys setting a lower standard, drafting little well beyond a bill." 3 Humanist concern for purity and eloquence
in the use of classical languages prompted sarcasm by clerics and university scholars at lawyers' bumbling command of Latin ("Quotu est
Clocka nunc? What a Clock is it now?" said the pompous fictional lawyer Sir Ignoramus on the Cambridge stage.)." Protestant and humanist support for the dissemination of Scripture and classical learning fanned centuries-old resentment at law French as a language of
legal concealment. The point could be put in a broader political context by linking concealment to the common law's role as "Norman
Yoke," an agent of social exploitation and political control on behalf
of the aristocracy and the landed elite. 5 Puritan use of the judicial
law of the Old Testament as a touchstone for evaluating positive law
highlighted disparities between the common law and God's legal
blueprint.""

Concern especially mounted over the uncertainty of the law, what
Francis Bacon called "the most just challenge that is made to the laws
of our nation."'17 This in part reflected long-standing lay unease with
the casuistical nature of common law reasoning. The common law "is
infinite, and without order or end," Thomas Starkey complained
through the mouth of Reginald Pole, his dialogist.
"There is no
stable ground therein, nor sure stay; but everyone that can color reason makes a stop to the best law that is before-time devised." 9 Yet
"s See Francis Lenton, A Young Barrister(1631), in CHARACTERS: OR Wrr AND THE
WORLD (1663) [hereinafter CHARACTERS]; Francis Lenton, A Young Inns of Court Gentleman (1631), in CHARACTERS, supra; THOMAS OVERBURY, A FantasticInns of Court Man,
in THE OvERBuRiAN CHARACTERS 45, 45 (W.J. Paylor ed., 1936) (1615). See generally
PREST, supranote 6, at 287.
11 RUGGLE, supra note 55, at act I, sc. 3. The play was performed at Cambridge
University for KingJames I in 1614.
1sSee CHRISTOPHER HILL, The Norman Yoke, in PURITANISM AND REVOLUTION:
STUDIES IN INTERPRETATION OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION OF THE 17TH CENTURY 50,
50 (1964).
"6 For good examples of the genre, see FINCH, supra note 50; HENRY BARROW, A
BriefDiscovey of the False Church (1591), in THE WRrnNGS OF HENRY BARROW 259, 599601 (Leland H. Carlson ed., 1962). See generally Avis, supra note 76, at 149-72;
THEODORE DWIGHT BOZEMAN, To LIVE ANCIENT LIVES: THE PRIMrnvWsT DIMENSION
IN PURITANISM 160-92 (1988).
117 BACON, Maxims of the Law, supranote 96, at 319.
", STARKEY,

supra note 17, at 173.
Al An anonymous petitioner to Parliament in the early 1570s, for example, obk.
served that judges who "presume their bosoms to be the chests of [the] laws" made
decisions conflicting with the year books and with their associates, so "that which is
known to have been law in one king's government is become no law in another's."
REFORMATIONS PROPOSED IN PARLIAMENT BY THE QUEEN'S MAJESIY, IN FAVOUR OF
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the vehemence of the complaints also owed to structural factors. Difficulties in sorting through the Statutes of Uses and Wills and the
growing mass of penal statutes vexed lawyers. Clashes between common law, ecclesiastical, regional, conciliar, and prerogative jurisdictions allowed for forum shopping and invocation of one tribunal's
authority against another while cases were in progress, highlighting
the manipulability of the system.
Since printed critiques survive where most manuscripts, sermons,
and tavern cursing do not, it is hard to compare the scale and intensity of the Elizabethan and early Stuart dissatisfaction to previous periods of English history. Wilfrid Prest and Edward FJ. Tucker have
detected a particular vehemence in this period. They point to the
frequency of complaints in literary, satiric, and religious sources and
the emergence of the lawyer from the company of physicians, merchants, and other sinners and exploiters-the fellowship of the denounced-to special prominence as a target. The increasing numbers, wealth, social prominence, and political influence of the
common lawyers built resentments, as did the growth in common law
litigation and the greater intervention of national law in the localities
through justices of the peace, assizes, and royal commissions. 12' The
proliferation of law bills introduced in late Elizabethan and early Stuart parliaments suggests the central, and growing, importance of the
issue to the political nation. The first seven parliamentary sessions of
Elizabeth's reign saw relatively few bills seeking improvement of the
law; in the final six sessions, by contrast, over a quarter of the bills introduced concerned law reform.12 The agreement during the EngJUSTICE AND OF HER WELL BELOVED SUBJECTS (MS, c.1572-1576),
THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND, 1559-1581, at 277-78 (1986).

quoted in G.R. ELTON,
In the Parliament of

1610, Thomas Hedley complained that even "divers of good understanding... say the
common law is nothing else but what the judges will." Thomas Hedley, Speech of
June 28, 1610, to the House of Commons, in 2 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT 1610, at
173 (Elizabeth Read Foster ed., 1966) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT].
120 See PREST, supra note 6, at 286-87; Tucker, supra note 112, at 314.
121 See DAVID DEAN, LAW-MAKING AND SOCIETY IN LATE ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND:
THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND, 1584-1601, at 188 (1996). In light of these parliamentary figures and the serious interest by the late Elizabethan privy council in consolidation of the law, Dean concludes: "There certainly seems to have been a change in
public perceptions of the law." Id.
A similar story emerges by comparing the number of law reform bills, generously
defined, introduced in parliament during the first half of Elizabeth's reign, 1558-1580,
a span of 22 years, against the number introduced in the 22 years of James I's reign,
1603-1625. Elizabeth's early parliaments saw 85 bills, James I's parliaments saw 225
bills. These numbers are based on bills noted in the journals of the House of Commons and House of Lords, and in modern scholarly editions of parliamentary records.
(I owe these numbers to the diligent research assistance ofJoanna Grisinger.)
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lish Revolution among parliamentarians, merchants, Levellers, radicals, and sectarians alike that the law needed repair, however different the proffered schemes, further identifies the early seventeenth
century as a time of particular disaffection with the common law.'2
Even if the apparent multiplication of complaints about the law
was a trick of the sources, an interpretive illusion worked by the migration of long-standing dissatisfactions into long-surviving printed
sheets, the change in form itself suggests the novelty and seriousness
of the challenge that defenders of the law and legal profession faced.
Peter Goodrich has argued that the print-carried critique of the legal
system encouraged Edward Coke, John Davies, William Fulbeck, and
other lawyers to produce an "apologetic" literature.'2s This was true,
but it is worth asking what made the press as a medium particularly
dangerous. In what fashion did it transform murmuring long heard
at quarter sessions, taverns, churchyards, merchant offices, and
Westminster chambers?
Printing, centered in London and distributed throughout England, further nationalized the themes and vocabulary of complaint (as
it did of praise and resignation). It spread the acerbities of clerics,
university scholars, civilians, and London and provincial wits beyond
the limits of a city or country home, incorporating jibes prevalent in
localities and subcultures into a common critique. As a literary matter, this offered a core of formulae for repetition and variation. As a
political matter, it highlighted the systematic and national (as opposed to local, regional, idiosyncratic, or personal) failings of the law.
It therefore tacitly invited national solutions. There is an old saw that
a hundred grumbling people aware that all are dissatisfied over the
same issues constitute a political constituency in a way that grumblers
hearing only their neighbors snort in agreement do not. The press
fostered this consciousness of shared and patterned antagonism fa'2

See generally DONALD VEALL, THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR LAW REFORM, 1640-

1660 (1970); CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN: RADICAL IDEAS
DURING THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 216-22 (1972); ROBERT BRENNER, MERCHANTS AND
REVOLUTION: COMMERCIAL CHANGE, POLITIcAL CONFLICT AND LONDON'S OVERSEAS
TRADERS, 1550-1653, at 571-76 (1993).
"2 See GOODRICH, supranote 7, at 70-71; Goodrich, supra note 4, at 13-14. Leading
works included the prefaces to Edward Coke's Reports and the first volume of his Institutes,John Davies's preface to his Irish Reports (1615), and William Fulbeck's A Direction
or Preparativeto the Study oftheLaw (1600). Lawyers amply displayed their sensitivity to
criticism and eagerness for selfjustification in reaction to the comedy Ignoramus
(1614). See, e.g., JOHN STEPHENS, Reproof. Or, a Defence for Common Law and Lawyers
Mixed with Reproof Against the Lawyers' Common Enemy, in ESSAYS AND CHARACTERS,
IRONICAL AND INSTRUCTIVE 29, 29-50 (1615) [hereinafter ESSAYS AND CHARACrERS].
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vorable to national political action even as merchants and clerics, civilians and Biblicists, country gentry
and city artisans would have prof2 4
fered quite different solutions.

Printing also reinforced a taken-for-grantedness about the severity
of the law's failings (however inflected), an impression created when
poets, dramatists, historians, landed gentry, ministers, scholars, satirists, and merchants joined together in printed criticism. Their complaints echoed through different genres of published works. The
poet Samuel Daniel, for example, rhymed the law's "uncertainty" with
its "obscurity," its "brawls" with its "walls" of Norman subtlety and subjection. t' 2 Printed ballads sang of lawyers "making wrong right,"' 2
while published plays featured unscrupulous "suck-purses" babbling
in law French and legalese until onlookers suspected demonic possession as the cause of such confused tongues.
Turning from the arts

124 1

wish to make only a limited point here: that by nationalizing and underscor-

ing a critical discourse, the press channeled and reinforced, not caused, a politically
potent law reform movement. The causes were many, including the common law litigation boom, the intrinsic failings of the system, and social resentment.
'2 Remain concussed with uncertainty,/ And seem to foster rather than withstand/ Contention, and embrace obscurity,/ Only t'afflict, and not to fashion
us,/ Making her cure far worse than the disease./ .... / If it be wisdom, and
not cunning, this/ Which so imbroils the state of truth with brawls,/ And

wraps it up in a strange confusedness/ As if it liv'd immur'd within the walls,/
Of hideous terms fram'd out of barbarousness/ And foreign customs, the
memorials/ Of our subjection, and could never be/ Deliver'd but by wrangling subtlety.
SAMUEL DANIEL, Dedication to Sir Thomas Egerton (pre-1603), in POEMS AND A DEFENCE
OF RHYME 101, 101-02 (Arthur Colby Sprague ed., 1950). Among many other examples, see, for example, THOMAS ScoTr, FOUR PARADOXES at B5r (1602) (Justice "still is
blind, and deaf, yet feels apace,/Her scales now weigh her fees, and not the case").
' .So Lawyers that wrest law, and matters prolong,/Their footsteps will appear
of
making right wrong." A NEW BALLAD ENTITLED DANIELS SIFTING IN THESE OUR DAYS
(1572), quoted in GREAVES, supranote 75, at 657. See also A Mournful Ditty on the Death of
CertainJudges and Justices of the Peace (1590), in ANcIENT BALLADS AND BROADSIDES
PUBLISHED IN ENGLAND IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 297-98 (1867). Almanacs reiterated the image of the corrupt lawyer impoverishing his foolish clients. See BERNARD
CAPP, ENGLISH ALMANACS: 1500-1800, at 106-07 (1979).
127 In the lawyer-taunting Cambridge University comedy Ignoramus
(performed in
1614), the barrister-antihero's nonsensical use of law French andjargon nearly earned
him a fiery exorcism. See RUGGLE, supra note 55, at 21, 99-103. As Edward F.J. Tucker
notes, the "law-distracted madman who is thought to be possessed with evil spirits" was
common in Jacobean drama. Tucker, supra note 112, at 318-20. Dramatists enjoyed
putting legal babble and debased classical languages in the mouths of lawyers. In John
Day's Law-Ticks (1608), Lurdo declares: "Do but send out your iterum summoneas/Or
capias ut legatum to attach/And bring him viva voce tongue to tongue, and vi & armis
I'll revenge this wrong." JOHN DAY, LAW-TRIcKS act 5, sc. II, 11. 1908-11 (1608). Ignoramus opened with a talking horse which observed that "Ignoramus the lawyer and I
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to history, one learned from Raphael Holinshed's popular Chronicles
(1577) that Englishmen suffered death and penalty at the hands of a
Frenchified law they could not understand. ' 28 Readers saw the bar's
vices and the law's delays and corruption in comic dress in the satiric
character books,'2 in earnest garb in Philip Stubbes's The Anatomy of
Abuses in England (1583),"so and with classical trimmings in The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), where Robert Burton used Plato, Livy, and
other learned quotables to dissect the damage the "gowned vultures"
did to the body politic.'3 ' Printed sermons, particularly those offered

at assizes, kept up the scholarly and political pressure, though with
prooftexts replacing togas in the margin notes. Scripture afforded
vivid images for chastisement. The wayward lawyer might spend the
morning vomiting up riches he swallowed down (Job 20:15);132 and
though not allowed to "wrestjudgment" (Deut 16:19), he might pass
the afternoon stretching "the law with glosses, as shoemakers do with
leather" before harrying cases from court to court.' m Assize sermons
typically closed with an appeal for godly conduct from corrupt judges
and lawyers who act as "bug-bears to their innocent neighbors, using
the laws for traps and snares" and making it "stink in the nostrils of
the people."34 Criticism of law and lawyers, then, was not a specific
are near of kin," to which his keeper replied, "And well you may be, you speak Latin
both alike." RUGGLE, supranote 55, at act I, sc. 3; first prologue at 4.

For one of many portrayals of greedy lawyers stirring up touble for profit, seeJOHN
WEBSTER, THE DEVIL'S LAW CASE act II, sc. i, iii; id act IV, sc. i (1623).

128For comic relief, Holinshed spun a fish story about a client twice putting
fees
into the thrusting hands of lawyers only to stare vainly as they remained silent at the
bar, hoping to extort more. See 1 RAPHAEL HOLINSHED, CHRONICLES OF ENGLAND,
SCOTLAND AND IRELAND 304 (1807) (1577); 2 id. at 13. He also condemned lawyers'
arrogance and "excessive taking of money." Id.
'2 SeeJOHN EARLE, An Attorney, in MICRO-COSMOGRAPHY at C3v-C5r (1628); Lenton, supranote 113, at B4v-B6r; Francis Lenton, A YoungInns of Court Gentleman Thomas
Overbury, in CHARACTERS, supra note 113, at F4r-F6r; THOMAS OVERBURY, A Mere Common Lauyer, in THE OVERBURIAN CHARACTERS, supra note 113, at 30, 30-32; THOMAS

OVERBURY, supra note 113, at 45-46; OVERBURY, A Mere Pettifogger, in THE OVERBURIAN
CHARACTERS, supra note 113, at 64, 64-65; JOHN STEPHENS, A Pettifogging Attorney, in
ESSAYS AND CHARACTERS, supra note 123, at 335, 335-41.
'" 2 PHILIP STUBBES, THE ANATOMY OF ABUSES 9-14 (Frederick J. Furnivall ed.,

1882) (1583).
'S'
ROBERT BURTON, THE ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY 82-86 (HolbrookJackson ed.,
1977) (1621).

in2 ROBERT BOLTON, A Sermon Preached at Lent Assizes, in MR. BOLTON'S LAST AND
LEARNED WORK 259 (4th ed. 1639).
"' SAMUEL GARY, IENTACULUM IUDICUM: OR, A BREAKFAST FOR THE BENCH 35-60

(1623).
'" ANTHONY CADE, A SERMON OF THE NATURE OF CONSCIENCE 11-17 (1621);
THOMAS GATAKER, God's Parley with Pinces, in CERTAIN SERMONS 112 (1637); HARRIS,
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type of work, distinct, concentrated, and readily missed like a book of
music or hawking. It was rather a device recurring across genres, diffuse and pervasive like the figure of the fool or the appeal to fictive
kinship.
This critical offensive made lawyers' resort to the press an attractive countermeasure. Historians have stressed the importance of lawyers' apologetic writings proliferating in the latter sixteenth century.
Indebted to John Fortescue's De Laudibus Legum Angliae, they mixed

apostrophes to practitioners' skill and morality with praise for the
common law, lauding its immemorial antiquity and suitability to the
English nation, its consonance with Scripture and reason, and its virtues of speed, certainty, and precision. Alongside this deeply impor-

tantjustificatory enterprise emerged an appreciation of legal publishing as an instrument of professional defense. Its roots lay in the
dictum that shallow misapprehension of the law bred dissatisfaction
and criticism, while deeper study cultivated appreciation and acceptance. Typical was Edward Coke's retort to the French civilian Francois Hotman's ridicule of Thomas Littleton's Tenures (1481): "Alas,
our books of law seem to them [civilians and canonists] to be dark
and obscure; but no wise man will impute it to the laws, but to their
ignorance, who by their sole and superficial reading of them cannot
understand the depth of them."13

5

Coke found the Catholic contro-

versialist Robert Parsons "utterly ignorant (but exceeding bold, as
commonly those qualities concur) in the laws of the realm. " 13 6 Here
was another branch of the Fortescue revival, sharing a sentiment
voiced in chapter five of De Laudibus. "what is not known is usually

not only unloved but also spurned; hence a certain poet observes, 'All
that he is ignorant of, the rustic declares, ought to be despised.'. . . Wherefore
it is commonly said that 'Art has no enemy ex7
cept the ignorant."

supra note 67, at 24-25; THOMAS SUTTON, JETHRO'S COUNSEL TO MosEs 24 (1631);

SAMUEL WARD, JETHRO'SJUSTICE OF PEACE 51 (1621).
'" EDWARD COKE, Preface to REPORTS, pt. 10, at xxx (1826 ed.) (1614). See also
JOHN FERNE, THE BLAZON OF GENTRY 39 (1586) ("No science can have a greater enemy than ignorance.").
EDWARD COKE, Prefaceto REPORTS, pt. 6, at xvi (1826 ed.) (1607).
Fortescue also adds: "But how shall you be able to love justice, if you do not
first somehow grasp a knowledge of the laws by which justice itself is known? For Aristotle says that 'Nothing is loved unless it be known.'" See JOHN FORTESCUE, DE
LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGUAR 10-11 (Shelley Lockwood ed., 1997) (MS, c.1470) (Chapter
5 title: "Here he proves that ignorance of the law causes contempt for it."). The notes
to the 1997 Cambridge edition of Fortescue cannot identify Fortescue's "poet" and
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The attribution of criticism to ignorance cast legal education as
both preventative and antidote, a point implicit in the apologetic literature and openly defended as the 1640s turned the common lawyers' attention from the lesser challenge of their disciplinary and jurisdictional rivals to the greater problem of answering a more vocal
and dangerous law reform agitation. Perhaps, some publicists
thought, the vernacular legal press could tutor critics in law's hidden
virtues. Perhaps it could assuage lay anger provoked by the collision
of unreasonable expectation with misperceived reality, a result of fifty
years of printed scurrility passing for common wisdom and providing
the lens for viewing law. "Which of us has not heard it objected,"
asked Thomas Wentworth in The Office and Duty of Executors (1641),
"that we the professors of the law, seek to hide and secret the knowledge thereof under this dark and distasted" French language? Wentworth counseled English-language publication as a remedy for the
overstated complaint. The "more nobles, gentlemen and others, shall
be acquainted with the law of the land, and the justness, equity, prudence and providence thereof, the more they will love it and affect
it;... the want of knowledge of it causes the leanness of loveto it. "
William Hughes translated the MirrorofJustices (1646) in part to dissuade the "meaner sort of the people" from charging that the common laws were "built but upon a sandy foundation, viz., the conceits
of a few men, and that they are not grounded upon the laws of God,
from which all laws of men ought to flow."'39 Hughes thought that
ignorance "principally nourished" this "vulgar... objection," and he
turned out several translations of lawbooks in the cause of education. 40 Indeed, interregnum pamphleteers defending the legal system from critics declared
that the common law "never had an enemy
4
it."' '
understood
who
William Sheppard's property treatise, The Touchstone of Common
Assurances (1648), hinted at the psychology of using dissemination as
find that Fortescue misattributed to Aristotle a sentiment expressed in St. Augustine's

On the Trinity.
3 THOMAS WENTWORTH, Prefaceto THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF EXEcUToRS at A2-A7

(1641).

" Hughes, Prefaceto MIRROR OFJUSTICES, supra note 45, at A3. In addition to the
MirrorofJustices, Hughes's translations included Anthony Fitzherbert's New Natura Brevium (1652), and Diversity of Courts (1646), William Leonard's Reports and Cases of Law
(1658-1675), and Arthur Gregory's Moot Book (1663).
1
1

Hughes, supranote 45, at A3.
ALBERTUS WARREN, EIGHT REASONS CATEGORICAL: WHEREIN IS EXAMINED AND

PROVED, THAT IT'S PROBABLE, THE LAW COMMON WILL STAND, AND CONTINUE AT

LONDON AND WESTMINSTER 3 (1653).
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professional defense. 42 A moderate law reformer sympathetic to the
interregnum government, but opposed to radical populist and Biblicist programs, Sheppard maintained a genuine commitment to legal
accessibility. Opening law to the people will win it regard "as a jewel
whose properties are known" despite the objections of "Papists" (as
ever, lurking).,4 3 Yet he shrewdly perceived that printed lawbooks,
particularly complex, technical ones brimming with "judgments, stat4
utes, resolutions and cases" could intimidate while enlightening.' 4
The jewel of legal argument, if intricately cut and polished, demonstrated the difficulty of thinking properly about law, let alone practicing it. It dissolved the critical confidence born of a quick look at law,
instead cultivating modesty and driving laymen back to lawyers for
guidance. Had the "Papist" manqui whom Sheppard's preface depicted as the obstacle to publishing English law succeeded in banishing the Touchstone to Romish darkness, he would have kept from the
people a sustained lesson in the limits of their own capabilities. For
law was
somewhat transcendent, and too high for ordinary capacities, the manner of putting cases is so concise, the distinctions and differences of law
are so many, that it is hard for any man not well read in the145laws of general, to judge or make use of any part of them in particular.
Though Sheppard, Wentworth, and Hughes followed the middle
sixteenth-century humanists in casting popular legal knowledge as an
"efficient cause" of respect for law and lawyers, they imagined an intellectually more active and politically more skeptical audience.
Hughes's readers would learn that the common law rested on "the
laws of God" rather than the "conceits of a few men" only when they
probed its allegedly "sandy foundation," while Sheppard's would-be
reformers and cut-rate "empirics" needed a tour through the thickets
of property law to appreciate the trained lawyer's skills. The onset of
the Revolution favored articulation of a strategy implicit in Coke, Bacon, and earlier publicists: that in an age of growing pressures for re-

supra note 55, at A4-AS. I have stressed Sheppard's emphasis on the
limits of lay abilities. He also thought that the Touchstone could help readers put better-informed questions to their counsel. What worried him was the danger posed by
"pettifoggers" to the interpretive monopoly and hence dignity, political power and income of lawyers. On Sheppard's career and the Touchstone, see NANCY L. MATTHEWS,
WILLIAM SHEPPARD, CROMWELL'S LAW REFORMER 77-91 (1984).
'43 SHEPPARD, supranote 55, at A4-A5.
142SHEPPARD,

144 id

1 Id
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form, publication offered a more secure defense of the law and the
bar's profitable specialty in interpretation than the anti-publicists'
mystery. Just as the anti-publicists tacitly accused the humanists of
facile optimism, so the early Stuart publicists returned the favor, suggesting that the anti-publicists' pessimism rested on an incomplete
understanding of the consequences of legal dissemination. The publicists' critique was in the form of a counter-prophesy. The antipublicists mistakenly thought legal printing corroded more than
deepened respect for the law because they underestimated the power
of legal publications to answer skeptics' doubts or, as useful, to create
self-doubt, to cultivate in readers a politically recessive diffidence
about criticizing the law.16

2. Making Knowledge Common and Inviting Its Misuse
Printing made a text "common," an act that could bear both positive and negative connotations. William Lambarde's justice of the
peace manual, Eirenarcha,became "common by impression" to help
layjustices better conduct their offices.147 What worried anti-publicists
was a text improperly common, one laid before those who had no
business reading it, a complicated judgment sensitive to context.
"J.L.," author of the preface to Henry Finch's Law, or a Discourse
Thereof (1627), a translation of an early draft of Finch's law French
Nomotechnia (1613), claimed that "[t]o impart good is to improve it,
which was one cause of the translation of this book; yet is it not
thereby made so facile as to descend to vulgar capacities; witness the
very phrase, the terms of art, excluding all hope of accrue to layconceited opinions." 4 1 Julius Caesar, a civilian admitted to the Inner
Temple, published The Ancient State Authority, and Proceedings of the
Court of Requests (1597), records demonstrating his tribunal's antiquity, in order to win it advantage in jurisdictional conflicts with the
common law courts. Caesar's manuscript letter of dedication to Lord
Burghley explained that since he found it "overchargeable to write
many copies" of his work, he caused a
brief table of my collections themselves to be imprinted, not to the end
to make them common but of purpose to deliver some of them to such,
either counselors of estate or counselors at law, or such students of an-

146

Revealing the "hidden" law also answered one of the critics' most powerful

charges while appealing to segments of the bar committed to legal dissemination.
17 LAMBARDE, Epistle, supra note 45, at Aiiv.
' J.L., To the Reader,inFTNCH, supranote

103, at A3v-A4r.
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tiquities and of histories, as from whose wisdom and good observations
either in law, or story, or antiquities there might be drawn such
amendment of things amiss or addition of things wanting or justification
of things misconstrued. 149

As J.L's and Caesar's comments suggest, the distinction between
knowledge properly restricted and improperly common could be
measured along multiple continua: between manuscript and print,
between lawyers and laymen, between gentry and the vulgar, between
the well- and ill-educated, between government officials and private
persons. To become common meant to pass a boundary along one or
more of these continua, with the placement of the boundary and the
relevant continua varying according to context. Printing of a text and
a broad, popular readership were "risk factors" in drawing the sneer
"common," but neither was a sufficient nor a necessary condition.
Manuscript writers, for example, complained when their works escaped from an envisioned limited circulation and, through unauthorized copying, wound up in too many or the wrong hands."" In Caesar's opinion, printing Court of Requests records did not make them

unsuitably common-provided that government officials, lawyers, historians, and antiquaries comprised the audience. Since Caesar knew
that laborers, journeymen, and small farmers would not snap up
Court of Requests records, the danger of commoning lay, realistically,
in distribution to the wrong segment of the educated, to those who
had no warrant for this sort of knowledge. To the extent that commoning meant violation of imagined limitations, it demarcated the
boundaries of expectation primarily, and of class, status, office, and
educational attainment secondarily.
Commoning worked a double injury in the eyes of the antipublicists. It debased the dignity of law as it did of any learning, a
sentiment expressed throughout learned Europe from the early sixteenth century in metaphors of intellectual promiscuity, as in the
common dictum, "The pen is a virgin, the printing press a whore.""
4

9 Juuus CAESAR, THE ANCIENT STATE AUTHORITY, AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE

COURT OF REQUESTS 4 (L.M. Hill ed., 1975) (1597); L.M. Hill, Introduction to id. at
xvii-xx.
50 See HAROLD LOVE, SCRIBAL PUBLICATION IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

35-89 (1993).
,' "Est virgo hec penna, meretrix est stampificata." Roger Chartier, The PracticalImpact
of Witing, in 3 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: PASSIONS OF THE RENAISSANCE 111, 123
(Roger Chartier ed., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1989). See also CONLEY, supra note

82, at 89-90, 102-03 (opposition of universities to vernacular translation of classics and
the fear that making learning common undercut awe among the multitude).
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The law shared with classics and mathematics this descent to the vulgar thatJ.L. feared. Yet with the exception of divinity, the publication
of law threatened social dislocations in a way that printing other bodies of knowledge did not. To make law common invited its abuse by
readers unequipped or unwilling to use it well. Edward Coke printed
his Reports but composed them in law French like the medieval yearbooks "lest the unlearned by bare reading without right understanding might suck out errors, and trusting to their conceit, might endamage themselves, and sometimes fall into destruction."'52 Coke's
concerns underlay the publicist William Sheppard's sketch of attorneys and scriveners and, worse, vicars, blacksmiths, carpenters, and
weavers having "no more law than is on the backside of Littleton," offering opinions on land titles to penny-wise customers. Publicists and
anti-publicists alike shared a paternalistic concern for laymen taken in
by patent-medicine lawyering. Solicitude for the unlearned moved
them. So did a sharp-eyed defense of barristers' livelihood against the
competition of attorneys and lay "empirics" ready to draft wills and
conveyances, those "pettifoggers" who intruded "into other
men's
53
callings" and "thrust their sickles into other men's harvest."
The underlearned conveyancers and village autodidacts were only
one half of the problem. The anti-publicists focused on the other,
darker half, the deceit and disobedience facilitated by legal publication. Recorder of London Anthony Benn thought that "the worst of
all are they that study daily how to break through laws to pervert and
disorder all civil government."'5 Such talk drew on elite fear of the
"many-headed monster," the common people and the alienated.'5 If
the "ruder sort" knew the "liberty allowed them by the law," a member of Parliament suggested in a 1597 debate on enclosures, they
would be "as unbridled and untamed beasts."5 6 But the antipublicists' point was broader than this commonplace, as suggested by
William Hudson's portrait of the multitude using lawbooks as "shifts
to cloak their wickedness, rather than to gain understanding... for
112EDWARD COKE, REPORTS, pt. 3, at xxxix-xl (1826 ed.) (1602).

"'iSHEPPARD, supra note 55, at AS-A5. Coke argued that doubts about the law
arose, in part, because of "conveyances and wills drawn and devised by such as have
scientiamsciolorum quae estmixta ignorantia." COKE pt. 4, supra note 30, at xviii.
15 BENN, supranote 100, at L28/46,
fol. 44r.
s CHRISTOPHER HILL, The Many-Headed Monster, in CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 181, 181 (1975).
15 SeeJim Sharpe, Social Strain and Social Dislocation, 1585-1603, in
THE REIGN OF
ELIZABETH I: COURT AND CULTURE IN THE LAST DECADE 204 (John Guy ed., 1995)
[hereinafter THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH I].
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surely few men would be ruinated by dishonest means, if men knew
not how to cover their dishonesty under some color of law or justice."' 57 Hudson held up the moral superiority of untutored honesty
over learned disingenuousness. From the ideal of Christian simplicity
to the image of the noble savage, this trope appeared in widely different guises in English culture, no less in law, where it helped justify the
denial of counsel to felony defendants. In the context of legal publication, this pose of unlearned forthrightness was ostensibly morally
attractive, but in practice politically disabling, as the anti-publicists
knew. Reluctance to print law not only restrained Hudson's cloaked
multitude. It also supported any hierarchy resting on superior access
to legal knowledge, including those at the upper levels of the political
nation-Court and parliamentarians, city council and burgesses,
bishops and clergy. Reading Hudson's and Benn's strictures primarily in class terms risks obscuring how withholding law from the press
for fear of its misconstrual reinforced hierarchies of information
within as well as between social strata. Indeed, as I will argue in Part
IIIA of this Article, the spread of printed legal knowledge through
wider segments of the political nation, to burgesses, successful artisans and yeomen, professionals and lesser clergy, fueled anti-publicist
fears of disclosure.
The publicist Ferdinand Pulton addressed anti-publicist complaints in the preface to his criminal law treatise, De Pace Regis et Regni
(1610). Might printed law "be misconstrued by every ignorant and
unlearned person .... the reader himself.., be led into error, and
others.., be misinformed by his imbecility of judgment?""" Pulton
held up the Bible in reply. The laity read Scripture despite the risk of
misunderstanding. The "wresting" of God's Scriptural law, like man's
positive law, convicted the reader of "ignorance, pride, self love, or
folly," but did not indict the law. Besides, an initial unsteadiness
hobbled the student of any branch of knowledge, from grammar to
logic to music to law, who must begin in ignorance and proceed
slowly to mastery. The "busy searcher of other men's knowledge"
should consider the vast learning abroad in books and attend to his
own shortcomings.
This defense of the dutiful novice's mistakes as a necessary stage
in the cycle of learning was straightforward compared to Pulton's de-

17

Hudson, supra note 2, at 2. Thomas Barnes argues that Hudson's sentiments

were "conventional." Barnes, supra note 2, at 297.
'5' PULTON, Preface, supra note 78, at [7].
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nial that his criminal law treatise provided apprentice felons with
"shifts to cloak their wickedness." I write about crimes, said Pulton,
but I aim for peace obtained by "the laws that do punish or restrain"
misdeeds.
As many Physicians have written large volumes of several infirmities in
man's body, and then expressed which be the medicines to cure them;
not to the intent to allure the reader to seek the disease, but how to prevent it ....
And several divines have composed whole tomes, of pride,
malice, covetousness, and such like offenses, not to the intent to entice
the frail man to fall into them, but to show the enormities of
them....to the end they might ...discourage transgressors from them.
Curious reassurances, unless the anti-publicist critique is kept in

mind. Why else worry that medical treatises will "allure the reader to
seek" diseases, or that theological writings "entice the frail man to fall
into" sin?159
Pulton cleverly shifted the terrain of argument to engage the antipublicists. He made temptation ("allure" into disease, "entice" into
sin) the supposed hazard of books. Since sin and disease held little
attraction for readers, the Promethean danger of published learning
could be conveniently, if too lightly, dismissed. But lawbooks offered
more alluring enticements than sin and disease: instruction in evasion of taxes and trade regulation; tactics for challenging royal parliamentary programs, entrenched urban oligarchies, and overcharging manorial lords; strategies for restraining bishops and the
ecclesiastical courts. Nor did the anti-publicists think the cultivation
of deviant interests the central danger of lawbooks. The problem was
less psychological than tactical-the apparatus of justification provided by lawbooks, the training in covering "dishonesty under some
color of law or justice" that Hudson condemned. Pulton minimized
the political dangers of misreading by, ironically, misconstruing to his
own advantage the anti-publicist critique.
With more justice, Pulton placed legal publication in a broad interdisciplinary context to alter the reader's perception of anomaly,
for the distinctive rather than the expected demanded justification.
With the widespread oral and chirographic transmission of law in
mind, law printing appeared anomalous; with the widespread vernacular printing of arts and sciences in Tudor England in mind, the
failure to publish law appeared anomalous. Had not authors "written
learnedly and profoundly, of grammar, logic, rhetoric, philosophy,
...Rd at [5]-491.
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physic, arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy, and published to
all posterity the several grounds, principles, and maxims of every of
them? " ' 6° Of these learned fields, scripture and medicine attracted
Pulton's particular attention, and with good reason. Laymen felt
themselves entitled to knowledge about their liberties and estates,
God, and the body in a way that distinguished law, religion, and
medicine from other learned fields, say, geometry or philology. Critics of the professions grouped lawyers with divines and physicians as
jointly monopolizing knowledge that should, by right, belong to all.1 6
By highlighting at the rhetorical level law's connection to medicine
and Scripture, Pulton increased the burden of explanation upon the
anti-publicists.
3. Litigiousness
Critics of legal publication charged that it bred lawsuits, a potent
complaint at a time when litigation in the royal courts was mounting
rapidly. From 1500 to 1640, the litigation rate in the common law
courts rose far faster than the population. Christopher Brooks has
estimated that the number of cases in advanced stages in the King's
Bench and Common Pleas increased from 2100 in 1490, to 5278 in
1560-1563, to 23,147 in 1606, and to 28,734 in 1640.'62 Englishmen
recognized that lawsuits redressed grievances and substituted for
physical violence yet bemoaned litigiousness as an index of disharmony and moral decay. The reasons for the sixteenth-century rise in
litigation rates were not well understood, making it easy to blame law
printing as a cause, as it may have been. William Barlee "heard one
old man," a lawyer, argue that "many suits have arisen in the Queen's
courts among subjects.., since our statute laws were published in the
English tongue to the common sort of people. " 163 Almost three quar-

0Id.at [8]-[9].
161

See HILL, supra note 122, at 297-300.

162 Population

grew slowly until 1520, when it began a steady rise from about 2.4

million to 3.5 million by 1580, and about 5 million by 1640. The simultaneous expansion of population and economic activity in the sixteenth century created a host of
disputes that found their way to Westminster rather than manorial and borough
courts. This happened in small part because of procedural innovations in the common-law courts that made litigation there more attractive, and in large part because of

weakness of the local courts as fora for civil disputes. The sevenfold price inflation of
the sixteenth century drove down the real value of the 40 shilling amount in controversy minimum in the common-law courts, bringing more business there. See BROOKS,
supra note 112, at 51, 88-100.
163

Letter from William Barlee to William Cecil, supra note 23.
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ters of a century later, in 1650, Bulstrode Whitelocke spoke in favor of
a Parliamentary statute making English the language of court process
and law-books. He entertained the objection that law "generally more
understood, yet not sufficiently, would occasion the more suits." ' 64
What did Whitelocke mean by law "more understood, yet not sufficiently"? William Fulbeck cited Cicero for the proposition that not
knowledge of the law but its ignorance bred litigation, a topos as useful
to publicists as to lawyers rebutting popular disdain for the contentiousness of their discipline.'6
"If the laws were plainly set forth,"
predicted John Hales, "fewer suits, less trouble, more quiet and concord should be among people." 6 Anti-publicists supposed that law
printing would not inculcate the "sufficient" understanding of law
necessary for Cicero's ideal of informed harmony. Rather, the press
would give the multitude but a taste of the law, conjuring in their addled minds fantasies of profiting through litigation and challenging
hierarchical superiors without guiding them from superficiality
through to sufficiency of understanding. If professional training
greatly surpassed lay law reading in rigor, both ideally shared the
same psychological aspiration: "to apply our minds to a virtuous and
wise rather than to a cunning and curious knowledge of the law," as
the Recorder of London Anthony Benn put it.' 67 Here in another
guise was a debate over the probability of the multitude manipulating
legal craft or interiorizing the virtues early modem legal panegyrists
saw in the law-its aspiration towards a reflective order.
4. Political Unity
Critics of legal publication charged that it would multiply faction
and dissension as had vernacular Biblical and religious printing after
the Reformation. "Ignorance was the mother of devotion, as these
men [the anti-publicists] now would make her of obedience," wrote
the publicist Ferdinand Pulton in caricature, underscoring the indebtedness of the point, at least in form of expression, to Tridentine
Catholic critiques of unguided, and hence socially disruptive and intellectually promiscuous popular education.J
The publicists con-

3 WHrrELOCKE, supranote 55, at 272.
,65
FULBECK, supranote 123, at 67.
166HALES, supra note 16, at MS LC 14:32.1, fol. 17r.
167BENN, supra note 100, at L28/46,
fol. 24v.
'0 See PULTON, Preface,supranote 78, at [7]. Identifying ignorance as "the mother
'"

and cause of true devotion and obedience" was a popular Protestant caricature of
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tinually asserted that law printing strengthened social order and political unity, thereby hinting at the background critique they needed
to answer, the frequency of their reassurances implying the seriousness of the challenge. Their strategy resembled that of Francis Bacon
in The Advancement of Learning (1605), fending off critics of his far
grander educational program:
For to say that a blind custom of obedience should be a surer obligation
than duty taught and understood, it is to affirm that a blind man may
tread surer by a guide than a seeing man can by a light. And it is without all controversy that learning does make the minds of men gentle,
generous, maniable, and pliant to government; whereas ignorance
makes them churlish, thwart, and mutinous; and the evidence of time
does clear this assertion, considering that the most barbarous, rude, and
unlearned times have been most subject to tumults, seditions, and
changes. 169

C. The Anti-Publicists
The anti-publicists were an elusive group. They mainly resided
offstage, as it were, with publicists responding to their arguments or
alluding to an ongoing debate over the propriety of printing law.
Ferdinand Pulton's De Pace Regis et Regni (1609), for example, defended legal publication in a several-page rebuttal to "the private
conceits, or particular fantasies of a few opinative persons" who "by
disputes encounter [i.e., "go counter to"] the publishing or reading
of our... laws in the English tongue." But who were the "opinative
persons"? And whom did he need to reassure that "divulging" the
criminal law did not "impeach [its] credit"? Who suggested to
William Sheppard that publication made the law "despised" and the
lawyer "less regarded and used"? Who was the old lawyer that Barlee
heard link the rise in litigation to the publication of the statutes "in
the English tongue to the common sort of people"? Who were the
barristers accusing Thomas Powell of trespassing in their enclosure
and commoning their mysteries? Who were the "clerks and officers"
that Bulstrode Whitelocke accused of wanting to retain the laws "in a
kind of mystery to the vulgar" to sustain their "private honor and
profit"? Who were the critics that Edward Coke had in mind when he

Catholic practice. See, e.g., JOHN JEWEL, Of Ignorance in Reply to M. Harding'sAnswer
(1565), in 2 THE WORKS OFJOHNJEWEL, supra note 75, at 799-800.
1
BACON, supra note 82, at 273.
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announced in the first volume of his Institutes (1628) that vernacular
publication of legal treatises cannot "work any inconvenience"?.
Reading these comments is like seeing footprints in the snow;
they alert you to the passage of a group, but tell little about its
makeup or principles. Indeed, was it a group? The anti-publicist critique appears as an intellectual position invoked selectively, even opportunistically, rather than a discernible movement. 1 William
Barlee, for example, prefaced his manuscript Concordance celebrating
the healing balm of lawbooks with a warning to readers to hide the
work "from rash headed fellows, lest they tear you or your friends in
pieces. I mean lest they vex lords of manors."'2 One can image a
manorial lord blaming lawbooks for encouraging copyholder suits
while welcoming them as aids to performing his duties as a justice of
the peace and a resource for parliamentary allies resisting royal purveyance, monopolies, and impositions.
The anti-publicists whose reservations survive on paper favored
royalist politics. William Hudson's Treatise on Star Chamber (MS,
1621) adopted James I's view of the king as the fountain of justice
within the realm, distributing judicature according to kingly prudence rather than constitutional or customary requirement.'73 As the
civilian Julius Caesar, the Master of Requests, climbed to higher offices in the king's service, Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1606, Master of the Rolls in 1614, he interleaved manuscript pages within his
private copy of the Ancient State Authority, and Proceedings of the Court of
Requests (1597), recording rules of decorous conduct at Court and of
protocol at meetings of the Council, implying that the dignity of the
J.L., whose preface to Henry
Council reflected onto Requests.'
work
would not "descend to vulgar
Law
(1627)
hoped
that
the
Finch's
capacities," approved of Finch's separate treatment of "the flower of
the crown, the king's prerogative," lest it "be valued in the hands of a

note 78; SHEPPARD, supra note 55, at AS; Letter from
William Barlee to William Cecil, supra note 23; POWIELL, THE ATroRNEY's ACADEMY,
170 PULTON, Preface, supra

supra note 45, at [7]-[15]; 3 WHnTELOCE, supra note 55, at 272; CoKE, Proemium, in
FIRST INsTITUTE, supranote 45.

I am indebted to Peter Hoffer for suggesting this point.
BARLEE, supra note 21, at 1.
173 See Hudson, supra note 2, at 9-10. Thomas Barnes has labelled a "conventional
concern" Hudson's refusal to go into print lest the multitude obtain "shifts to cloak
their wickedness." Barnes, supra note 2, at 297.
'71

17

'7' See L.M. HILL, BENCH AND BUREAUCRACY: THE PUBLIC CAREER OF SIR JULIUs
CAESAR, 1580-1636, at xvii-xx (1988).
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common person." 7 5 Recorder of London Anthony Benn, who argued
that the law did not bind but submitted itself to the king, noted sourly
"how desirous every man is to publish laws and how faint hearted they
are to execute them."7 6 Yet if anti-publicists showed an affinity for
royalist politics, there was no necessary connection. Some ofJames's
champions in the bar, such as Francis Bacon and John Davies, offered
(qualified) support to law printing.
Anti-publicist discomfort with the press sounded from the last
quarter of the sixteenth century into the seventeenth. A darkening of
mood, a growing (or at least more publicly expressed) ambivalence
and suspicion clouded the earlier, and continuing, approval of the
medium. Though "mood" and "ambivalence" are difficult to chart,
three kinds of evidence support this hypothesis. First, comparison of
the overall tenor of lawyers' reflections on legal publishing suggests a
deepening concern over the effects of print after, approximately,
1575. Lawyers optimistic, or at least matter of fact, about print's potential (Rastell, St. German, Taverner, Phaer, Barlee, Pulton,
Fraunce) began writing in roughly the 1520s and continued on into
the seventeenth century to include the law publishing cottage industries of Michael Dalton, William Hughes, and William Sheppard. The
lawyers who themselves expressed reservations about printing law
(Caesar, "J.L.," Hudson, Benn) or acknowledged background murmuring by answering objections (Barlee, Coke, Powell, Pulton,
Sheppard, Whitelocke) wrote after, roughly, 1575.
Second, an increasing anxiety about resorting to the press appeared not only in successive groups of lawyers, but in the writings of
one exceptionally long-lived author, Ferdinand Pulton (1536-1618).
Pulton's Abstract ofAll the Penal Statutes, published in 1560 and in multiple later editions, offered a Rastellian defense of legal publication.
Almost fifty years later, the preface to his criminal law treatise De Pace
Regis et Regni (1609) offered an extended rebuttal to those "opinative
persons" opposing vernacular legal publication. This apologia responded not only to the critics' questions and doubts but to their
growing importance.
Third, authors of printed lawbooks from 1575-1640 who said
nothing against law publishing did an awful lot of hand-wringing,
apologizing for using the press in low bows of modesty and self175

J.L., To the Reader, supra note 148, at A3v.

176

ANTHONY BENN, GOD BEFORE ALL, AND ALL AFTER THE KING, Bedford Record

Office, MS L28/49 [11]; BENN, Of Laws, in ESSAYS WRrTTEN BY ANTHONY BENN, supra
note 100, at fol. 41v.
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abasement. "I published this book because a printer got hold of a
manuscript through my friends or through a surreptitious copyist,"
thus Simon Theloall and Edmund Plowden.J "There are too many
books these days, so with great trepidation I add one more," thus
John Ferne, Henry Swinburne, and John Croke. 178 "I did not wish to
print, but friends, patrons and the common good implored me," thus
William Lambarde, Edward Coke, Edmund Plowden, James Dyer's
literary executors, and Thomas Ashe.7 Edmund Plowden assembled
his law reports "without the least thought or intention of letting it appear in print," later resisting the solicitations of the judges "to make it
public, which I was very unwilling to do." 8" The nephews of James
Dyer, badgered by pleas to print the deceased judge's manuscript law
reports, "assented not, nor purposed to yield unto at all" for two years,
until the "importunacy of our said friends... procured others of
greater countenance, most earnestly to move us in that behalf, who
with sundry weighty reasons... very effectually assailed us."' 8,
Did these touches of embarrassment and defensiveness suggest
discomfort with law printing? One could read the rituals of reluctance as a reasonable hedge against the risk of publication. Lawyers
feared damaging their reputation by appearing overeager and underqualified. Being "conscious of the simpleness of my own understanding," wrote the reporter Edmund Plowden, "and consequently of my
want of excellency in judgment, I thought it my duty to decline making public.., the arguments of men more learned than myself,... and thereby to avoid the censure of affecting a more acute

and discerning judgment than I really had."812 Would-be critics like
William Hudson stood ready to condemn lawyers' books as "a flag of
vain-glory unworthy [of] their gravity" that "publish to others that
which they well understand not themselves," so legal authors adopted
the Renaissance strategy of coupling modest disclaimers of skill with
177 See SIMON THELOALL, LE DIGEST DES BREFES ORIGINALS, ET DES CHOSE

CONCERNANTS Eux at iiib (1579); EDMUND PLOWDEN, Preface to REPORTS AT v (1816)

(1578).
178 SeeJOHN FERNE, THE BLAZON OF GENTRIE at Av' (1586); HENRY SWINBURNE,

Prefaceto the Reader,A BRIEF TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS (1590-91);John
Croke, Introductionto KEILWAY, REPORTS (1602).
19 See LAMBARDE, supra note 45, at Aii; EDWARD COKE, REPORTS pt 1, at xxviii-xxix
(1826 ed.) (1600); PLOWDEN, Preface,supra note 177, at iii-iv; R.F. &J.D., To the Students
of the Common Laws, in DYER, supra note 45; Thomas Ashe, Preface to ABRIDGEMENT DES
TOUTS LES CASES REPORTES A LARGE PER MONSIEUR PLOWDEN (c. 1600).
'80 PLOWDEN, Preface,supranote 177, at iii-iv.
181 R.F. &J.D., supra note 179.
1 PLOWDEN, Preface,supra note
177, at v.
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invocation of a powerful patron to ward off attacks.'8 3 Lawyers with
ambitions of royal preferment or sensitive to the fragility of their gentle status feared the social stigma attaching to printing in Courtly circles identifying publication with a grasping, popularizing spirit inappropriate in a gentleman.'84 And the political implications of an
author's legal writings could thwart career advancement if officials
took offense, even years after publication when the direction of the
tides of conventional thinking could not have been foreseen.
One could also read the evidence as mere formulae, another appearance of a familiar figure-the unwilling author reluctantly allowing publication of his unworthy work. The diffident author enjoyed a
long history among medieval manuscripts before serving Renaissance
printing, and he took his works to the press with the same avid hesitancy with which he once took them to the scribes.'84 Yet if the trope
was both conventional and a reasonable precaution, it did become far
more common among published lawyers in the last quarter of the sixteenth century than before. Sieges of Dyeresque proportion were not
among the humanists' literary clich6s. The ebbs and flows of formulae mark the background conventions and problems against which
authors wrote, and the dramatic increase after 1575 in the number of
published lawyers explaining why they decided-or felt compelledto print suggests a conflicted opinion about the propriety of resort to
the press.
The very elusiveness of the anti-publicists presents a challenging
interpretive problem for the historian. Is the importance or the unimportance of the anti-publicists the phenomenon to be explained?
Do the extant anti-publicist complaints and publicist responses represent the tip of an iceberg or the tip of an ice cube? For if one construes their arguments as but a small scribble upon the heap of paper
generated by the Tudor and early Stuart legal profession, then the
question to be asked is why law printing generated so little opposition

"3 Hudson, supra, note 2, at 1-2. See generally BENNETT, supra note 20, at 5-10, 29;
H.S. BENNETr, ENGISH BOOKS & READERS, 1603 TO 1640, at 29-31, 231-32 (1970).
184 SeeJ.W. Saunders, The Stigma of Print, 1 ESSAYS IN CRITICISM 139, 139 (1951).
Martin Elsky has explored Francis Bacon's oscillations between carefully modulated
praise and disdain for print as his courtly ambitions fell and rose. See MARTIN ELSKY,
AUTHORIZING WORDS: SPEECH, WRITING, AND PRINT IN THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE
(1989).
1"5For a discussion of its late Renaissance incarnation, see BENNETT, supra note 20,
at 5, 25, 29.
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compared to publication of Scripture, medicine, and
and discussion
16
classics.

1

I have read the extant statements of the anti-publicists and publicists as evidence of an important debate. One cannot gauge the extent of the debate by merely tallying up surviving quotations. Antipublicists were unlikely to put their complaints into print, as printers
were unlikely to strike off denunciations of their business. Grumbling
about the disadvantages of legal publication mainly appeared, one
suspects, in conversation and correspondence (of which relatively little survives for lawyers). Counting quotations on the effects of legal
publication likely underestimates the importance of the problem to
early modem lawyers, who wrote surprisingly little about other sociocultural issues ranging from the effects of burgeoning foreign trade
and population growth on the law, to the impact of expanding educational opportunity and New World discovery, to the differences between Biblical hermeneutics and legal interpretation. Did lawyers not
think about these matters? (Technical, professional questions, politics, religion, and family matters occupy the bulk of their surviving
writings.)
Questioning the correlation between the number of surviving
quotations and the salience of a debate could terminate in sterile agnosticism or, worse, the invention of imaginary discourses. Fortunately, the identity of the authors and the content of the surviving
evidence suggests the importance of the dispute over legal publication. William Hudson, for example, succeeded in the politically
tinged Star Chamber practice. Would such a man present to the new
Lord Keeper in 1621, the bishop John Williams, a letter dedicatory
fulminating against the legal press if the opposition to law printing
were the work of only a few cranks? If grumbling about legal publishing sounded only in dark byways of the bar, why would Hudson suppose a bishop interested in the matter? Hudson himself could be a
crank, but Pulton's several-page reply to critics of law printing in the
preface to De Pace Regis (1609) suggests otherwise. Did Pulton, a
statutory compiler of fifty years' standing turned treatise writer, respond to a merely trivial critique, and reply no less at length, in print,
and over the course of several editions?18 7 Francis Bacon, likely thinking about the proper boundaries of publicizing religion, science,

'8 I am indebted to Prof. Thomas Green for suggesting that I think about this issue.
'" Pulton's preface appeared in the 1610, 1615, and 1623 editions of DePaceRegis.
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medicine, and other knowledges besides law, jotted a reminder to
himself in a notebook: "Qu[ery] of the manner and prescripts touching secrecy, tradition, and publication." 89 The allusion to the effects
of publication both by nationally prominent lawyers (Coke, Bacon,
Bulstrode Whitelocke, Thomas Powell, William Sheppard) and by
provincial practitioners such as Barlee suggest that the issue was neither ignored at the highest levels nor confined to London. Finally,
publicist justifications of the press from Rastell onwards and publicist
defensiveness about printing were aimed at somebody-a critic, an
interlocutor-making the appeal to the audience necessary, or at
least sensible.
Still, one can infer only so much from the ghostly presence of the
anti-publicists, and many questions remain unanswered. Did the publicists and anti-publicists differ in social origins, type of practice, religious and political professions? Perhaps most intriguing: what were
the anti-publicists for? At various places in this paper I have tried to
reconstruct their commitments as the inverse of their critiques, but
that method cannot ascertain whether they worked out a positive defense of oral and chirographic legal culture.
III. CHALLENGES TO THE PUBLICISTS, FOUNDATIONS FOR THE ANTIPUBLICISTS: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS
FOR THE DEBATE ABOUT LAw PRINTING

The anti-publicists were not intellectual innovators, but foragers,
their suspicion of popular legal dissemination expressed in borrowed
frowns. Their critique of the legal press appropriated old, often Biblical and classical, criticisms of the improper dissemination of knowledge reinvigorated and directed against printing by Reformation polemics against theological publication. The power of print to foster
dissension and rebellion, for example, was commonplace after Luther
and the German Peasants' War. Plato's Phaedruscriticized writing for
teaching only the semblance of wisdom and putting knowledge into
the wrong hands, a point easily transposable to print.'89 St. Paul pro-

"a FRANcIs BACON, Transportata ex Cmentario Vetere (July 26, 1608), in 11 THE
WORs OF FRANcIs BAcON 66 (James Spedding et al. eds., 1859).

189 In Phaedrus,Socrates argued that writing offered a
merely illusory promise of
cultivating wisdom. Cut off from the give-and-take of dialogue and unable to answer
questions, writing taught the surface of knowledge. And writing could not be properly
contained, for it "drifts all over the place, getting into the hands not only of those who
understand it, but equally of those who have no business with it;
it doesn't know how
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vided the classic prooftexts for disapproval of common people's takRulers and scholing up knowledge too "high" for their capacites.
ars had long tried to keep the vulgar from what they could not comprehend and would do them harm, an intellectual paternalism only
intensified by the support Tridentine Catholic thought lent, even in
Protestant countries, to strategies of selective concealment coupled
with vigorous, didactic "framing" of knowledge set before the multitude. 191
The forensic strategies of both the anti-publicists and publicists
echoed as they were part of a wider debate in English learned culture
about the propriety of vernacular publication of academic and professional knowledge. As Christopher Hill has observed, early translators,
popularizers, and publishers of classics, medicine, mathematics, and
astronomy, "like the early translators of the Bible, had to defend
themselves against the charge that they were debasing the value of the
originals, or making learning too common." The Oxford faculty put
to its inceptors in the faculty of arts the question: "whether it be
permitted to communicate a secret craft?" The suggested answer was
"no." The surgeon William Clowes numbered among the worst of his
critics those "who stand upon their tiptoe, saying with many puissant
and forcible reasons, 'Away with all these books, and bookmen, for
they have made our art too common.'" John Dee claimed that his
English-language printing of Euclid (1570) did not undermine the
honor of the universities, as the publicists Ferdinand Pulton, Bulstrode Whitelocke, and William Sheppard would later reassure lawyers worried that their repute rested on concealment. Dudley Fenner, a translator of Ramus, advocated disseminating academic
learning "'lest the people curse them,'" the strategy that Thomas
Wentworth and William Sheppard pursued to blunt criticism of the
common law. Publicists and anti-publicists alike alluded to vernacuto address the right people, and not address the wrong." PLATO, PhaedrusII. 274d275e, in DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note 97, at 520-21.
"0 See Ginzburg, supra note 82. Ecclesiastes 12:12 also warned "of making many
books there is no end."
191SeeTODD, supra note 35, at 206-60.
2 See HI., supra note 77, at 28, 29, 31; An liceat artissecreta communicare (1619), in
Questiones Philosophiae in 2 REGISTER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 178 (Andrew
Clark ed., 1887) (1571-1622); William Clowes, Epistle to the Reader, in A PROVED
PRACTICE FOR ALL YOUNG SURGEONS [16] (1588); Translator'sEpistle to ChristopherHatton, in PHIIuPPUS CAESAR, A GENERAL DISCOURSE AGAINST THE DAMNABLE SECr OF
USERERS at ii" (1578) [hereinafter Translator'sEpistle] ("And although I am not ignorant, that among the learned some (as among all sorts there be, which, so themselves
do gain, care not how many be undone) both think and speak much against the di-
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lar printing underway in other disciplines. Pulton defended law
printing on the precedent of physicians, divines, philosophers,
mathematicians, and astronomers, while Coke described his first Institute as a necessary introduction to English law "not undertaken by
any, albeit in all other professions there are the like."193 Hudson lamented that not only lawyers, but "men in all professions" sullied
themselves at the press. 94
Though aware of the debates over the propriety of religious and
academic vernacular publication underway since the 1520s, the lawyers did not develop a significant anti-publicist opposition until about
half a century later.9 The story of the late Elizabethan and early Stuart legal anti-publicists is not the formulation of objections to printing
never previously encountered or considered so much as a change in
their assessment of the balance of advantages and disadvantages of
the press. The challenge is to understand why the humanist confidence underlying Rastell's, Barlee's, and Pulton's reassurances wore
thin and the doubts showed through, expressing themselves in traditional topoi of concealment and belittlement of popular intellectual
capabilities common to anti-publicists outside law as well as within.
The explanation cannot be sought in the press itself in the abstract, considered as a technology or a capitalist business enterprise.
Lawyers published, bought, and sold books for decades without much
public negative comment. Indeed, the noticeable darkening of mood
within the bar a hundred years after law printing began in 1481 presents an interesting interpretive challenge, a seeming anomaly. For it
was not the introduction of legal publication that provoked an excited and disturbed coming to grips with the implications of the new
communicative technology of the press, an agitation that faded with
print's assimilation into routine. Rather, after a century a latent undercurrent of doubt emerged into prominence, drawing on condemvulging of good things into a common tongue");JONES, supra note 82, at 47-50 (notes
the opposition of the universities and physicians to vernacular publication of classics,
mathematics, and medicine; his focus is on objections to translation rather than to
publication).
193PULTON, supra note 78, at [8]-[9]; COKE, Proemium, in FIRST INSTITUTEs, supra
note 45.
19 Hudson, supra note
2, at 1.
195I base this conclusion on two arguments: (1) though I do not assume
that antipublicist sentiments were unknown before 1570, my research has disclosed them in
printed sources and manuscripts after that date; (2) publicists allude to an antipublicist critique after the 1570s. This evidence suggests not the invention of antipublicism in the 1570s, but an increase in its quantity and political and professional
importance.
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nations of vernacular religious, medical, and classical publications,
deepening at the same time as the increasing variety and scale of legal
publishing made lawbooks more familiar. Why did printed lawbooks
evoke less anxiety as novelties than as everyday, accustomed parts of
study and practice? The answer, which the rest of this Article will try
to suggest, lies in the contingent relationship of the legal press to
wider political and intellectual pressures. It is a history of the plausibility of second thoughts.
What might these wider pressures be? One possibility is that the
anti-publicists disdained law printing for making the proliferating
number of young barristers and, especially, attorneys more dangerous
competitive rivals to the established lawyers, draining away business
and income. While this provides a partial account of their motivation, it leaves unexplained why established, successful barristers wrote
as both publicists and anti-publicists. It does not make sense of the
timing of the anti-publicist rhetoric (why not complain of lawbooks
produced in the middle third of the sixteenth century when Inns of
Court matriculation rates began to climb?). Nor can it shed light on
the content of anti-publicist rhetoric or the reasons for its persuasiveness (or lack), a result of downplaying overt political and cultural motivations in favor of unexpressed economic ones.
Perhaps the anti-publicists represent the impact on the legal
world of what Hiram Haydn dubbed the "Counter-Renaissance," a
growing wariness in the latter sixteenth century about humanist enthusiasm for spreading learning beyond clerical and scholastic elites
coupled with a darker estimation of the social consequences of so doing. The upsurge of philosophical skepticism during the Continental
wars of religion, the hot Protestant accusation that the pursuit of
knowledge bred pride and immorality unless suffused by grace, and
the "politique" emphasis on the connection between learning, disputation, and rebellion came together in the last decades of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the next, fusing into a critique
that Bacon took on with his defense of learning at the outset of The
Proficiency and Advancement of Learning (1605)."' This pessimism,
which underlay the anti-publicists' constrictive view of order, drew
strength from the social and political instabilities of late sixteenthcentury England: Spanish invasion attempts, assassination plots

19

See HIRAM HAYDN, THE COUNTER-RENAISSANcE (1950); Geoffrey Bullough,

Bacon and the Defence of Learning in SEVENTEENTH CENTURY STUDIES PRESENTED TO SIR
HERBERT GRIERSON 1, 1 (1967).
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against Elizabeth, ideological competition with aggressive Catholic
powers, and, most importantly, what has been called the "crisis of order," as population growth outstripped economic opportunities, resulting in growing poverty, vagrancy, social polarization, landlessness,
the wandering of "masterless" men along the roads, and heightened
crime rates and perceptions of criminality.1 7
While these intellectual and social developments provide a general background to the dispute between the anti-publicists and publicists, their very generality invites a search for more finely-tailored explanations. It is a long way from the wandering poor and debaters'
commonplaces on the follies of learning to the anti-publicists' distaste
for publishing treatises on the court of Star Chamber. I will pursue
the problem of explanation from two perspectives. First, I will explore in Part III the pressures within the legal world that made the
printing of lawbooks problematic and the bridges that connected the
debate over law printing to the broader question of the control of
public knowledge. Three pressures, three bridges stand out: the political uses to which a growing lay readership put lawbooks; the late
sixteenth-century tightening of censorship amid an increasing episcopal and royalist suspicion of the unwitting dangers of licit printing;
and the deepening realization within the legal profession of how
print was reshaping the control of knowledge (and hence of status
and power) among themselves and between themselves and the nation. Second, I will consider in Part IV how the debate over law publishing implicated the proper role and political personality of subjects
and the fictive "ownership" of law, issues raised by the collision of absolutism with publicist humanism, transforming the latter in the
process.
The developments I trace in Parts III and IV provide further, inferential evidence to underscore the importance of the dispute over
legal publishing. And they supply a context for the debate that helps

'97 See DAVID UNDERDOWN, REVEL, RIOT, AND REBELLION: POPULAR POLITICS AND
CULTURE IN ENGLAND,

1603-1660, at 9-43

(1987); WRIGHTSON, supranote 75, at 121-48;

Jim Sharpe, Social Strain and Social Dislocation, 1585-1603, in THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH
I: COURT AND CULTURE IN THE LAST DECADE 192, 192-211 (John Guy ed., 1995);John

Guy, Introduction: The 1590s: The Second Reign of Elizabeth ?, in THE REIGN OF
ELIZABETH I: COURT AND CULTURE IN THE LAST DECADE, supra, at 1-19;J.S. Cockburn,
The Nature and Incidence of Crime in England, 1559-1625, in CRIME IN ENGLAND, 1550-

1800, at 49,49-71 (J.S. Cockburn ed., 1977); Louis A. Knafla, "Sin ofAllSorts Swarmeth":
Criminal Litigation in an English County in the Early Seventeenth Century, in LAW,
LITIGANTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 50, 50-67 (E.W. Ives & A.H. Manchester eds.,

1983).
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answer questions about the timing, resonance, shape, and implications of publicist and anti-publicist arguments. Why did the antipublicists' complaints grow in importance and visibility in the latter
years of Elizabeth's reign, about fifty years after the humanist justification of legal publication and nearly a century after the first printing of
an English lawbook, Thomas Littleton's Tenures in 1481? What made
plausible both the anti-publicists' dark predictions of faction, commoning, litigiousness, lay misuse of law, and diminishment of the legal profession and the publicists' optimistic prophesies? What, finally, does the debate over legal publishing tell us about larger
changes in English legal and political culture?
A. Audience, Acclimation, and the Breakdown in Strategies of Containment
The changing nature of lawbooks and the growth of a lay audience for them in the century before the Civil War provoked a sharper
appreciation among anti-publicists of the disadvantages of print.
Printing a book made it "public," but typically only a select audience
read and used a work. Who these people were, and how they used
the books-both in fact, and in the imagination of critics-influenced
the perceived social consequences of "publicizing" through the press.
Leaving aside statutes and manuals of local government and court
keeping, professional materials (yearbooks, abridgments, compilations of writs, and technical tracts such as Littleton's Tenures) comprised the core of the printed legal literature in the early to middle
sixteenth century. These lawbooks were difficult for laymen to understand, in part because they served to "recycle" knowledge back
into a heavily oral professional world. 8 In comparison to later legal
works, they played a relatively greater mnemonic (as opposed to educative) role, reminding lawyers of what they learned by participating
in oral exercises in the Inns of Court, by practice and observing
courts, and by consulting manuscripts. E.W. Ives has described the
late medieval yearbooks in this fashion as the "extended memory" of
the legal professn.199
poes.
Comnlce and
n abridgments
brdmns served
evdaas
Commonplaces
prompts to the memory, directing the lawyer to relevant cases and

193I have

drawn the concept of "recycling" from WALTER J. ONG, ORALrIY AND

LITERACY: THE TECHNOLOGIZING OF THE WORD 119 (1982). On the medieval practice
of envisioning books as cues for the memory-a tradition that continued with qualifications through the early modem period-see MARYJ. CARRUTHERs, THE BOOK OF
MEMORY: A STUDY OF MEMORY IN MEDIEVAL CULTuRE 8, 16, 30-31,256 (1990).
19 E.W. Ives, The Purpose and Making of the Later Year Books, 89 L.Q. REV. 64, 70

(1973).
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authorities. Thomas Littleton's Tenures (1481) introduced propositions of law with the formula "it is said that," and modestly advised the
reader "that I would not have thee believe, that all which I have said
in these books is law, for I will not presume to take this upon me. But
of those things that are not law, inquire and learn of my wise masters
learned in the law."200 The book imagined itself crystallizing an erudition that rested, primarily and authoritatively, in the oral and chirographic world of the Inns of Court.
Readers of professional lawbooks also required special skills to
make sense of what was on the page-knowledge of terms of art, law
French and Latin, court structure, conventions of expression and, indeed, of the very purposes served by different documents (yearbooks,
cases, writs, and so forth). None of this was intuitively obvious. The
opaqueness of professional lawbooks warned off lay interpreters.
Contrast Scripture, where the problem faced by the church hierarchy
was a text alluringly open, where readers distressingly often failed to
square what they read with the Church's position on sacraments and
ecclesiastical governance. Bishops had to persuade nonconformists
that they had not rightly grasped what they thought they understood.
Fitzherbert's Abridgment, the yearbooks of Edward III, and the Register
of Writs put up their own barriers, off-putting, though not impenetrable.
The century between the Henrician Reformation and the Civil
War saw the appearance of an increasing number of lawbooks accessible to a literate, but not professionally trained, audience. The trend
accelerated after 1600. No hard and fast distinction divided works
oriented to a professional audience from those open to a broader,
nonprofessional readership. For the sake of establishing a rough,
working definition, though, the following characteristics suggest an
accessible text 0' The more accessible a work, the less it presented
documents and information in medias res, as did a yearbook or commentary on writs, assuming that the reader already knew the interpretive conventions to make sense of the text. Instead, accessible lawbooks tended to provide an explanation of the purposes of an
institution or practice, sometimes with a historical account of its development. Their structure more resembled a narrative than a published commonplace book: The author organized points according

(1813) (French ed. 1481).
For the sake of exposition, I am drawing the distinction too sharply. In practice, most texts fell along a continuum.
2'0 THOMAS LITLETON, TENURES 319
20'
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to categories widely shared in learned culture (such as the Aristotelian four causes, subject and accident, or genus and species) instead
of listing them sequentially without comment in a series of sentenceor paragraph-long abridgments of statutes and cases. 2 They were in
English (or at least Latin) rather than law French. Abbreviations and
terms of art were few or explained. Authors provided clues in prefaces or dedications that they envisioned a wide audience.
A comparison of Richard Crompton's L'Authoritie etJurisdictiondes
Courts (1594) and William Lambarde's Archeion: Or, a Discourse upon
the High Courts ofJusticein England (MS, 1591; printed 1635) illustrates
the difference between books constructed for professional and for
broader, educated readerships. The texts were roughly contemporaneous, though Lambarde's was published posthumously, over forty
years after Crompton's. Lambarde wrote in humanist-flavored English sprinkled with Latin etymologies and Saxon antiquities;
Crompton in law French interspersed with abbreviations and unexplained terms of art. Lambarde dedicated his work to Robert Cecil of
Queen Elizabeth's Privy Council; Crompton to Lord Keeper Puckering and the members of the Middle Temple, whose training and
company, he says, laid the foundation of his preferment and success.
When Crompton discussed the Star Chamber, he described its site,
personnel and procedure for securing appearances in one paragraph
and then began a march through disjointed points of law organized
as in a commonplace book: "Nota que ... ," "Dyer dit... ," "In le case
de .... " Lambarde, by contrast, explained why Star Chamber ex-

isted, who ran it, and how it fit into the constitution and squared with
Magna Carta, thereby providing a setting for exploring the powers
and jurisdiction of the court. Instead of mimicking the commonplace, which either lacked order or relied on the reader to supply
one, Lambarde tied together the history, purpose, and limits of legal
rules.203 In its expository strategy, literary style, and language of composition, Lambarde's work opened up the law to a nonprofessional

For representative uses of the Aristotelian four causes as an organizing format,
see William West's discussion of the meaning of equity in The Second Part of Symboleography ... Whereunto is annexed another Treatise of Equity, theJurisdiction, and proceedings
of the high Court of Chanceiy (1627 ed.) orJohn Dodderidge's employment of the Aristotelian four causes to define terms throughout The English Lauyer 87, 98-101, 117-43,
165-90 (1631).
20 CROMPTON, supra note 45, at fols. Aii-Aiii (dedications), 29r-41v (Star Chamber); WILUAi LAMBARDE, ARCHEION OR, A DISCOURSE UPON THE HIGH COURTS OF
JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 3-4 (dedication), 48-116 (Star Chamber) (Charles H. McIlwain &

Paul L. Ward eds., 1957) (1635).
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reader in a way that Crompton's did not, an ambition underscored by
the imagined audiences signaled in their respective dedications.
By the criteria set out above, a handful of works in 1550 aimed at
nonprofessional readers: John Fortescue's comparative study of English and French government that explained basic ideas of the common law and the training of the legal profession, De Laudibus Legum
Angliae (Latin, 1537; English, 1567); Richard Taverner's beginner's
manual of the land law, Institutions in the Laws of England (c.1540);

Thomas Phaer's collection of legal instruments, The New Book of Presidents (1543); John Rastell's legal dictionary, Expositiones Terminorum

Legum Anglorum (c.1525); and Christopher St. German's discussion of
the grounds of the common law and collection of cases of conscience,
Doctor and Student (English ed. 1531).205 By 1640, both the number
and diversity of such publications had markedly increased. William
Fulbeck and John Dodderidge offered advice on the best way to study
law, reflecting on what character traits and educational attainments
suited novices for the profession.26 They also considered the close
relationship between law and logic, as did the Ramist Abraham
Fraunce.2°' Readers wanting a synoptic overview of the common law
could turn to Henry Finch's Law, or A Discourse Thereof in Four Books

(1627) or John Cowell's Latin Institutes (1605), an attempt to lay out
the common law within Justinian's division of persons, things, and actions. 208 Cowell brought to his work not only Justinian's categories,
but a comparative focus, contrasting the common and civil laws, a
project that William Fulbeck (1601) shared .2 ° Edward Coke published the first of the four volumes of his influential Institutes (1628),
a sinuous, overstuffed commentary on Littleton, part gloss on the
land law and the constitution, part exposition of principles of jurisprudence and interpretation, part learned free-association. 2 10 Writers

'

While I have drawn a sharp distinction for expository purposes, Lambarde's

work required some constitutional, historical, and legal sophistication to understand,
while Crompton's was not impenetrable to all but trained lawyers. The difference was
one of degree.
20' To reiterate, I am focusing on lawbooks other than statutes and local government manuals.
207

SeeFULBEcK, supra note 123; DODDERIDGE, supra note 202.
See Fraunce, supra note 51.

2'8 See FINCH, supra note 103; JOHN COWELL, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND (1651) (Latin ed. 1605).
2'9 See WILLIAM FULBECK, PARALLEL, OR CONFERENCE OF THE CIVIL LAW, THE
CANON LAW, AND THE COMMON LAWs OFTHIS REALM OF ENGLAND (1601-1602).

2,0

See CoKE, FIRST INSTITUTES, supra note 45.
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and printers brought out tracts on discrete portions of the law.
Thomas Smith on the constitution (1583); Henry Swinburne on wills
(1590-91); William West on equity and Chancery procedure (1594);
William Lambarde on Kentish gavelkind custom (1596); John
Manwood on the law of the forests (1598); Ferdinando Pulton on
criminal law (1609); Aaron Rathborne on manorial law (1616);
Thomas Powell on court procedure (1623); John Dodderidge on
church livings and advowsons (1630); Edward Coke on copyhold tenure (1630); Thomas Edgar on legal rules affecting women (1632);
Charles Calthrope on manorial law (1635); and William Lambarde on
the historical origins and structure of the high courts (1635). 211 In
addition, the press offered John Cowell's law dictionary (1607),
Francis Bacon's collection of maxims (1630), Thomas Powell's and
Arthur Agard's guides to records (1622; 1631), and a compilation on
212
the law of nuisance, urban customs, and poor relief (1636).
These books made a difference. Englishmen before the Civil War
complained of the confusion and needless opacity of English law and
legal literature. Historians looking backward after the achievements
of Matthew Hale and William Blackstone have stressed the dominance of chronologically and alphabetically organized works and the
rarity of monographs and treatises. 213 Yet using the legal literature of
1550 rather than an ideal as a baseline, and looking forward from
there rather than backward from Blackstone, one sees a relative increase in the accessibility of legal literature to non-professional audiences. From the latter part of Elizabeth's reign through the Civil
War, proportionately more works assumed a readership unfamiliar
with their contents and imagined themselves teaching rather than

21 SeeTHOMAS SMITH, ON THE COMMONWEALTH OF ENGLAND (1583); SWINBURNE,

supranote 178; William West, Of Chancery, in SECOND PART OF SYMBOLEOGRAPHY (1594
ed.); WILLIAM LAMBARDE, The Customs of Kent, in LAMBARDE, supra note 93; MANWOOD,
supra note 45; PULTON, supra note 78; AARON RATHBORNE, THE SURVEYOR (1616);
POWELL, THE ATTORNEY'S ACADEMY, supra note 45; JOHN DODDERIDGE, A COMPLEAT
PARSON: OR, A DESCRIPTION OF ADVOWSoNs (1630); EDWARD COKE, COMPLETE
COPYHOLDER (1630); T[HOMAS] E[DGAR], THE LAW'S RESOLUTIONS OF WOMEN'S
RIGHTS (1632); CHARLES CALTHROPE, THE RELATION BETWEEN THE LORD OF A MANOR
AND THE COPYHOLDER HIS TENANT (1635); LAMBARDE, supra note 203.
"' JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER (1637) (1607 ed. suppressed); FRANCIS
BACON, THE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND (1630); THOMAS POWELL,
DIRECTION FOR SEARCH OF RECORDS (1622); ARTHUR AGARD, THE REPERTORY OF
RECORDS (1631); ARTHUR AGARD, A BRIEF DECLARATION FOR WHAT MANNER OF

SPECIALNUISANCE (1636).
2"' See Simpson, supra note 7, at 636-39; W.R. Prest, Law and Women's Rights in Early
Modern England,in 6 THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 169, 169-80 (1991).
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reminding, a perspective implicit in the section headings Thomas
Powell chose for The Attorney's Academy (1623): "Instructions to sue
forth a recovery" and "The common exceptions which be given to
commissioners are these, viz." 214 To be sure, the output of alphabeti-

cally and chronologically organized legal literature in French grew as
well. One only has to think of the nominate law reports of Dyer,
Plowden, and Coke. French-language commentaries on writs and
procedures continued to sell well among professionals. But by 1640,
a Bristol merchant, York doctor, or Kent divine could obtain a greater
variety of works -writtenin English and providing background and explanatory material. And these works, as they often boasted in their
prefaces, concentrated information in one place to "make this scattered part of learning, in the great volumes of the common-law books,
and there darkly described, to be one entire body, and more ready,
and clearer to the view of the reader."2 '5 An Englishman not privy to
the manuscripts and oral traditions of the London-based legal professionals would have had an easier time in 1640 than in 1550 learning
about the procedure and duties of the royal courts, the boundaries of
political and property rights, and the lineaments of the constitution.
These developments resist numerical measures given the lack of
basic information about the distribution of books by geography, occupation, and status, and about the number of copies produced per
imprint (for not all imprints ran the full 1500 copies allowed by the
1587 Stationers' Company rules). 21 6 Yet a rough-I stress roughdemonstration can be made of the growing accessibility and diversification of English legal publishing by tallying imprint dates of works
directed at a general audience for twenty year periods between 1500
and 1640. 217 "Works directed at a general audience" is a somewhat
subjective category, so I have listed in the footnote below the law-

books included. 2' 8 Amending the list would change the rate of ascent
214 POWELL,

THE AT-rORNEY'S ACADEMY, supranote 45, at 122, 17.
EDGAR, Prefac4 supra note 211, at sig. a; see also SHEPPARD, supra note 45;
WENTWORTH, supra note 138; SWINBURNE, supra note 178.
216 See BLAGDEN, supra note 86, at 45.
217 I have taken the imprint dates out of 1 W. HAROLD MAXWELL & LESLIE F.
2'5

MAXWELL, SWEET AND MAXWELL'S LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS: ENGLISH LAW TO 1800 (2nd ed. 1955).
218 THOMAS ASHE, FAsCIcuLUs FLORUM GATHERED OUT OF THE SEVERAL BOOKS
OF... COKE; BACON, supra note 212; BRACTON, De Legibur, Brief Declaration
of... Nuisance... and Extent of Custom... and Relief of the Poo, JOHN BRITTON,
BRITTON ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; CALTHROPE, supra note 211; COKE, supra note
211; COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE, supra note 45; COWELL, supra note 212; JOHN COWELL,
INSTITUTIONS; CROMPTON, supra note 45; JOHN DODDERIDGE, LAWYER'S LIGHT;
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in the latter sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but not the
general pattern. To give an example: Sir William Staunford's Exposition of the King's Prerogativeappeared in 1567, 1568, 1573, 1577, 156877, 1590, and 1607. It provided five imprints for the period 15611580, one for 1581-1600, and one for 1601-1620. Tabulating the figures (unadjusted) gives the following results:
TABLE 1

15011520
3

15211540
30

15411560
37

15611580
42

15811600
35

16011620
53

16211640
49

These figures understate the diversification that occurred between

1580 and 1640. Numerous imprints of four works-St German's Doctor and Student, Littleton's Tenures, the Institutions or PrincipalGrounds,
and Fitzherbert's Diversity of Courts-drove up the imprint figures in
the first two-thirds of the sixteenth century. For example, in the period 1541-1560, Littleton's Tenures by itself provided nineteen of the
imprints and the Institutions another twelve, meaning that these two
works accounted for thirty-one of the thirty-seven imprints (with St.
German and Fitzherbert providing three of the remaining six). The
raw figure of thirty seven imprints for that period suggests a greater
depth and variety of law printing than in the years 1571-1600, yet that
was not the case. Subtracting the imprints of those four works from
the data gives the following:

DODDERIDGE, ENGLISH LAWYER, supra note 202; DODDERIDGE, supra note 211; LORD
ELLESMERE, SPEECH ON THE POsT-NATi; HENRY FINCH, NOMOTECHNIA; FINCH, supra

note 103; ANTHONYFITZHERBERT, DivERSITE DE COURTES; FORTEsCUE, supra note 137;
FULBECK, supra note 123; FULBECK, supra note 209; FULLER, supra note 45; GLANVILL,
TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS; INSTITUTIONS OR PRINCIPAL GROUNDS; LAMBARDE, supra note

203; LrIrLETON, supra note 200; LODOWiCK LLOYD, BRIEF CONFERENCE; JOHN
MANWVOOD, BRIEF COLLECrION; JOHN MANWOOD, supra note 45; POWELL, THE
ATTORNEY'S ACADEMY, supra note 45; THOMAS POWELL, ATTORNEY'S ALMANAC;
PULTON, supra note 78; JOHN RASTELL, ExPOSmONES TERMINORUM; JOHN RASTELL,
LES TERMES DE LA LEY; RATHBORNE, supra note 211; ST. GERMAN, supra note 19;
THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM; WILLIAM STAUNFORD, AN EXPOSITION OF
THE KING'S PREROGATIVE; WILLIAM STAUNFORD, LES PLEES DEL CORON (1560);

SWINBURNE, supra note 178; EDGAR, supra note 211; William West, Four Treatises, in
SECOND PART OF SYMBOLEOGRAPHY, supra note 211.
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TABLE2

15011520

15211540

15411560

15611580

15811600

16011620

0

2

3

23

16

36

16211640
42

Resting upon (contestable) judgments about which works were
"accessible" and "general," these figures are hardly Quantified Data,
yet neither are they valueless. They reinforce the opinion of contemporaries and the impression gained by eyeballing early modem legal
bibliographies that the diversity and scale of law printing increased
from the last third of the sixteenth century.
Though lawbook prefaces generally assumed that practitioners
and students constituted the bulk of their readership, authors and
printers sometimes envisioned, and welcomed, a wider audience.
Thomas Powell hoped his Attorney's Academy (1623) would establish a
"course of compliance between the officers and ministers of our laws
and their clients."21 9 The printer of Nicholas Fuller's Argument in the
Case of Thomas Lad (1607) translated the French and Latin terms for
the benefit of "the simple and such as be unleamed. " 22° Coke wrote
his commentary on Littleton in English "to the end that any of the
nobility, or gentry of this realm, or of any other estate, or profession
whatsoever, that will be pleased to read him and these Institutes, may
understand the language wherein they are written."2' The compiler
of The Law's Resolutions of Women's Rights (1632), most likely Thomas

Edgar of Gray's Inn, knew that practitioners and the high-status men
mentioned by Coke would use his work but "chiefly addressed" it to
women. Through his book, "things behooveful for them [women] to
know are laid plain together, and in some orderly connection, which
heretofore were smothered, or scattered in corners of an uncouth
language clean abstruded from their sex, which concealment, because it seemed to me neither just, nor conscionable, I have framed
this work."22 William Fulbeck could look upon this broadening audi219

POWELL, To the Reader, in THE ATTORNEY'S ACADEMY, supra note 45, at

[A2],

[AS].
SFULLER, supra note 45, at [3] (comments of printer).
221

COKE, Proemium7, FIRST INSTITUTES, supranote 45.

EDGAR, supra note 211, at 403. For other examples of works whose prefaces envision an audience broader than practitioners, see PULTON, supra note 78; SWINBURNE,
supra note 178; MANWOOD, supra note 45; R. POWELL, ANTIQUITY... OF THE ANCIENT
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ence with some humor. He introduced his learned dialogue among
representatives of the common, civil, and canon law with the musing
of a "poor country man" surrounded by neighbors
so full of law-points, that when they sweat, it is nothing but law; ... when
they dream, it is profound law. The book of Littleton's Tenures is their
breakfast, their dinner .. . Every ploughswaine with us may be a seneschal in a court baron. He can talk of essoins .... and recaptions. And
if you control him the book of the grounds of the law is... ready at his
girdle to confute you ....

So that for a man to be among them [the

neighbors], and to have living and want law: is as if a man should have
bread to eat, and want teeth to chew it. Which occasions moved me at
the first to seek for some skill in law, and amont other books, I bought
[the first volume of] The Conference ofLaw....

Satirists assumed that their audiences had at least heard of leading
lawbooks. They casually dropped the names of Littleton's Tenures,
Perkin's Profitable Book, Kitchin's Le Court Leet, and Fitzherbert's
Abridgment in the course of mocking lawyers.n4
The admittedly spotty evidence of booksellers' inventories and estate records reinforces the impression of a growing, more diverse
audience for printed lawbooks. Two rare surviving inventories of
provincial booksellers, both from the city of York, provide a test case.
A 1538 inventory of York stationer Neville Mores suggests a book
market heavily patronized by that city's cathedral clergy and church
lawyers. The eighty-five identified tities include several of the civil
and canon law, but none of the common law.
In 1616, by contrast,
stationer John Foster's holdings included Fitzherbert's Abridgment,
several volumes of Coke's Reports, West's Symboleography, Manwood's
COURTS OF LEET (1641) at [a] (addressed book to "the sons and servants of farmers,

yeomen, and others versed in rural affairs");ASHE, supra note 218, at A4v (Coke's maxims translated into English for the benefit of "the vulgar sort and less learned of the
commonalty").
WILLIAM FULBECK, Introduction to SECOND PART OF THE PARALLEL, OR
CONFERENCE OF THE CIVIL LAW, THE CANON LAW, AND THE COMMON LAW OF THE
REALM OF ENGLAND at B2-B3 (1602).
22' SeeFRANCis LENTON, A Layers Clerkfin CHARACTERS, supra note 113; LENTON, A
Young Inns of Court Gentleman, supranote 113;JOHN STEPHENS, A PettyfoggingAttorney, in
ESSAYS AND CHARACTERS, supra note 123, at 338 (2d ed. 1615) (at the court leet, the
attorney's mind "be not in the Dishes, it is in the Kitchin"); THOMAS NASH, LENTEN
STUFF (1599), quoted in 3 G.B. HARRISON, THE EUIZABETHAN JOURNALS 3-4 (1939);
John Taylor, An Inkhorn DisputationBetween a Lauyer and a Poe in TAYLOR'S WATERWORK at G1v (1614) (mentioning Littleton, Fitzherbert, Plowden, and Brooke along

with a bevy of legal terms of art such as capias, demuirer, latita4 scirefadas, praemunire
and decem tales).
D.M. Palliser & D.G. Selwyn, The Stock of a Yor* Stationer,1538, in 27 THELIBRARY
207 (1972).
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Laws of the Forest, Staunford's Pleas of the Crown, Rastell's Exposition,
Littleton's Tenures in English and French, Fortescue's Commendation,
Glanvill's Tractatus de Legibus, Fulbeck's Preparative,St. German's Doctor and Student, Staunford's Exposition of the King's Prerogative, and
Perkin's Profitable Book, along with various statutory collections and
manuals for justices of the peace, constables, and keepers of manorial
and leet courts.! 6
While provincial booksellers in Elizabethan and Stuart England
like Foster no doubt catered to the rapidly increasing number of local
attorneys, solicitors, and minor government officials, contemporaneous estate inventories reveal some evidence of growing holdings by
non-professionals. Peter Clark has identified the types of books
(Scripture, theology, history, and law) in over 2000 estates in three
Kentish towns from 1560 to 1640. The inventories underestimate
holdings, in part because records do not survive for all owners, in part
because of the carelessness of list makers, and in part because many
titles disappear into rubrics like "sundry old books." Law books appeared ^in• one
to three percent of the inventories of non227
professionals.
E.S. Leedham-Green's study of books in probate inventories taken in the vice-chancellor's court of Cambridge University
reveals that some of the faculty and fellows, whose professional interests primarily lay in divinity, medicine, and civil law, owned common
law works in increasing numbers in the latter sixteenth century.
Leedham-Green records 192 inventories between 1535 and 1617. Dividing that total into three groups provides sixty-four inventories
taken between 1535 and 1554, sixty-three between 1555 and 1567,
and sixty-five between 1568 and 1617. The number of common law
books (excluding statutory compilations) recorded in these three
groups was, respectively, 15, 16, and 37; including statutory compilations, they numbered 24, 24, and 68. These holdings are illustrated

in Table

3.22

M See Inventory of York StationerJohn Foster, Taken November 26, 1616,
in ROBERT
DAvIEs, A MEMOIR OF THE YORK PRESS 342, 342-74 (1988) (1868).
227 SeePeter Clark, The Ownership ofBooks in England, 1560-1640: The Example of Some

Kentish Townfolk, in SCHOOLING AND SOCIETY: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION
95-111 (Lawrence Stone ed., 1976). In particular, see Table 4.5, "References to Book
Titles in Inventories of Kentish Townsmen," which "excludes the book lists of professional men (lawyers, schoolteachers, etc.)." Id at 102.
See E.S. LEEDHAM-GREEN, BOOKS IN CAMBRIDGE INvENTORIES: BOOK-LIsTs FROM
VICE-CHANCELLOR'S COURT PROBATE INVENTORIES IN THE TUDOR AND STUART
PERIODS (1986). Most of the inventories were taken between 1535 and 1617. A few
were taken after 1617, the last in 1760.
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TABLE

3

Common Law Books in Cambridge University
Estate Inventories, 1535-1617
Date of inventories
Number of inventories
Number of
common law books
(excluding statutory
compilations)
Number of
common law books
(including statutory
compilations)

1535-1554

1555-1567

1568-1617

64

63

65

15

16

37

24

24

68

J

The growing representation of common law books in Cambridge
estate inventories paralleled the acquisition of such works by university libraries. Colleges that maintained law libraries stocked, overwhelmingly, civilian and canonist works. Yet around the turn of the
seventeenth century, common-law books began to appear. Pembroke
College and Emmanuel College devoted benefactors' funds for book
acquisition to common law works, signaling that they valued them
even though not part of the curriculum. Bishop John Williams and
William Platt gave common law books to St. John's College, and
Archbishop Matthew Parker gave them to Corpus Christi College.29

229 The

holdings of Pembroke included Pulton's De Pace, Dyer's and Plowden's Re-

ports, Brooke's and Fitzherbert's Abridgments, proclamations and statutes, Littleton's
Tenures in English, Lambarde's Eirenarcha,the NaturaBrevium, a table to Coke's Reports,
Kitchin, Staunford's Plees del Coron and Prerogative,Fortescue, Perkins, Rastell's Exposition, St. German, Fleetwood, Smith's De Republica, Fitzherbert's Surveying, Swinburne's
Wills, the Institutions of the Laws, Brooke's Cases, the Diversity of Courts,A Discourse of the
Laudable Customs of London, and an assortment of works of local government for justices of the peace and court keepers. Emmanuel's holdings included statutes, Finch's
Nomotechnia, Staunford's Plees, Swinburne's Wills, Smith's Commonwealth, and Cowell's
Interpreter. St. John's holdings included Bracton, Coke on Littleton, Cowell's Institutes
and Interpreter, Crompton's Jurisdiction of Courts, Fenton's Usury, Littleton, Smith's
Commonwealth, Swinburne's Wills, Brooke's Cases, five volumes of Coke's Reports,
Fitzherbert's Abridgmnent, Dyer's Reports, and an assortment of statutes and works of local government. See Alain Wijffels, Law Books in CambridgeLibraries, 1500-1640, in 10
TRANSACTIONS OF THE CAMBRIDGE BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY 359, 383 n.89, 410 n.196,
402 nn.158 & 161, 391 (1993).
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The first printed catalogue of the Bodleian library at Oxford records
several common law works amid the canonist and civilian booksY
By 1657, in the midst of the Interregnum, William London's Catalogue of the Most Vendible Books in England could portray the gentry at
large in addition to lawyers as his customers for common law works.2i
Beginning the catalogue with a panegyric on the importance of learning to the social position and governmental responsibilities of gentlemen, London then explained how each category of books he
sold-divinity, law, history, chemistry, and so on-benefited this idealized studious gentry. London did not confine the duty of legal
study to gentlemen who became lawyers or enrolled in the Inns of
Court for a temporary sojourn. Nor did he interpret the humanist
dictum that governors must know the law to require only a passing
familiarity with statutes, manuals of local government, and the foundational jurisprudential works of Fortescue and St. German. Rather,
he set before his gentry the full panoply of common law monographs
and commentaries, reports and abridgments. To what extent his
salesmanship worked is an open question, and London may have
been wooing a market as much as serving one, but the fact remains
that he imagined the gentry at large as the potential readership for
the whole range of common law works. By contrast, mid-sixteenth
century booksellers and printers had identified only practitioners and
students as their customers for lawbooks, as in a 1577 Stationers petition criticizing the law patentee Richard Tottell for charging" too
high
z2
prices "to the hindrance of a great number of poor students.

If in the century before the Civil War lawbooks became more accessible to non-professionals and more widely owned, the potential
readership of such works-the nobility and gentry, and the "middling
sort" of divines, merchants, shop keepers, physicians, apothecaries,
schoolmasters, successful yeomen and artisans, surveyors, and
clerks-also became more adept at using complicated texts. English
education improved after the Henrician Reformation with the rise in

Bodleian's catalog included such common law works as Bracton, Britton,
Glanvill, PrincipiaLegum Angliae, Staunford's Pees del Coron, and Swinburne's Wills. See
THE FIRST PRINTED CATALOGUE OF THE BODLEIAN LIBRARY, 1605: A FAcsIMILIE 223,
225, 242, 252, 258, 261 (1986).
2" See William London, An Introduction to the Use of Books, in A CATALOGUE OF THE
MOST VENDIBLE BOOKS IN ENGLAND sig. G2r-G3r (1657). London addressed the cata-

logue to the four northern counties of England.
221 TRANSCRIPT OFTHE REGISTERS, supranote 81, at 111.
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literacy, proliferation of grammar schools and scholarships for the
less well-to-do, and expansion in university and Inns of Court admissions.2" Englishmen had also become more acclimated to using
printed texts in argument. The use of textual authority is a skill that,
like other talents, needs to be cultivated and may be improved. Over
a hundred years of persistent religious argument from the Lutheran
controversies of the 1520s through the Civil War pursued through intensive interpretation of and citation to Scripture, church fathers,
commentaries, and printed religious controversialists trained increasingly wide segments of the English population in the art of using textual authority. Published treatises, tracts and sermons; preaching, lectures, prophesyings, classes, and home study with neighbors: These
not only taught principles, but taught the means of disputing. Such
skills were on nearly constant display from the Henrician Reformation onward, through the political and religious regime changes of
Henry VIII to Edward VI to Mary to Elizabeth, through the
Elizabethan defense against Catholic polemicists and Protestant separatists and sectarians, and through the debates between champions of
the Church and nonconformists over dress, ceremonies, liturgy,
preaching, discipline, ecclesiastical jurisdiction, tithes, Sabbath observance, and the basis and limits of episcopal power.
Conservatives who disliked the social effrontery and interpretive
naivet6 of laymen disputing with ministers feared that law would follow the troubled path of religion, unearned interpretive presumption
in one reinforcing it in the other. Indeed, much Elizabethan and
early Stuart religious argumentation combined legal and scriptural
exegesis, particularly the puritan attack against episcopacy, resistance
to High Commission, and the assault on usury.23 Archbishop of Canterbury Richard Bancroft had little patience for "hot-brained" men
See Lawrence Stone, The EducationalRevolution in England, 1560-1640, PAST &
PREENT,July 1964, at 41.
2

The puritan attack against episcopacy produced the anonymous Presbyterian

tract, AN ABSTRACT OF CERTAIN ACTS OF PARLIJ
NT, OF CERTAIN HER MAJESTIES
INJUNCTIONS, OF CERTAIN CANONS, CONSTITUTIONS AND SYNODALS PROVINCIAL
ESTABLISHED AND IN FORCE, FOR THE PEACEABLE GOVERNMENT OF THE CHURCH...
FOR THE MOST PART HERETOFORE UNKNOWN AND UNPRACTICED (1583), and the
Church's reply by RICHARD COSIN, AN ANSWER TO... A CERTAIN FACTIOUS LIBEL, AN
ABSTRACr OF CERTAIN ACTS OF PARLIAMENT (1584). For resistance to the High Commission, see JAMES MORICE, A BRIEF TREATISE OF OATHS (c.1600); ALEXANDER
LEIGHTON, AN APPEAL TO THE PARLIAMENT; OR, SION'S PLEA AGAINST THE PRELACY
(1628); HENRY BURTON, AN APOLOGY OF AN APPEAL (1636). A mixed religious and
legal critique of usury may be found in ROGER FENTON, A TREATISE OF USURY 71-74

(1611).
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who "say the scripture is sufficient as the spirit directs; and so by this
means every ignorant ass interprets scriptures according to his hot
humors. " 235 He found the same spirit loose in the law, for when
speaking in support of a subsidy for King James I before the House of
Lords, he opined: "[T] he King must be relieved in his necessity. I'll
cite no places of scripture for it, for nowadays every man, though he
have not read more than the first leaf of Littleton, is able to teach the
best doctor of divinity. What will come of it God knows, and wise men
may foresee it." 2 6 Opponents of a 1650 statute mandating English as
the language of pleading and legal literature portrayed the disruptions unleashed by the vernacular publication of Scripture as illstarred precedent for similar efforts in the law. Thus the English
Catholic poet Patrick Carey
Our Church still flourishing w' had seen
If th' holy-writ had ever been

Kept out of laymen's reach;
But, when 'twas English'd, men half-witted;
Nay women too, would be permitted
T' expound all texts, and preach.

Then what confusion did arise!
Cobblers divines 'gan to despise,
So that they could but spell:

This ministers to scorn did bring;
Preaching was held an easy thing,
Each one might do' t as well.
This gulf church-government did swallow;
And after will the civil follow,

When laws translated are:
For ev'ry man that lists, will prattle;
Pleading will be but twittle-twattle,
And nought but noise at bar.

Then let's e'en be content t' obey,
And to believe what judges say,
Whilst for us, lawyers brawl:

Though four or five be thence undone,

Richard Bancroft, Speech in the House of Lords (Apr. 30, 1610), in 2 PRoCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT, supra note 119, at 72.
M Richard Bancroft, Speech in the House of Lords (May 5, 1610), in 2 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT, supranote 119, at 79.
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'Tis better have some justice
7 done,
Than to have none at all.23
Restoration royalists, looking back on the decades before the Revolution, saw most clearly a progression from Scriptural to legal casuistry.
As the lawyer and antiquary Fabian Phillips remarked, "They that
could then misinterpret Scripture, abuse the plain and genuine sense
and meaning of all our laws, clearly expressed and fully to be understood.. . ."m For an anti-publicist worried about the social consequences of printed dissemination of law, religious sectarianism and
disputation did not just foreshadow what might happen with law.
They were a training ground, a schooling, that made unorthodox,
factious readings more sophisticated and dangerous.
Compounding the problem were the closer ties developing between the London legal world and the rest of the nation. The number of lawyers in Elizabethan and early Stuart England grew sharply,
both in the "upper branch" of the profession (the serjeants, benchers,
and utter barristers of the Inns of Court) and the "lower branch" (the
court officers, clerks, attorneys, and solicitors). Admissions to the
Inns of Court rose from about 100 per year in the 1550s to about 300
per year in the 1620s. Between 1570 and 1640, the four Inns matriculated almost 16,000 students and called about 2800 barristers. Comparison to the early sixteenth century suggests the scale of the increase. Lincoln's Inn recorded 164 bar calls in the five decades
between 1520 and 1569, but 628 calls between 1590 and 1639. The
four Inns admitted slightly over 1000 in the 1550s and over 2700 in
the 1610s. The upper branch reached about 500 members in the
1610s, about five times more than in 1560, and about ten times more
than in the early sixteenth century.29 Matriculants at the Inns who
did not practice before the royal courts became town recorders, kept
manorial courts, solicited causes, or served as local agents for royal
commissions. Many others did not become professional lawyers, leaving London after a year or two with fading memories of writs, dancing

27

Patrick Carey, Baladto the Tune "I'll Tell Thee, Dick, That I Have Been" (1651), in 2

MINOR POETS OF THE CAROLNE PERIOD 460, 461 (George Saintsbury ed., 1906).

2s FABIAN PHILLPs, LIGEANCIA LUGENS: OR, LOYALTY LAMENTING THE MANY
GREAT MISCHIEFS AND INCONVENIENCES WHICH WILL FATALLY AND INEVITABLY
FOLLOW THE TAKING AWAY OF THE ROYAL PURVEYANCES, AND TENURES IN CAPITE AND
BY KNIGHT-SERVICE 25 (1661).
29 See PREsT, supra note 6, at 6-7; PREsT, supra note 59, at 5-7, 11, 243-44. Calls to

the bar rose from a little over 18 per year in the 1570s to over 50 per year in the 1630s.
See PREST, supranote 6, at 7.
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masters, and Ben Jonson to take up another livelihood or return to
their estates, perhaps entering the commission of the peace.
The lower branch of the profession swelled more dramatically.
Christopher Brooks has calculated the number of attorneys practicing
before King's Bench and Common Pleas at about 200 in 1560, about
1050 in 1606, and about 1750 in 1640. The ratio of attorneys to
population steadily improved, rising from one attorney for every
20,000 people in 1560, to one for every 4000 in 1606, to one for every
2500 in 1640. The impact in the localities was dramatic. Between
1560 and 1640, the number of attorneys in Devonshire increased
from about ten to fifty-six, in Hertfordshire from about three to
twenty-four, and in Warwickshire from about two to thirty. They
largely displaced the amateur and semi-professional local lawyers who
had drafted documents, kept manorial courts, and served as clerks
and minor legal officials in the counties and towns.2 °
In comparison to the provincial amateurs and semi-professionals,
these attorneys had a stronger connection to the London legal world.
They served as links between the localities and the national common
law and prerogative courts, pursuing cases themselves or soliciting for
attorneys and barristers resident in London. As residents of the Inns
of Chancery during term time, they mingled with the "upper branch"
of the profession and attended the royal courts, developing a sharper
sense of the legal arguments current in the capital and an exposure
to popular lawbooks. In their growing numbers and in their displacement of provincial amateurs, the attorneys became agents for
the deeper penetration of national law into the localities. So, too, did
the barristers, increasingly active in town and manorial courts. And
so did the partially-trained "dropouts" returning to their families and
neighbors with a readier ability to understand and engage in legal argument.
The growth of the legal profession was part of a larger process by
which the national law carried in printed books, the law of the London-based common law, prerogative and equity courts, extended both
its pragmatic and cultural influence. Some of the main points can be
briefly noted. A fourteen-fold increase in common-law litigation between 1490 and 1640 made the gentry, merchants, and the upper
I0
1
have drawn these numbers and the distinction between the "upper branch"
and "lower branch" from BROOKS, supra note 112, at 112-15. For a numerical breakdown of the legal profession in the early to mid sixteenth century, seeJ.H. BAKER, The
English Legal Profession, 1450-1550, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE COMMON LAW:
HISTORICAL ESSAYS 75 (1986) and IVES, supra note 112, at 11-21.
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strata of the yeomen and artisans more aware of, and dependent on,
the royal courts. The common law's aggrandizement of authority at
the expense of ecclesiastical, regional and local jurisdictions, and its
acceptance of copyhold disputes by the latter sixteenth century,
brought more problems to London. The supervision of the justices of
the peace and local magistrates at the assizes, along with the oversight
of local and urban jurisdictions by Star Chamber and by removal,
gave national law a heightened prominence in the countryside, as did
the expansion of Tudor monarchical government and parliamentary

legislation.24
241

Then there was politics. The common law enjoyed a greater
presence in late Tudor and early Stuart political culture than it had
fifty years before when the humanists had cheered legal printing.
Churchmen and the Court, as well as nonconformists and antiabsolutists,
valued knowledge of the common law as a political re242
source.
To be sure, legal skill had been an advantage in the endemic struggles between Crown, nobility, Parliament and the church
in the early Tudor period. And the latter sixteenth century hardly invented the pursuit of political conflict through legal argumentation
or the use of the common law as a touchstone for testing the legitimacy of governmental practice. 43 Yet if the common law had long
been politically contested terrain, by the latter Elizabethan period the
struggle spread more broadly in the political culture, engaging combatants outside the traditional circles of Court, Parliament and legal
profession. Law printing became a more politically problematic act
in 1620 than it had been in 1520.
What had changed? First, the Reformation recast the underlying
legal framework of disputes about religion pursued in secular courts.
Before the Reformation, clashes between the English realm and the
241 See generally BROOKS, supra note 112, at 51, 88-100; CHARLES
MONTGOMERY
GRAY, COPYHOLD, EQUITY, AND THE COMMON LAW (1963); ERIC KERRIDGE, AGRARIAN
PROBLEMS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER 54-93 (1969); J.S. COCKBURN, A

HISTORY OF ENGLISH AsSIzES, 1558-1714, at 153-58, 168-72, 181-87 (1972); PREsT, supra
note 6, at 49; PETER CLARK, ENGLISH PROVINCIAL SOCIETY FROM THE REFORMATION TO
THE REVOLUTION: RELIGION, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN KENT, 1500-1640, at 279-84
(1977); MARJORIE KENISTON MCINTOSH, A COMMUNITY TRANSFORMED: THE MANOR
AND LIBERTY OF HAVERING, 1500-1620, at 326-50 (1991) (analyzing loss of manorial

authority tojustices of the peace and sewer commissions).
242 I define common law here broadly to include the ancient statutes and charters
(such as Magna Carta).
2 See generally G.R. Elton, The Rule ofLaw in Sixteenth-Century
England,in 1 STUDIES
IN TUDOR AND STUART POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 260 (1974); BAUMER, supra note

14.
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Church of Rome highlighted the problem of defining boundaries between legal orders of differing sources of authority and legitimacy.
The Reformation's legacy of an Erastian church polity removed
Rome's distinct but intertwined legal powers, concentrating attention
on English statutes and the common law, particularly when puritans
and Catholics looked to them as a check on the bishops and ecclesiastical courts in the latter sixteenth century. Faced with episcopal repression of nonconformists in the middle 1580s, a constitutional wing
of puritanism emerged. They joined to long-standing scriptural and
historical arguments limiting episcopal power a new set of constitutional arguments against ecclesiastical discipline and High Commission procedure citing common law liberties and Magna Carta. In
1604, to cite one example, their leaders circulated a manifesto teaching ministers legal strategies to use against newly promulgated church
canons. The document offered an inventive, if tendentious, reading
of the statutes, demonstrating that bishops and the High Commission
lacked the power to deprive clergy. If that strategy failed, the manifesto continued, a minister should claim that his benefice was a freehold and try to switch the cause to a common law court.244 The
churchman Thomas Rogers deplored the "London Brethren" telling
King 'James to his head, how the subscription which he calls for is
more than the law requires."2 45 The Jesuit propaganda offensive of
the later sixteenth century against the Elizabethan regime also generated dissident readings of the common law. The controversialist
Robert Persons took issue with the precedents Coke offered in Caudrey's Case in defense of the Crown's system of ecclesiastical discipline.
In forty-two aggressive pages of A Quiet and Sober Reckoning with M.
Thomas Morton (1609), the Jesuit Persons cited Bracton, Staunford,
Fitzherbert, the yearbooks, and Coke's own Reports to accuse his adversary of persistent misunderstanding and misquotation of English
246
law and antiquities.
Second, Englishmen resisting Stuart policies found in the common law precedents against unwelcome royal initiatives and tenets of
an anti-absolutist political theory featuring strong property rights and
244 SeeJ.N.

NEALE, ELIZABETH I AND HER PARLIAMENTS 1584-1601, at 222-32 (1957);

ROLAND USHER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE HIGH COMMISSION 124-48, 180-211
(1913); The Puritans'Directions to Avoid the Proceedings of the Bishops (MS, 1604), in 2
ROLAND G. USHER, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH 362-65 (1910)
[hereinafter USHER, RECONSTRUCTION].
25 THOMAS ROGERS, Preface to THE FAITH, DOCTRINE, AND RELIGION PROFESSED
AND PROTECTED IN THE REALM OF ENGLAND [24]-[25] (1607).
246 SeeROBERT PARSONS, A QUIET AND SOBER RECKONING 500-42 (1609).
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constitutional limitations on prerogative. If there was not a continuous opposition to the Crown inhering in a country interest, a parliamentary faction, or a rising class, there was still, to borrow Robert
Zaller's apt phrase, a series of "situational" oppositions crystallizing
around such grievances as purveyance, monopolies, impositions, the
forced loan, billeting, imprisonment at royal command, martial law,
and ship money. Each opposition purported to find support in the
common law for its case. 247 In the most general of terms, reliance on
the common law as a restraint on kingly power was not novel. But
Stuart absolutist thought worked a change in constitutionalist rhetoric (if less so in practice), enabling royal opponents to valorize the
common law as the guardian of constitutionalism itself. This both
raised the stakes and allowed anti-absolutists to identify it with the
very preservation of liberty and property. Royalists struck back. Ministers seeking courtly preferment preached sermons "to rail upon the
fundamental laws of the kingdom," charged a member of Commons
in 1610, while barristers such as John Davies and William Noy crafted
a common law defense of Stuart policies. 2481 Though in some tension,
these royalist strategies engaged the anti-absolutists on the terrain of
the common law, only heightening its importance to the political nation.
Appeals to the common law within Parliament took on a new
complexion when the length, specificity, and technicality of the debates were considered. Lawyers arguing for both the Crown and its
opponents spent days discussing different lines of precedents, parsing
cases, statutes, records, and ancient charters, distinguishing contrary
authorities, and counting up favorable and contrary citations as if doing forensic bookkeeping. (John Selden: "In the late arguments
made, 7 acts of Parliament are cited on the subject's behalf, besides
11 precedents.... And 9 were given in that may seem to be against it,
but I see not how in truth they can be against it .... ,

247

4)

The pursuit

Robert Zaller, The Concept of Opposition in Early Stuart Englan, 12 ALBION 211,

232 (1980).

2432 PROCEEDINGS

IN PARLIAMENT,

supra note 119, at 328.

See also J.P.

SOMMERVILLE, POLITIcs AND IDEOLOGY IN ENGLAND, 1603-1640, at 86-111, 145-88
(1986); MARGARET ATWOOD JUDSON, THE CRISIS OF THE CONSTITUTION: AN ESSAY IN

CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND 1603-1645, at 44-67, 218-73

(1949).

2 COMMONs DEBATES 1628, at 230 (Mary Frear Keeler et al. eds., 1977)
(statement ofJohn Selden during debate on the Five Knights' Case on April 1, 1628).
249

Herbert Butterfield remarked that proceedings in Commons in the 1620s seemed
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of legal authority could lead Parliament into the minutia of documentary provenance. On March 29, 1628, the Solicitor General defended in Commons the Crown's position in the Five Knights' Case by
citing a report of a 1615 King's Bench precedent. Edward Coke objected to such "apocrypha reports, there's no credit to be given to
them. It was done by some young student that did mistake."2 Three
weeks later, John Selden pointed out the lack of support for the Solicitor's precedent in English law and then had another go at the hapless student, now accused of conflating three cases into one report,
"and nothing is expressed in it as it came from the mouth of the
judges otherwise than as his fancy directed him."21 Such debates,
along with the delegations setting forth from every early Stuart Parliament to search through precedents, the tendency to redescribe political questions as legal ones, and the correspondingly heavy weight
assigned legalistic and legal-historical argument, and the fashionable
pose of the parliamentary lawyers to submerge themselves in cases
and historical exempla--"It is not I, Edward Coke, that speaketh it. I
shall say nothing, but the records shall speak'"-all this distinguished
the use of common law argumentation in Stuart national politics
from its Henrican and early Elizabethan role. 2 In these senses, the
common law and its stepchild the ancient constitution had come to
occupy a more prominent place in the national political culture.2 3
Making possible this legalistic turn in political debate was a gentry
prepared to follow it. The tripling of Inns of Court admissions after
the middle sixteenth century provided more gentlemen, or their
brothers and sons, with a legal education. The results can be seen in
Parliament, where the proportion of Inns of Court matriculants in
"rather to have resembled arguments in a court of law than debates in a legislative assembly." H. BUTrERFIELD, THE ENGLISHMAN AND HIS HISTORY 38-39 (1944).
...
2 COMMONs DEBATES 1628, supra note 249, at 193 (Mar. 29, 1628) (statement of
Sir Edward Coke).
2 Id. at 526 (Apr. 17, 1628). In another vignette: On April 1, 1628, Coke and
Selden's allies produced a favorable case out of the manuscript law reports of Judge
Anderson, written in the jurist's own hand and brought to parliament by his son. But
how could Parliament know if the source was authentic? Coke vouched for the handwriting, claiming to have had a copy of the reports in Elizabeth's reign. John Eliot relayed a guarantee of authenticity from Anderson's son. See 2 id at 229-30 (Apr. 1,
1628). Selden read the full case aloud on the floor of Commons. See2 id- at 354 (Apr.
7, 1628).
252 2 id. at 101 (Mar. 25, 1628) (statement of Sir Edward Coke).
m See generallySOMMERVILLE, supranote 248; JUDSON,supranote 248; PococK, supra note 6; DAVID UNDERDOWN, A FREEBORN PEOPLE: POLITICS AND THE NATION IN

SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 19-44 (1996).
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that body rose from twenty-six percent in 1563 to fifty-five percent in
1640-1642, likely enhancing its receptivity to legal arguments.
Although many gentleman students in the Inns left after only a year or
two with a shallow education and a vivid memory of London's social
attractions, their sojourn in such large numbers helped give the law a
greater prominence in lay intellectual life. It reinforced the humanist, and particularly Ciceronian, depiction of legal knowledge as an
ornament to a gentleman;25 indeed, a particularly useful ornament
given the incessant common law litigation of the latter sixteenth century and the recruitment of gentlemen onto the expanding justice of
the peace commissions. Taken as a group, the gentry had become
more legally literate between 1520 and 1600 and better able to understand common law argumentation in politics.
The trend embraced more than the gentry. Legal arguments in
late Elizabethan and early Stuart national politics tacitly addressed
more than the circle of royal advisors, parliamentarians, nobility, upper gentry, and high clerics who counted around 1520, even as the
convention remained that courtly and parliamentary debate not suffer debasement in common ears. The fivefold sixteenth-century inflation enhanced the political role of social groups below the gentry:
yeomen, successful husbandmen and artisans, professionals and
quasi-professionals (such as clerks, apothecaries, and scriveners),
merchants and shopkeepers.6 It reduced, in real terms, restrictions
on officeholding and voting based on static, prescribed levels of
wealth and income, lifting a sizable number of middling property7
owners into juries, civic office, and the parliamentary electorate.2
24 See Stone, supranote 233, at 63.
2" See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 27, at 6, 9; BRAHAi, supra note 28, at Biiii, Ci'-Ciii,
Eiii; CLELAND, supra note 28, at 95-97, 144-46; Richard Knolles, Dedication to Peter
Manwood, in THE Six BOOKS OF A COMMONIVEAL WRrITEN BY J. BODIN [iii] (1962)
(1606).
2 An index of inflation can be derived by the comparison over time of the prices
of basic agricultural products and of an agricultural laborer's "cost of living"
(measured by a weighted combination of basic commodities). Between 1500 and
1600, the price of grain increased about sixfold, the price of livestock about fourfold,
and the agricultural worker's cost of living over fourfold. See 1 C.G.A. CLAY, ECONOMIC
EXPANSION AND SOcIAL CHANGE: ENGLAND 1500-1700, at 40-41, 49-51 (1984). Between 1500 and 1640, the price of grain increased over sevenfold, the price of livestock over sixfold, and the agricultural worker's cost of living about sixfold. See id
17 See GUY, supranote 40, at 416. The qualification for the parliamentary
franchise
in the counties was set by statute in 1430 at 40 shillings freehold. Inflation eroded the
real value of the restriction, qualifying many yeomen and husbandmen for the franchise. A wide variety of wealth and status formulae defined the parliamentary electorate in the boroughs, but here too a general trend towards expansion of the franchise
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Their opinions about national law became politically more significant, influencing not only their votes, but their conduct in local and
civic offices, their enforcement priorities, and the exercise of perhaps
their greatest collective power, the ability to sit still and ignore duties
imposed from above. Oppositional political mobilization also targeted these men. In the middle 1580s, puritan leaders looking to
Parliament to curtail the bishops' disciplinary authority copied the
long-standing government strategy of rallying local supporters to elect
sympathetic knights and burgesses. Opponents of royal policies in
the early seventeenth century did likewise.m
Professionals, merchants, and successful yeomen and artisans followed the gentry and nobility towards greater legal literacy in the century before the Civil War. They too benefited from the sixteenthcentury expansion of educational opportunities at the Inns of Court
and in the grammar schools and universities, where students became
more adept at textual analysis, a useful skill in understanding legal
arguments.2 9 They provided many, perhaps most, of the rapidly

can be discerned in the middle to late sixteenth century, accelerating in the early seventeenth, particularly from 1620-1640. By the Long Parliament, approximately half of
the adult men qualified for the parliamentary vote in the freemen franchises, the most
numerous sort, favored by most of the larger towns. The actual electorate always differed from the legally entitled electorate, sheriffs and towns constraining or expanding the franchise according to local traditions and factional politics. Although the
Elizabethan and early Stuart nobility, leading gentry, and town oligarchies tried to
prevent what they saw as the divisiveness of contested elections, there did appear to be

more appeals to the expanding electorate by the puritans in the 1580s and by antiCourt oppositions from the 1590s through the Civil War. See DEREK HIRsT, THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE?: VOTERS AND VOTING IN ENGLAND UNDER THE E-ARLY
STUARTS 29-105 (1975);J.H. Plumb, The Growth of the Electoratefrom 1600 to 1715, PAST
& PRESENT, Nov. 1969, at 90, 93-103; MARK A. KISHLANSKY, PARLIAMENTARY SELECTION:
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHOICE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (1986) (emphasizing
anomalous and disturbing appearances of pre-Civil War elections to nobles and leading gentry).
A 40-shilling freehold also qualified a man for petty (trial) juries at assizes and
quarter sessions, so that inflation lifted "a new range of modest property holders" onto
thejuries, which drew from the yeomen, upper strata of husbandmen, and tradesmen.
In practice, hard-pressed sheriffs drafted witnesses, victims, constables, and spectators
present at sessions and assizes for jury service when eligible freeholders failed to appear, sometimes in quiet suspension of the 40-shilling requirement. See CYNTHIA B.
HERRUP, THE COMMON PEACE: PARTICIPATION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURyE NGLAND 99-106, 136, 139, 205 (1987).
2 See NEALE, supra note 244, at 147-48.
2" Against a received picture that the gentry supplied the bulk of Inns of Court
students, Wilfrid Prest found unexpectedly high numbers of nongentry. The sons of
the landed elite comprised slightly over half of the matriculants in the decades before
the Civil War, and perhaps even less, given status inflation in the records. The sons of
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growing number of attorneys.26' And their surprisingly heavy involvement in burgeoning sixteenth-century litigation provided an
unwitting legal education of sorts, furthered by the partial migration
of copyhold and middling commercial disputes from the manorial
and urban courts to the common law tribunals and Chancery. 6 '
(One should not overdo the point. There was but a relative shift in
legal competency, a situation compatible with ignorance of the common law beyond a few platitudes. Still, from whence sprang Fulbeck's
ploughswain talking of essoins and Littleton, his poor country neighbors "so full of law-points, that when they sweat, it is nothing but
law? 262)
The printing press exposed this expanded political nation to a
wider range of contrasting legal interpretations than previously available through kinship, clientage, and geographic networks passing
along manuscripts and oral accounts, in part by injecting ideas into
those networks. Print spread the legal positions of puritans and antimerchants, lawyers, clergy, and yeomen predominated among the half (or more) of
the student body not recruited from the gentry. SeePREST, supra note 6, at 87-92.
Lawrence Stone dubbed the vast increase in educational opportunities that
opened up in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries an "educational revolution." See Stone, supra note 233, at 41-80. In some English counties, the number of
grammar schools teaching a predominantly classical curriculum increased tenfold in
the period 1480 to 1660, drawing students from as far down the social scale as the
tradesman, artisan, and copyholder (though excluding unskilled laborers). Small feepaying private schools and private tutoring in classics by clergy proliferated even more
rapidly. Cambridge University matriculations grew from about 150 per year in the
1550s to about 300-400 per year from the 1570s through the Civil War. Social groups
below the landed gentry contributed about 60% of the matriculants to the universities,
drawing disproportionately from the towns and from trading and professional families.
At St. John's College, Cambridge, about one-sixth of the students were sons of husbandmen and plebeians. See id.
Christopher Brooks studied the social origins of attorneys in the counties of
The records allowed for an
Devonshire, Hertfordshire, and Warwickshire.
"impressionistic picture," not quantitative analysis. None of the attorneys came from
families of esquire or high gentry status or from the poor. Rather, they came from a
middling range of families, predominantly yeomen or lesser gentry, with a scattering
of townsmen, that could not afford to send a son to the Inns of Court but were able to
furnish him with a basic education plus £30-80 for training as an attorney. SeeBROOKS,
supranote 112, at 243.
" Approximately 70-75% of King's Bench and Common Pleas litigants in the
years 1560-1640 were below the rank of gentleman. About a third of Common Pleas
defendants were yeomen or husbandmen, about a quarter from the commercial
classes (e.g., merchants, small traders, innkeepers, artisans), and about a tenth from
the professions. See id. at 59-60.
2'2 No doubt the portrait exaggerates, but it would not work as satire unless it described a recognizable, if more modest, phenomenon. See FULBECIC, Introduction, supra
note 223, at B2r-B2v.
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Nicholas Fuller's critique of ecclesiastical jurisdictions,

Edward Coke's romances about the antiquity of Parliament and the
immemorial constitution, Fortescue's, Bracton's and Staunford's limitations on royal power all helped to mobilize "situational" oppositions
of varying composition and duration.23 And the press made more
widely available the "raw material" of legal and legal-historical oppositional argument: yearbooks; the register of writs; old classics like
Bracton, Glanvill, and Fortescue; tracts on land law; prerogative;
crime; the extent of royal prerogative; and other subjects.
How much did the increasing prevalence of printed legal works
affect the actual conduct of politics and governance? One can be agnostic, even frankly skeptical, about its influence, yet can still accept
that the simultaneous growth of legal publishing and the salience of
common law argumentation in an expanded, more legally literate political nation heightened the perceived significance of controlling
common law knowledge. For the perception shaped and engendered
the debate over legal publication in late Elizabethan and early Stuart
England.
The cumulative effect of the growing accessibility of lawbooks to a
larger, better educated, and more textually adept lay audience, the
tighter enmeshing of that readership with the institutions and advocates of the national courts, and the deepening pragmatic and political importance of national law changed the meaning of "publishing
the laws of England" between 1530 and 1640. A lawyer contemplating
the printing of a legal text in 1530 could minimize in his own mind
the dangers attributed to print in the wake of the Reformation by assuming a primarily professional audience imbued with lawyers' interpretive conventions. Though a printed lawbook was "public," he
might imagine that only a limited few would take the time and have
the patience and skills to understand it. There was, in short, an implied social and political containment of the text.
In other contexts, where this was not true, English intellectuals
and governments might resort to more overt ways of cabining knowledge. On occasion Parliament flatly prohibited discussion of contentious issues such as the presence of Christ's body in the sacrament of

26 See FULLER, supra note 45; COKE, Preface, supra note 30, pts. 3-6, 8-9; COKE, FIRsT
INSTITUTE, supra note 45; FORTEScUE, supra note 137; BRAGrON, DE LEGIBUS ET
CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE (Latin ed. 1569); STAUNFORD, supra note 218.

PRTING ENGLISH LAW

1998]

the altar (1539) and succession to Elizabeth (1570) .26 Restricting
knowledge to higher-status men was another tactic, as Parliament
briefly attempted in legislating that "No women or artificers, prentices, journeymen, servingmen of the degree of yeomen or under,
husbandmen nor laborers, shall read the New Testament in English. "se Scholars repeated Pythagoras's admonition against novices
reasoning in public about knowledge scarcely learned and shallowly
understood; and they underscored Plato's warning that judgment in
the arts or governance exercised by those unprepared could imperil a
commonwealth, as when the young elevated their opinions over the
old, or servants over masters, or private men over magistrates. "What
ship can long be safe from wreck," asked the anonymous author of A
Discourse of the Commonweal of This Realm of England (1581; MS, 1549),
"where every man will take upon him to be a pilot; what house well
governed where every servant will be a master or a teacher?"6 In that
spirit, Henry VIII commanded by proclamation that no Englishman
might dispute about the sacrament of the altar except for "learned
267
men in Holy Scripture, instructed and taught in the universities."
Queen Elizabeth ordered the Bible displayed for public reading, but
"
with the proviso that none might "reason or contend.se
Contrast the
lawyer of the early to middle sixteenth century who weighed the likely
social and political repercussions of law printing. He could still meet
the legal press with equanimity or enthusiasm, could welcome publication without restricting the potential audience and uses of texts, if
he imagined that the narrow range of lawbooks and readers ensured
that "public" knowledge would be-in practice-the preserve of welltutored specialists.
See An Act for Abolishing Diversity of Opinions in Certain Articles Concerning
Christian Religion, 31 Hen. VIII, ch. 14 (1539), in 10 OWEN RUFF-EAD, STATUTES AT
LARGE 125-30 (1770); 13 Eliz., ch. 1 (1570), in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra,. at 583.
Intellectuals tried the same strategy. Writing on behalf of Henry VIII's government in
response to the Pilgrimageof Grace (1536), Richard Morison called on Englishmen to
avoid debating acts made in Parliament and contending positions in religion. On
Morison's pamphleteering, see FERGUSON, supra note 9, at 156-57.
An Act for the Advancement of True Religion and for the Abolishing of All
False Doctrine, 34 Hen. VIII, ch. 1 (1542), in 2 RUFFHEAD, supra note 264, at [319].
Parliament repealed this act in 1547 by 1 Edw. VI, ch. 12.
2

SIR THOMAS SMITH (attributed), A DISCOURSE OF THE COMMONvEAL OF THIS

REALM OF ENGLAND 30-31 (Mary Dewar ed., 1969) (1581).
67 ProclamationProhibitingUnlicensed Printingof Scripture, Exiling
Anabaptists,DeprivingMarriedClergy, Removing St. Thomas t Becket from Calendar(1538), in 1 TUDOR ROYAL
PROcLAMATIONs 1485-1603, supra note 40, at 273.
2' Injunctions Given by HerMajesty (1559), in 1 TRANsCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS, supra

note 81, at xxxviii.
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By the late sixteenth century this was harder to do. The diversification of lawbooks and audience and the growing penetration and
importance of national law, particularly as a political resource, undermined the assumed containment of legal printing and raised the
stakes of publication. This context engendered and made more plausible the late Elizabethan and early Stuart anti-publicist critique of the
consequences of legal publication: inflamed disputation and faction,
vulgarization of knowledge, law drawn into disrepute, credulous
readers misled and disingenuous ones made shiftier, and guild mysteries lost. It also, ironically, provided the social predicate for the
publicist case. Implicit in the publicist enlistment of law printing in
the service of order, political unity, and professional defense was the
assumption of an audience as broad or broader than the political nation and expanding along with it. Their depiction of legal knowledge
as a salve rather than spur to litigiousness made its publication more
desirable amid the legally inflected religious and political arguments
and law reform agitation of late Elizabethan and early Stuart England.
I wish to be especially clear about what I am, and am not, arguing.
I do not claim that the printing of English law brought on what the
anti-publicists feared or the publicists hoped. How legal printing in
fact affected English law and society is a complex question beyond the
scope of this Article. Nor do I assert that the developments charted
above necessarily made the anti-publicists' or publicists' views of legal
publishing more compelling. As "history of the book" scholarship has
repeatedly demonstrated, the publication of a text or the transformation of an audience has multiple, often contradictory, consequences.
Which was, crucially, the point. Partisans of the anti-publicists and
publicists focused, respectively, on the disruptive and integrative repercussions of law printing, their appeals persuasive if viewed from
the proper angle and with the right blinders. The developments discussed in this section did not ratify or invalidate the predictions of either side so much as magnify the contradictory effects of law printing,
making it a more salient intellectual problem, driving forward and
elaborating the debate. The corrosion of the implied political and
social containment of lawbooks pushed anti-publicist doubts to the
fore, in turn inducing the publicists to explain the value of legal publishing as professional self-defense, joining this argument to the still
vibrant humanist and Protestant idioms for justifying law printing.
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B. Wariness TowardsRoutine Print:
Censorship, Religious Conformity, andPoliticalArcana

Law printing is a subset of printing. Assessment of the audience
and use of lawbooks, one of the press's many products, took place
against a background of conflicting opinions about the value and
risks of printing as a medium. Of that large story, one part is of pressing relevance: the deepening appreciation among late Elizabethan
and early Stuart conformist churchmen and absolutists of the unwitting dangers of licit printing. For though the publicists could readily
distinguish their law reports and monographs from the treasonous,
seditious, and heretical imprints chased from printers' basements and
seaports to the pyre, suspicions about the licit press at Court and
among the church hierarchy complicated their task while encouraging the anti-publicists.
Press regulation is but a part of the regulation of opinion, and it
took decades for the government to treat the press as a particularly
dangerous way to spread unwelcome ideas. As David Loades has observed, the early Tudor state followed medieval practice in focusing
more on the content of prohibited opinions than on the means of
transmission. It punished sedition whether delivered through print,
manuscript, letters, conversation, or ballads. Although this grouping
of print, writing, and speech continued in statutes and proclamations
throughout the Tudor and early Stuart period, Henry VIII's campaign
against Tyndale's Bible and Protestant tracts proved a turning point,
targeting the press as an especially dangerous medium. Henry added
an ambitious, though porous, system of pre-publication licensing to
post-publication penalties inflicted on all sedithe existing regime• of
. 269
The censorship enforced through this systious communications.

29 See D.M. Loades, The Theory and Practiceof Censorship in Sixteenth-CenturyEngland,
in 24 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOcIETy 141, 141 (1974).
The details of the censorship system changed over time. Queen Elizabeth's In-

junctions of 1559 vested licensing power in the Queen, or six of the Privy Council, or
the Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop of London; for lesser publications, mem-

bers of the High Commission sufficed. The Star Chamber Decree of 1586 reserved
licensing to the Archbishop of Canterbury or Bishop of London, except for common

law books. See infra note 270 for details. The 1637 Star Chamber Order divided up
licensing by field of knowledge, sending lawbooks to the chiefjustices, heraldry to the
Earl Marshal, statecraft and history to one of the principal Secretaries of State, and
other books to the Archbishop of Canterbury or Bishop of London. See W.W. GREG,
SoME ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF LONDON PUBLISHING BETWEEN 1550 AND 1650, at 5153 (1956).
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tem embraced lawbooks as well as other texts.270
Within this framework of state press censorship, the 1580s stand
out as a transitional moment. Government determination to repress
dissident publications grew after a decade and a half of pamphleteering by Protestant separatists, by Catholics attacking Elizabeth's legitimacy, and by several waves of Puritans engaged in the controversies
over vestments, the Admonition, and Archbishop John Whitgift's suspension of nonconforming ministers.2 7 ' The government's reliance
270 The

English government tried, and largely succeeded, in creating a censored

and monopolistic legal press. In 1553, the Crown appointed Richard Tottell the first
law patentee with the sole privilege of publishing common law books, a right which he
and his successors held through the Civil War. The King's or Queen's printer published statutes and proclamations. Like other texts, lawbooks needed to undergo prepublication licensing, though by legal luminaries rather than the bishops or Privy
Councilors. Tottell's 1553 patent allowed royal justices, serjeants or lecturers
(readers) in the Inns of Court to approve common law books. The 1586 Star Chamber Decree restricted the power to two of the three chiefjustices, amended in 1637 to
one of the three chiefjustices or their appointees. On Tottell's patent, see FREDERICK
SEATON SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1476-1776, at 54 (1952); for the
Star Chamber Decrees of 1586 and 1637, see respectively 2 TRANSCRIPT OF THE
REGISTERS, supra note 81, at 810; 4 id. at 530.

In operation, legal censorship was not the separate system the government orders
implied. Publication rights and licenses recorded in the registers of the Stationers'
Company reveal that a variety of legal officials, bishops, and clerical designees acting
in conjunction with lawyers all approved lawbooks. Sometimes legal officials licensed
lawbooks, either in their own right or as designees of the justices, as when Chancellor
Thomas Bromley approved William Lambarde's Eirenarcha (1581), Recorder of London William Fleetwood approvedJ. Adames's Orderof Keeping a Court Leet (1585), and
Master of Requests Edward Powell approved Thomas Powell's The Attorney's Academy
(1623). Sometimes clerics licensed common law books, as when Robert Austin, the
chaplain to Archbishop George Abbott, approved Richard Crompton's Causes Belonging to the Star Chamber (1635). Sometimes clerics called in legal assessors for guidance,
as when Thomas Wykes consulted Morgan Jones, who advised approving William
Lambarde's Archeion (1635) and Charles Calthrope's Relation between the Lord of the
Manorand the Copyholderhis Tenant (1635). See W.W. GREG, LICENSERS FOR THE PRESS,
& C. TO 1640: A BIOGRAPHICAL INDEX BASED MAINLY ON ARBER'S TRANSCRiPT OF THE
REGISTERS OFTHE COMPANY OFSTATIONERS 22, 36, 77, 7, 101, 52 (1962).
2' SeeJ.N. NEALE, ELIZABETH I AND HER PARLIAMENTS, 1559-1581, at 94 (1952).
On Puritan pamphleteering, see PATRICK COLLINSON, THE EIZABETHAN PURITAN
MOvEMENT 77-78, 139-40, 146, 152-54, 273-75, 391-97 (1967). Elizabeth's Royal Injunctions of 1559 regulating press licensing, a 1566 Star Chamber Decree against
"disorders in printing," and six proclamations against the seditious books of Catholics,
Puritans, and Brownists led up to the Star Chamber Decree of 1586 imposing more
stringent regulation. See 1 AMES, supra note 44, at 527; 1 TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS, supra note 81, at 322; 2 TUDOR ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS 1485-1603, supra note
40, at 312-13 (1569), 341-43 (1570), 347-48 (1570), 375-76 (1573), 376-79 (1573), 50102 (1583), 506-08 (1584). In 1607, the divine Thomas Rogers painted an inaccurate, if
revealing, picture of an early Elizabethan England united within against the Catholics,
building the church "without noise and stirs," but falling victim in the 1580s to inter-
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on the Stationers' Company and on monopoly patentees to keep order within the printing trade created unexpected tensions as newly
released apprentices swelled the number of competing presses in the
1570s and 1580s. With many profitable books forbidden as a result of
the patent system, struggling printers raided other men's titles or
published illicit, high-profit tracts, giving the impression of a trade
272
Proposals for tightening press censorship,
slipping out of control.
common enough early in Elizabeth's reign, came more frequently. In
1580, the lawyer William Lambarde revived an idea floated in the
1566 Parliament to establish a board of "Governors of the English
Press," composed of clerics and lawyers, to regulate "the art of printing books... now of late time greatly abused."2"3 The bishops proposed in 1583 that all printed books, including "treatises that in any
way touch the state of the realm or the church," be licensed by Archbishop Whitgift or the Bishop of London.24 Puritans, fearing
Whitgift's discipline but aware of the pressure for invigorating censorship, proposed licensing by four ministers and four lawyers, thereby
cutting out the bishops, "known affectionate parties in some late differences touching the ordering of Church government." 27 Attorney
General John Popham drafted a repressive bill for the Parliament of
1584, subjecting printed slander of the "religion here professed or of
the laws in force" to praemunire on the first offense and treason on
the second. The effort failed on its first reading in Commons, perhaps because members feared the damage Whitgift could do with it to
nal dissension provoked by Jesuit and nonconformist pamphleteering. See Rogers,
Prefac4 supra note 245, at [5], [10]-[16].
= See BLAGDEN, supra note 86, at 66-74; SIEBERT, supra note 270, at 40. The conflict between the Stationers' Company andJohn Wolfe and his confederates was a representative example of the problem. See 2 TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS, supranote
81, at 778-82.
273 Lambarde's Act to Restrain the Licentious Printing,Selling, and
Uttering of Unprofitable and Hurtful English Books (1580) revised a 1577 proposal in the State Papers Domestic, which was a copy of a 1566 parliamentary bill. For Lambarde's 1580 bill, see 2
TRANSCRIPr OF THE REGISTERS, supra note 81, at 751-53. For background, see Cyprian
Blagden, Book Trade Control in 1566, 13 THE LIBRARY 287, 290-92 (5th Series, 1958).
24 This memo from Archbishop Whitgift and a committee of bishops
(Oct. 1583)
has been printed in A COMPANION TO ARBER: BEING A CALENDAR OF DOCUMENTs IN
EDWARD ARBER'S TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS OF

LONDON, 1554-1640, at 137-38 (W.W. Greg ed., 1967) [hereinafter A COMPANION TO
ARBER].
2
CertainPoints to Be Considered of Touching the Petition Made to Her Majesty by... the
Archbishop of Canterbury (1584), in 1 THE SECOND PART OF A REGISTER; BEING A
CALENDAR OF MANUSCRIPTS UNDER THAT TITLE INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION BY THE
PuRTANS ABOuT 1593, AND NOW IN DR. WI.LIAMS'S LIBRARY 175 (Albert Peel ed.,

1915); see also The Copy of a Letter,supranote 92, at 143-46.
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critics of the Church of England. 2' 6 Blocked in Parliament, the government issued a Star Chamber Decree in 1586 featuring prepublication licensing by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of London, or a Privy Councilor (or in the case of lawbooks, any two of the
chief justices). The Decree, like Lambarde, decried the "great enormities and abuses as of late [in the press], more
than in time past"
2
that "do rather daily more and more increase." 7
Historians have pointed to the 1586 Decree as evidence of greater
governmental determination to control the press, and to some extent
it was. 278 But only to some extent. The Decree did not fundamentally
reshape enforcement machinery or substantially heighten the severity
of the government's policing of ideas. Along these dimensions, the
Decree's significance submerges within the continuities of Tudor and
early Stuart censorship. First, its administrative logic was not novel.
The Decree's system of prepublication licensing dated back to Henry
VIII's 1538 Proclamation and more immediately to Elizabeth's Injunctions of 1559 mandating review of all books except school and
university texts by Privy Councilors, bishops, university chancellors, or
ecclesiastical commissioners. 279 Second, the impetus behind the Decree came less from the government than the Stationers' Company,
which expended £80 during two years of lobbying. Most of the Decree's departures from Elizabeth's 1559 and 1566 ordinances
strengthened the Company's powers against the swelling number of
poachers infringing copyrights and royal patents to the detriment of
the wealthier, established printers. 280 Third, the Decree did not
27 See NEALE, supra note 271, at 95.
For Popham's bill, see A COMPANION TO
ARBER, supranote 274, at 138.

2 TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERs, supra note 81, at 807-12.
See SIEBERT, supra note 270, at 61-63; D.M. Loades, Illicit Presses and Clandestine
Printingin England, 1520-1590, in TOO MIGHTY TO BE FREE: CENSORSHIP AND THE
277
M

PRESS IN BRrrAiN AND THE NETHERLANDS 9, 21-22 (A.C. Duke & CA. Tamse eds., 1987)
[hereinafter Too MIGHTY TO BE FREE].

Henry's 1538 Proclamation mandated Privy Council licensing, building upon a
1530 Proclamation requiring approval by the ordinary of the diocese for Englishlanguage theological works. See 1 TUDOR ROYAL PROcLAMATIONS 1485-1603, supra
note 40, at 193-97, 270-76. Edward VI reiterated the need for Privy Council licensing
in a 1551 Proclamation. See Id. at 514-18. For Elizabeth's Injunctions of 1559, allotting
licensing authority to Privy Councilors and ecclesiastics, see 1 TRANSCRIPT OF THE
REGISTERS, supra note 81, at xxxviii.
= In 1584, the Stationers' Company authorized its Wardens to approach Parliament and the Crown in search of stronger powers to use against recalcitrant poachers.
V9

The Decree strengthened the Company's powers vis-A-vis individual printers in the following ways: It restricted publication to the universities and London, forbidding provincial presses far from the Stationers' searches and fines; it prohibited hidden
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measurably increase the severity of the government's overall control
of printed opinion (of which it was part, along with the law of treason,
heresy, sedition, and scandalum magnatum)

It presupposed the Tu-

dor and early Stuart Crown's claimed right to confine opinion, in
practice within flexible boundaries contracting periodically in moments of political and social unrest, then easing. The swings between
worry and inertia, the emphasis on suppressing goads to disorder
rather than achieving consistency in standards of censorship were as
characteristic of the decades after 1586 as before.282
presses; it limited the allowed number of apprentices (who would eventually become
competitors); it barred new master printers from entering the trade until the Archbishop of Canterbury determined that death and retirement had reduced their supposedly excessive numbers to an appropriate level, and provided that new master
printers required the consent of both the Stationers' Court and the Court of High
Commission; and it enjoined printers to obey Company ordinances, thereby tacitly
putting government authority behind the Company's internal copyright system. In
this fashion the Company's wealthier ruling printers enlisted the government in their
struggle against competition. Highlighting the Company's interests does not invalidate the state's desire to tighten press censorship so much as qualify the picture of a
resolute government. See BLAGDEN, supra note 86, at 69-73; BENNETT, supra note 20, at
57-64. The Decree can be found in 2 TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS, supra note 81, at

807-12.
's' See Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control
of the Press,37 STAN. L. REV. 661, 666-73 (1985).
22 In response to separatist writings and the "Martin Marprelate" tracts, for example, the government cracked down on dissenting Protestant books from 1587 to 1593.
Around 1600, fear of a disputed succession to Elizabeth coupled with economic reversals underlay Archbishop Whitgift's order suppressing satires and epigrams, requiring
English histories to be vetted by the Privy Council, and prohibiting the publication of
plays "except they be allowed by such as have authority." With the successful transition
to Stuart rule, scrutiny relaxed. The middle 1620s and middle 1630s marked two more
periods of intense concern, as James issued proclamations in 1623 and 1624 ordering
stringent observation of the 1586 Star Chamber Decree amid the political and religious turbulence caused by England's inaction as overseas Protestants suffered in the
Thirty Years War, and as William Laud, appointed Archbishop of Canterbury in 1633,
blocked works inhospitable to his changes in church polity and to Charles I's
"personal rule." See FREDERIC A. YOUNGS, JR., THE PROCLAMATIONS OF THE TUDOR
QUEENS 210 (1976); 3 TUDOR ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS 1485-1603, supra note 40, at 1317; 1 STUART ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS: ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS OF KING JAMES I, 1603-

1625, at 583-85, 599-600 (James F. Larkin & Paul L. Hughes eds., 1973) (1623 and
1624 proclamations) [hereinafter STUART ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS]; 3 TRANSCRIPT OF
THE REGISTERS, supra note 81, at 316; 4 id. at 529-36; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, STATE
PAPERS DOMESTIC, 12/282/31 (c. Oct. 1601) (unease over succession to Elizabeth re-

flected in the preamble to a parliamentary bill prohibiting the writing and publishing
of books about the title of the Crown); CHRISTOPHER HILL, Censorshipand English Literature, in 1 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF CHRISTOPHER HILL: WRITING AND REVOLUTION
IN 17TH CENTURY ENGLAND 34-38 (1985); Blair Worden, Literature and Political Censorship in Early Modem England, in Too MIGHTY TO BE FREE, supra note 278, at 50-51;

SIEBERT, supra note 270, at 142; KEVIN SHARPE, THE PERSONAL RULE OF CHARLES I, at

648, 650 (1992).
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If the 1580s, then, did not introduce a new-found severity, scope,
or consistency to censorship, it did mark a transition in at least one
meaningful sense: a movement, in relative terms, from a more ad
hoc (if blunt) policing of publication towards a more systematic review. The 1586 Decree changed the book registration procedures of
the Stationers. The Company required pre-publication registration
("licensing") of all works at their Hall, the license serving as a copyright that protected the work against infringement. Company registration was independent of the pre-publication licensing that the
Elizabethan Injunctions of 1559 demanded. Although the Company
occasionally protected itself by insisting on evidence of governmental
licensing before registering a work, they seldom did so before 1586.
The Stationers accepted most proffered works upon the approval of
their own Wardens, consulting government officials selectively.28 After 1586, by contrast, the Company changed policy. The Clerk more
frequently refused to register books on the authority of the Stationers' Wardens alone, requiring the signature of one of the bishops or
officials empowered by the Decree. Sir John Lamb, after examining
Company records around 1634, reported that in the decade before
the Decree, "many [works] were licensed by the [Stationers'] Master
and Wardens, some few by the Master alone, and some by the Archbishop [of Canterbury] and more by the Bishop of London." Felix
Kingston, made a Company freeman in 1597, told Lamb that "before
the Decree the Master and Wardens licensed all. And that when they
had any divinity book of much importance they would take the advice
of some two or three ministers of this town [i.e., London]. "254 W.W.
Greg's review of the Stationers' Clerk's book reinforces contemporary
impressions. From 1557 to 1571, the Clerk recorded 1388 entries
(about half ballads), of which only fifty mentioned licensing by outside authorities, less than four percent of the total, though Greg suspects underreporting by the Clerk. After 1586, a strong majority of
the entries noted official licenses, falling to about half in periods of
slackness.2
The Company insisted on licensing in order to collect fees and to prevent the
publication of heretical or seditious works, for which Stationers' officials might be
held responsible by the government. SeeBLAGDEN, supra note 86, at 43-44.
28 See 3 TRANscRIPT OF THE REGISTERS, supra note 81, at 690.
Unfortunately, Greg does not provide a statistical breakdown of different types

of licenses (Company, official, both, neither) for the period after 1586. He gives only
qualitative impressions based on his examination of the Clerk's books. He did count

new copies entered in the Stationers' records between 1576 and 1640 (e.g., on both
sides of the Decree) which reveals 9397 new copies entered: 1813 with no evidence of
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It is possible that the Company's registration books after 1586
show a significantly greater percentage of works arriving with governmental licenses because of changes in the Clerk's recording procedures rather than in the practice of authors and printers. Yet
Archbishop Whitgift's appointment in 1588 of twelve "correctors" of
the press to vet manuscripts in his stead suggests otherwise. Bishops
had long delegated review of some works to their chaplains. In part
to relieve his workload and in part to spread responsibility should a
licensed book later prove controversial, Whitgift expanded and formalized the
system,
his "dozen "correctors"
sorting through a more
reguar
argend "
.
285
regular and larger flow of manuscripts.
For the seditious or threatening tract, the machinery of denunciation by proclamation and prosecution by High Commission, Star
Chamber, and assize stood ready, operating intermittently after the
Decree as before, driven by political calculations. For the unobjectionable work on its way to the press, the Decree heightened the
chances of review by the Church or government, perhaps by an agent
specifically commissioned for licensing.
This stands out, for our
purposes, as the most salient difference between the porous 1538 and
1559 licensing systems and the more systematized one in place after
1586. The greater determination to scrutinize the innocuous in order to stem the subversive implicated not just the press as a carrier of
corrosive ideas but the press as a medium. For in contrast to the episodic pressure imposed upon seditious tracts, this routinization of review, applied to all publication candidates however unobjectionable
and to print alone as a form of communication, underscored the risks
of the press as a medium. This stance carried an unwelcome implication for the publicists.
The 1586 Decree signaled a growing circumspection about the
press at Court and among the bishops. There was a tilt toward waria license, 1672 with only a Company license, 439 with only an official license, and 5473
with both a Company and official license. See GREG, supranote 269, at 41-52.
2 The announcement of Whitgift's designees can be found in the Stationers'
Court book. See REcoRDS OF THE COURT OF THE STATIONERS COMPANY 1576 TO 1602,

at 28-29 (W.W. Greg & E. Boswell eds., 1930). The bishops appointed new correctors
over subsequent decades, their names recurring frequently in the Stationers' registration records. SeeSIEBERT, supranote 270, at 61-62.
2
The government's ambitions ran ahead of its actual effectiveness, which
was
compromised by its inability to block imported books and eliminate underground
presses and by the failure of approximately one-third of published works to undergo
the formalities of licensing and registration with the Stationers. See BLAGDEN, supra
note 86, at 44.
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ness. The tighter enmeshing of the licensing system of the Stationers
with that of the government better communicated the biases of Privy
Councilors and bishops to writers and publishers, a development only
reinforced by the 1586 Decree's bestowal upon the Archbishop and
High Commission of the power to approve the nomination of all new
master printers. The 1580s saw the death or retirement of Privy
Councilors and bishops touched by humanist and Protestant optimism about printed pedagogy and their replacement by men quicker
to sense threats and police opinion. 2 8 The death of the Earl of
Leicester in 1588 following several years of declining influence removed from the Privy Council a patron of English-language publication of the classics, history, and Continental Protestant reformers.
The circle of Puritan nobles surrounding Leicester died or drifted
into political isolation in the 1580s and 1590s. Church policy followed the lead of "court bishops" and their aides such as John
Whitgift, Richard Bancroft, and Richard Cosin who made careers opposing Puritans and aggressively defending the established church in
the name of conformity. Whitgift's appointment as Archbishop of
Canterbury in 1583 and elevation to the Privy Council in 1586, where
he allied himself with the anti-Puritan Christopher Hatton, signaled
the political ascent of the conformists. In the opinion of Wallace
MacCaffrey, their rise in the 1580s marked a generational divide in
the English episcopacy. For they replaced the original group of
Elizabethan bishops such as Edmund Grindal and Edwin Sandys,
sympathetic to the Marian exiles' eagerness to preach by word and
press and tolerant of some limited measure of local variety and lay intellectual initiative within the Protestant national church.
To be sure, the change was one of degree. Matthew Parker and
Elizabeth's other early bishops attacked writers and printers behind
the Admonition campaign (1572-1573) and imprisoned or deprived
Puritans who took too great liberties with clerical dress, liturgy, and
prophesyings. Yet the court bishops made the drive against nonconformity a central goal, proceeding without the hidden sympathies and

The following paragraphs have drawn upon ELEANOR ROSENBERG, LEICESTER:
PATRON OF LETTERS (1955); WALLACE T. MAcCAFFREY, QUEEN ELIZABETH AND THE

MAKING OF POLICY,1572-1588, at 80-118, 437-55 (1981); COLLINSON, supra note 271, at
146-55, 243-72, 386-87; PATRICK COLLINSON, ENGLISH PURITANISM 23 (1983); 1 USHER,
RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 244, at 403-23; NEALE, supra note 244, at 280-97. The

disciplinarian tilt at Court and among the church hierarchy coincided with the continuing vitality of humanist themes among political writers, in particular, the valorization of an informed citizenry using knowledge in the service of the commonwealth.
See generally PELTONEN, supranote 46.
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twinges of conscience noticeable in predecessors such as Grindal.
They "boast and brag of obedience," complained the Puritan divine
Orthodoxos in A Dialogue Concerning the Strife of Our Church (1584),
"having in their mouths nothing but obedience, obedience, even as if
they were obedience itself."2 With Elizabeth's assent, Whitgift and
his successor Bancroft joined Privy Councilors in equating Puritans
with papists as threats to the realm, underscoring the importance of
shutting down nonconformist lectures, private meetings, and printed
appeals (as in the hunt for the Martin Marprelate network).M
Whitgift's remarkable letter supporting Bancroft's appointment as
Bishop of London in 1597 revealed episcopal priorities. A quick
glance at the prot6g6's preaching and academic degrees prefaced the
detailed recounting of what interested the senior cleric: Bancroft had
by "diligent search" detected the Marprelate presses, helped the
Crown's council prosecute Martin's agents in Star Chamber, rooted
out Thomas Cartwright's book of Presbyterian discipline, pressed the
Star Chamber action against Cartwright, and intercepted the Puritan
John Penry's writings.2 '
What did it mean that the hunting and destroying of presses had
become a central recommendation for Christ's Shepherd? Perhaps
not much if one sees the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century
bishops as continuing their predecessors' task of denying the press to
Catholics, separatists, and nonconformists in an age of proliferating
publication. Yet there is a sense in which the drive against nonconformist ideas and practices, of which the 1586 Star Chamber Decree
was a part, undermined the celebratory rhetoric about the press inherited from Foxe and Tyndale. It compromised identification of
print-born religious instruction with the Protestant cause, giving reservations about printed religious tutelage a greater cultural salience.
Archbishop Whitgift's concentration on the potential dangers of
preaching and of unsupervised lay religious education deepened
these reservations. Ministers following Foxe in extolling the press
29A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE STRIFE OF OUR CHURcH

66-67 (1584).

required subscription to detailed articles designed to expose ministers
with reservations about the Book of Common Prayer and used High Commission and
MWhitgift

its ex officio oath as a weapon against more radical nonconformists, tactics putting
300-400 ministers at risk of suspension and a large handful in prison. Whitgift's successor, Bancroft, deployed the Church's Canons of 1604 against nonconformists, depriving about 90 ministers.
29 John Whitgift Reasons Alleged by the Archbishop of Canterbury
for Dr.Bancroft"s Being
Promoted to the Bishipric of London (MS, 1597), reprinted in 2 USHER, RECONSTRUCTION,
supra note 244, at 366-69.
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commonly cast it as a mechanical preacher, granting it by analogy a
share in the deep respect preaching the word enjoyed among Elizabethan Protestants. The aging Archbishop of York Edwin Sandys spoke
of published sermons and tracts as "a salve to every sore" inflicted by
the enemies of the gospel, a way to "re-edify" and "raise and erect the
newJerusalem." 2 The translator of Phillippus Caesar's A GeneralDiscourse Against... Usurers (1578) thought that straying Christians
"abhorring the sight of godly preachers" might rejoin Christ's flock
"by reading secretly the works of some, which they could never be allured openly to hear."293 But the common depiction of the press as a
typographical preacher became a more ambivalent device amid the
episcopal campaigns against prophesyings, traveling to sermons outside the local parish, and participation of other than family in-home
religious study (Bishop Alymer's "night conventicles") . These highlighted the disruptive potential of preaching in person and through
typographical surrogates and expressed skepticism about the capacity
of laymen to pursue religious education outside the supervision of the
Church. By the turn of the seventeenth century, conformist divines
such as Richard Bancroft and Lancelot Andrewes attacking puritan
"popularity" said more about the unwitting disruptions unleashed by
preaching and religious publications inviting the multitude to pursue
subtle points of doctrine, more about the value of quiescence and the
dangers of over-incisive curiosity. Following Richard Hooker's lead,
they emphasized the educative value of ceremonies, sacraments, and
prayer at the cost of downplaying the word-centered (read: Puritan)
focus on preaching.2 s All this qualified Foxe's legacy of applause for
the ministrations of the mechanical preacher, the press.26
EDWIN SANDYS, Epistle to the Christian Readers, in SERMONS (1585), reprinted in
THE SERMONS OF EDWIN SANDYS 1, 2 (John Ayre ed., 1842). Sandys delivered his opinions while taking issue with the injunction against "making many books" in Ecclesiastes
12:12 (KingJames).
293 Translator'sEpistle supra note 192,
at ii.
In 1583, Archbishop Whitgift prohibited "all preaching, reading, catechism,
and other such like exercise in private places" drawing from more than one family because they were "a manifest sign of schisme." See PATRICK COLLINSON, THE RELIGION
OF PROTESTANTS: THE CHURCH IN ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1559-1625, at 248 (1982)

(quoting Archbishop Whitgift).
295See PETER LAKE, ANGLICANS AND PURITANS? PRESBYTERIANISM AND ENGLISH
CONFORMIST THOUGHT FROM WHITGIFr TO HOOKER 128, 162-77 (1988); Peter Lake,
Lancelot Andrewes, John Buckeridge, and Avant-Garde Conformity at the Court ofJames I, in
THE MENTAL WORLD OF THEJACOBEAN COURT 113, 114, 123-24 (Linda Levy Peck ed.,
1991).
296 Qualified, not eliminated and then within conformist circles. Attitudes toward
the press were complicated. The churchman Thomas Rogers championed the public
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Indeed, in the decades before the Civil War, conformists began to
look with greater sympathy upon the Tridentine Catholic critique of
decentralized Protestant theological publication and lay religious
study. With "every man... printing a catechism, a new model of his
own, according to his own private notions," with "every willful opinion, ignorant assertion, and some blasphemous dotages, cast forth by
any man that is of our Confession," the simple multitude wavered and
doubted in their faith. Numerous fractured and vulnerable targets
rose up for destruction by Catholic polemicists blessed with unified
doctrine. So Richard Montagu, who further taxed the press with carrying "unnecessary quarrels... in question of speculation and obscurity" to "popular ears and capacities.., unable to comprehend
them." 7 John Donne agreed, hoping that the fine points of biblical
exegesis should not be "served in every popular pulpit to curious and
itching ears, [and] least of all made table-talk, and household discourse."25 Charles I's bishop Joseph Hall lamented that errors "that
could but creep" before the Reformation "do now fly," and commended silence, pointedly adding that "[wv] e might learn of our wise
adversaries, that guide the helm of the Roman church."2 The reverberations of this offensive can be heard in the diary of the Middle
Temple barrister John Manningham. Attending Dr. Withers' sermon
at St. Paul's in November 1602, Manningham was told: "In that he
[Christ] took but three disciples it may be collected that all things are
not at the first to be published to all men, but first to some few and
after to others."3 3
Manningham's sympathies ran against Dr.
Withers', for one month later, in response to an unknown prompting,
he wrote: "That opinion which some hold that Paul did not publish
his writings till he and they were confirmed by Peter, as the head of
the Apostles, is plainly everted by the first and second chapters to the

reading of printed homilies and sermons against Puritan insistance that edification
grew from a minister's active preaching in a "lively voice," not his "bare reading." For
this polemical purpose, Rogers identified hostility toward learned books and published sermons as a doctrine of the Brownists and Anabaptists. See THOMAs ROGERS,
Article 35: OfHomilies, in ROGERS, supra note 245, at 202-05.
27 RICHARD MONTAGU, APPELLO CAESAREM 243-45, 80, 82 (1625); see
also RICHARD
MONTAGU, DIATRIBE UPON THE FIRsT PART OF THE LATE HISTORY OF TITHEs 2-3
(1621).
TODD, supra note 35, at 224.
CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE ENGLISH BIBLE AND THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY

REVOLUnON 14(1993).
'o John Manningham, Diary ofJohn Manningham of the Middle Temple, in 99 ROYAL
HISTORICAL SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS 76 (John Bruce ed., Westminster 1868).
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Galatians,
where it is apparent that Paul withstood and contradicted
30 1
Peter.
This qualification of Protestant propagandists' celebration of the
press received a boost from absolutists' emphasis upon and expansion
of the scope of the notion of arcana imperii (that secrets or mysteries
of the state should only be accessible to the crown's counselors).
Elizabeth on occasion forbade public and parliamentary discussion of
religious reform, royal succession, and foreign policy, imprisoning
those who "meddled" with what was above them. Building on her
legacy and on the cultural salience given the concept by the vogue of
Tacitean history and raison d'Etatstatecraft in the late sixteenth century, James and his courtiers elaborated and pushed to the foreground the concept of arcanaY2 They used it not only to shield and
valorize royal policy in Parliament and in the politically important trials of Impositions and Ship-Money, but also to suppress a lawbook,
John Cowell's legal dictionary, The Interpreter (1607). Cowell gave too
high a royalist definition to politically contested keywords such as
"subsidy," "parliament," and "prerogative," earning the enmity of the
House of Commons and condemnation by James at Parliament's behest 3 A 1610 royal proclamation banning the work, written by James
himself, deplored the "unsatiable curiosity in many men's spirits," the
"itching in the tongues and pens" that led them to speculate on the
"very highest mysteries in the Godhead" and to "wade in all the deepest mysteries that belong to the persons or state of kings." In the grip
of this license, said James in anti-publicist idiom, "men go out of their
element, and meddle with things above their capacity; themselves
shall not only go astray, and stumble in darkness, but will mislead3 also
diverse others with themselves into many mistakings and errors. 04
The royalist language of arcana perhaps lent comfort to lawyers,
physicians, scientists, alchemists, and artisans unwilling to reveal guild
secrets to a prying public; it served, by analogy, as an archetype for
Id. at 109.

For background about these ideas, see Ernst H. Kantorowicz, Mysteries of State:
An Absolutist Concept and Its Late Mediaeval Origins, 48 HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV. 65
(1955); Ginzburg, supranote 82, at 28-41; Malcolm Smuts, Court-CenteredPolitics and the
Uses of Roman Historians, c. 1590-1630, in CULTURE AND POLITICS IN EARLY STUART
ENGLAND 21, 28 (Kevin Sharpe & Peter Lake eds., 1993).
s COWELL, supra note 212; see also 1 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT, supra note

119,

at 25 (remarks of Mr. Martin to Parliament, Mar. 2, 1610).
James I, A Proclamation TouchingD[r.j Cowels Booke Called the Interpreter(1610), in
1 STUART ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS, supra note 282, at 243.
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nondisclosure. 5 But it also held a special meaning for the bar. Because of the centrality of common law institutions and concepts to
early modem governance, royalist reliance on the notion of arcana
enriched anti-publicist arguments by suggesting that inappropriate
publication of the common law offended royal as well as professional
interests. One of the complaints against the civilian John Cowell was
his effrontery in writing beyond his professional competence, meddling with the common law "mysteries" at the foundation of the constitution. James made this point the centerpiece of his proclamation,
and his counselors underscored it repeatedly in the 1610 Parliament.30 6 From the Lord Treasurer on behalf of James: Cowell "overcuriously wr[o]te in that subject, which is out of his proper element."0 7 From the Lord Privy Seal: "the matter" of Cowell's dictionary "is too full, too large, too high, for the author to deal with all.""0 '
From the Lord Privy Seal's summary of Attorney General Henry
Hobart's speech: Cowell's "great fault is that in a faculty not his own,
he has ventured in such sort as he has; so it cannot be esteemed an
error ofjudgment but presumption."3 °
The plasticity of the concept of arcana and its spillover effects
were not lost on lawyers and parliamentarians treated to lectures on
the limits of their understanding. Thomas Wentworth pointedly remarked to Parliament in 1610 that "the King referred us to his speech
in print wherein 'tis said to be sedition to dispute what a king may do;
which, if it be, all our law books are seditious, for they have ever done
it."" 0 A reductio ad absurdum, certainly, but one that captured the
latent implications of the royalist position. For if the common law
helped establish the constitutional structures within which monarchs
practiced the mysteries of statecraft, might not legal publications delineating constitutional boundaries and private rights, even if not in-

5 It was an archetype in the limited sense that its prominence strengthened those
resisting the claim of a public "right" or "interest" in knowing. The fit, however, was
not exact, particularly in the style of drawing boundaries. Royalists established hierarchies of high and low persons and knowledges, while guilds and professions distinguished insiders from outsiders.
M James's 1610 proclamation condemned writers like Cowell
who "freely wade" in
the "deepest mysteries of monarchy and politique government." 1 STUART ROYAL
PROCLAMATIONS, supra note 282, at 243.
307Lord Treasurer (Mar. 8, 1610), in 2 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT, SUPra note
119, at 29.
Lord Privy Seal (Mar. 8, 1610), in 1 id at 189.
Id at 185.
s'0 Thomas Wentworth (May 22, 1610), in 2 id. at 108.
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tentionally antagonistic, expose too much for royalist tastes? s1' Solici-

tor General and courtier Francis Bacon argued "that questions which
concern the power of the king and the liberty of the subject should
not be textual, positive, and scholastical, but slide in practice silently
and not be brought into positions and order."31 2 Lord Chancellor
Ellesmere's argument in Calvin's Case (1608) rued the popular interest in whether the common law
be jus scriptum, or non scripture; and such other like niceties: For, we
have in this age so many Questionists; and quo modo, and quare, are so
common in most men's mouths, that they leave neither religion, nor

law, nor King nor council, nor policy, nor government out of question.... And the end they have in this question, What is the common

law? is to shake and weaken the ground and principles of all govern313
ment.
In this fashion, the royalist language of mystery could extend beyond

its core use in shielding Crown policy to protect lawyers' guild knowledge and implicitly cast suspicion on nonoppositional publicist dis-

closure. s4
Together the royalist stress on political arcana, the conformist
turn in the church, and the refashioning of censorship strengthened
the undercurrent of unease about routine legal printing in late Elizabethan and early Stuart England. The effects were indirect, and it is
important to make clear the limits of the argument. Arcana rhetoric
and the campaign against nonconformity in the church did not have
the legal press squarely in mind. The post-1586 censorship regime
touched on legal publishing only obliquely by providing lawbooks a

s, AsJames I was fond of reminding lawyers andjudges: "That which concerns the
mystery of the King's power, is not lawful to be disputed." James I, Speech in Star Chamber (June 20, 1616), in THE POLITICAL WORKS OFJAMES I, at 333 (Charles H. Mcllwain
ed., 1965). Whether lawbooks posed a danger of exposing the arcana imperii became
part of the Restoration debate over the regulation of legal publishing. See THE CASE
OF THE BooKSEL_.ERs AND PRINTERS STATED (1666).

Francis Bacon (May 19, 1610), in 2 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT, supra note
119, at 98
s's Lord Ellesmere, The Speech of the Lord Chancellor of England, in The Ex312

chequer Chamber, Touching the Post-Nati(1608), inKNAFLA, supra note 7, at 216, 216.
34 In his Star Chamber speech of 1616 to the judges, James referred to the common law as a "mystery" in the sense of a guild or trade knowledge. "For though the
common law be a mystery and skill best known unto yourselves, yet if your interpretation be such, as other men which have logic and common sense understand not the
reason, I will never trust such as interpretation." THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES I,
supra note 311, at 332.
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separate tract: licensing by the chief justices rather than churchmen
or Privy Councilors; no need to register works with the Stationers
since the patentee's monopoly provided copyright protection.1 Legal printing did not wilt, but continued to flourish, increasing in scale
and diversity in the latter sixteenth and early seventeenth century.
Nonetheless, from the 1580s, the legal press operated in an intellectual climate where conformist churchmen and royalist counselors
disparaged lay theological discussions fed by printed religious tracts,
placed greater value on conformity, mystery, and silence, and more
strongly underlined the latent factious dangers of routine, seemingly
innocuous publications. They sharpened concern about printing as a
medium.31 6 Conformist divines distinguished between a basic corpus
of Protestant doctrine necessary for the people to absorb through
preaching or print and the supererogatory "fine points" that distracted believers from the essentials of faith and encouraged disputation. This position was structurally similar to the legal non-publicists'
discomfort with revealing the reasons and fictions of the law. Arcana
rhetoric overlaid these warnings, in particular James's threat after the
Cowell affair that vulgar persons prying into matters of state "above
their reach" might provoke him to appoint licensers to "look more
narrowly in the nature of all" books "concerning our government ... or the laws of our kingdom."317 All this was a matter of emphasis, of stressing half-century old critical topoi about print: the press
as conveyer of the semblance of knowledge to the impressionable; the
press as efficient cause of ill-informed, undisciplined independent
thought in religion and law, nurturer of faction and challenges to
authority.
The beginning of this process in, roughly, the 1580s coincides
with anti-publicist warnings and with publicist allusions to the critique
of printing and justification of their own resort to the press. One
hears the message, even the accent of conformist and arcana rhetoric
315

In practice, churchmen licensed lawbooks as well as the chiefjustices, and the

patentee recorded some titles with the Stationers. See BLAGDEN, supra note 86, at 43-

44.
316

The disciplinarian trend in the culture of the English church and court after

1585, especially in the "nasty nineties," is the theme of the essays collected in THE
REIGN OF ELIZABETH I, supra note 156. Guy found in that period "an authoritarian reaction from privy councillors and magistrates, whose emphasis on state security, the
subversiveness of religious nonconformity, and the threat of 'popularity' and social
revolt became obsessional." John Guy, Introductionto THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH I, su-

pra note 156, at 1, 1.
317

1 STUART ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS, supranote 282, at 244-45.
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in the complaints of Recorder of London Anthony Benn: "The
speculation of laws and rule belongs not to the common people but
simply the obedience thereunto, but as unto the ark of the highest
mysteries every tinker will in these days be peeping and not so satisfied will also be prating.",1 8 If the disciplinarian view of the press
taken by leading churchmen and royalists did not reverse the accelerating pace and diversification of legal publishing, it did invite lawyers
to reflect on whether law printing was justified, making a long-present
question more pressing and disturbing. Hudson's attack on legal
publishing, Pulton's and Powell's forthright defense, and Caesar's,
J.L.'s, and Coke's reassurances to critics were all answers to this question, part of a debate whose legacy lay in the apologies for and defenses of going into print offered in late Elizabethan and early Stuart
lawbook prefaces. Lawyers printed, but they looked over their shoulder.
C. Print and Manuscriptas Mediafor TransmittingLaw
Common lawyers retained and conveyed law through the simultaneous use of print, manuscript, and oral tradition. Most legal literature was in manuscript, not print, particularly among professionals
practicing in London or resident in the Inns of Court. Elizabethan
and early Stuart lawyers, for example, produced about six to twelve
manuscript volumes of law reports for every printed one.319 In the
century before the Civil War, print became steadily more important,
while remaining intertwined with manuscript and oral tradition. The
growth of the legal press in scale and diversity made legal texts more
widely available to non-professionals and put about half of the commons' available written knowledge into print by the 1630s, according
to the estimate ofJohn Baker.!
How did print, as a medium for transmitting law, differ from
manuscripts in ways that might excite anti-publicist unease? To begin
crafting an answer, consider the interests of the judges, serjeants, and
barristers, the "upper branch" of the legal profession, as a guild (at
3,8

BENN, supra note 100, at L28/46, fol. 44v.

3'9J.H. BAKER, The Dark Age of English Legal History, 1500-1700, in THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND THE COMMON LAW, supra note 240, at 435, 446. The last years of
Elizabeth's reign, 1590-1603, generated over 200 extant volumes of case reports, copied from about 20 distinct reporters. See David Ibbetson, Law Reporting in the 1590s, in
LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 74-75 (Chantal Stebbings ed., 1995).
20
'J.H.Baker, The Inns of Court and LegalDoctrine,in LAWYERS AND LAYMEN 274, 282
(T.M. Charles-Edwards et al. eds., 1986).
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the cost of temporarily muting the conflicts within that guild). The
years between the Henrician Reformation and the Civil War saw great
gains in the influence of the common law in English politics and society, a process that print crucially aided, not least by overwriting local, customary, and memorial legal traditions (an important story, but
one for another day). Yet at the same time, the press undermined the
profession's collective authority over the organization, transmission,
and evaluation of common law knowledge (my interest here).S2'
Manuscript circulation of common law reinforced collective guild
control over legal information. Lawyers and students in the Inns of
Court routinely copied manuscripts from one another, at times verbatim, at times combining parts of borrowed texts, in the process leaving out sections and adding cross-references, emendations, and questions. Serjeant Arthur Tumour, for example, assembled large
volumes of law reports out of the notes of his Middle Temple contemporaries, thoughtfully naming his sources: Common Pleas cases
care of Robert Tanfleld preceded those of Henry Yelverton, Robert
Brown, and Henry Calthorpe, with arguments by counsel, obituaries,
and Turour's own notes interspersed.s John Baker has traced the
wanderings from hand to hand of Coke's manuscripts that after forty
years were published as parts 12 (1656) and 13 (1659) of the Reports.
Having "passed into general circulation" they "were avidly copied by
legal collectors. " '23
None of the manuscript copies collates exactly with any other, because
each copyist made different omissions and took his copies in different
sequences. Some of the copies were taken directly from Coke's manual,
others
at
second
or
third
hand .... John
Bradshaw's
copy... [included] marginal notes (in a second hand) ...written after
Coke's death .... The copyists naturally left out what Coke himself had
printed, and 24they also left out in varying degrees what they did not consider useful. 3
For the sake of exposition, I have opposed the legal guild and laymen and the
London legal world and the peripheries. These are ideal types that obscure the many
gradations and linkages among the terms. Nonetheless, comparison of (admittedly
ovemeat) ideal types can illuminate differences between center and periphery and
print and manuscripts obscured by their continual interconnections in practice.
'22 See ARTHUR TURNOUR, REPERTORY AND REPORT (Harvard Law Library Rare
321

Book Room, MSS 104-107).
S J.H. Baker, Coke's Notebooks and the Sources of His Reports, 30

CAMBRIDGE L.J. 59,
80-83, 80 (1972).
32 I
at 81-82. Early modem legal manuscript writers often identified the sources
from which they copied cases, monographs, speeches, orders, or other texts, perhaps
adding marginalia and comments. A few representative examples include: Reports,
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Lawyers sometimes brought together disparate genres of legal writing
on a given topic, creating specialized manuscript compilations: a Star
Chamber collection joining a description of the court's purpose with
a primer on procedure and an assembly of cases; a Chancery collection assembling William Lambarde's discourse on the royal courts
along with orders and speeches by the Chancellors, forms of oaths,
suggestions for law reform, royal patents, case reports, and notes on
jurisdictional debates between Coke and Ellesmere."
Owners of manuscripts had to decide whether to lend them, and
to whom, and on what terms, for they were not freely available to all.
Borrowers had to decide what to retain, what to cut, and what to reshape. A number of consequences followed. First, outsiders to the
Inns did not enjoy guaranteed access to manuscripts, which were not
"public." Although there was some leakage, lawyers tended to confine manuscripts within legal and governmental circles. Indeed,
within the Inns, manuscripts circulated within restricted networks of
friends, kinsmen, and senior lawyers. T.F.T. Plucknett has noted that
drafts of the anonymous, mid-sixteenth-century Discourse on Statutes,
perhaps written by Thomas Egerton, show no influence of Edmund
Plowden's important collection of case reports until its publication in
1571, suggesting that the author was too junior to warrant inclusion
in the group favored with Plowden's writings.32 6 Second, the power to

shape the collective manuscript record of the law was dispersed within
the profession. Each human link in the chain of borrowing and transcription enjoyed relatively little control over the aggregate body of
circulating manuscripts, but each could exercise some incremental
power in his decisions about whether to lend, borrow, or copy, and in
his choices about what to include, exclude, or change. Third, the
profession, as a collectivity, inculcated conventions of reading and interpretation in its members that guided the amendment of texts and
Lincoln's Inn, MS Maynard 80; Reports by Thomas Owen, Lincoln's Inn, MS Hale 80; Reports by RichardHutton, Lincoln's Inn, MS Maynard 14.
John Baker's English Legal Manuscripts in the United States of America, A Descriptive
List: Part I Early Modern and Modern Periods (1558-1902) (1990) and his English Legal

Manuscripts, VoL H: Catalogueof the Manuscript Year Books, Readings, and Law Reports in
Lincoln'sInn, the Bodleian Library and Gray'sInn (1978) provide the sources from which
manuscript writers drew their reports, monographs, and compilations. His notes underscore the extent of borrowing and manuscript splicing within the Inns of Court.
See also L.W. ABBOTT, LAW REPORTING IN ENGLAND, 1485-1585, at 107 (1973).

S2 See STAR CHAMBER MATERIALS (Harvard Law School Rare Book Room, MS
149);
CHANCERY MATERIALS (Harvard Law School Rare Book Room, MSS 1034 & 1156).
326 See T.F.T. PLUcKNETr, Ellesmere on Statutes, in STUDIES IN ENGLISH
LEGAL
HISTORY 242, 245 n.9 (1983).
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found their way into the manuscript record as queries, notes, crossreferences, and marginalia. Of course, one lawyer's improvement is
another's corruption, and authors did not always welcome the quilled
interventions of their fellows. As William Barlee's manuscript Concordance of manorial law traveled to London from Essex in the luggage
of intermediaries, it bore a warning:
If any to whose hands these shall come shall detain the same, so as they
cannot pass as it is intended, or if ye deface any of these notes with erasures, annotations or interlinings, let such dread that indignation may
grow towards themselves from the prince or from her magistrates for
whose honor they are written. 27

The press, by contrast, undermined collective control of information. Its effects were least noticeable within the Inns, where lawyers
and students used printed books in ways that minimized their difference from manuscripts. 328 Consulting both in research, they transcribed sections from one into the other, introducing cases from
printed books into commonplaces and manuscript references into
the margins of printed works. The printed books owned by Thomas
Egerton as a law student in the 1560s still exist at the Huntington Library in California. They contain his notes on cases he heard and
read about elsewhere and display the lawyer's characteristic crossreferences and "quere" and "nota" in the margins.32 The Master of
Requests Julius Caesar published a collection of records from his
court in 1597, but continued to update the book with manuscript
notes of cases, interleaving them with his private copy of the printed
book.33' In this way, lawyers worked into printed books new principles
of law and the changing interpretive conventions of the profession.
Updating of this sort was less frequent outside of the London le-

gal world, among the attorneys, solicitors, scriveners, minor government officials, justices of the peace, town recorders, country gentry,
divines, physicians, and merchants purchasing the growing and diverse number of printed lawbooks. While this burgeoning audience

'27BARL.EE,

supra note 21, at 1-2.

..One important difference was that access to manuscripts rested on the good
will of owners, while printed books could be obtained without patronage.
2'See Louis A. Knafla, The Law Studies of an Elizabethan Studen 32 HUNTINGTON
LIBR. Q. 221 (1969); as an example, see Lincoln Inn, MS Misc. 94, a gift copy of the

fifth part of Edward's Coke's Reports (1605), which the recipient covered with law

French margin commentary.
35' See HILL, supra note 174, at 235.
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supplemented lawbooks with local traditions and recent cases they
heard about, they were less likely than London-based legal professionals to criticize and amend texts by consulting a wide range of
printed works and manuscripts.331 From the point of view of the legal
guild, such readers were doubly problematic. First, they lacked the
expository conventions that lawyers absorbed in the Inns of Court and
that guided the range of plausible interpretations. Second, they did
not know what they were "supposed" to add, subtract, and silently
change in printed lawbooks. 332
The printed text, in other words, "fixed" the law at the moment of
publication more decisively outside the London legal world than
3
within.33
Consider the reactions of Lord Ellesmere, the Chancellor
of England, to Coke's Reports. As the eleventh and final part of the
Reports emerged from the press, Ellesmere wrote a critique of the series for the Privy Council that contributed to Coke's fall from office in
1616. Ellesmere noted in one instance that
[w]hile the arguments were even warm in the judges' mouths the case
was likewise warm in the press and published, though there was a writ of
error presently brought upon the said judgment in the Exchequer
Chamber which yet depends, [and] though by the confidence used by

3 This is, of course, a matter of degree. Surviving justice of the peace manuals,
for example, sometimes contain notes on cases and legal points discussed at sessions
and assizes and in private conversation. See FELIcITY HEAL & CLIVE HOLMES, THE
GENTRY IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1500-1700, at 179-80 (1994).
332 Printed lawbooks often went through multiple
editions, with subsequent ones
amending and enlarging previous ones-a qualification to the above statement.
M Elizabeth Eisenstein has identified as one of print's central features its power to
fix texts, preventing the losses and accretion of errors characteristic in manuscripts
copied and recopied ("textual drift"). She identified textual "fixity" as a "basic prerequisite for the rapid advancement of learning." In the permanence and accurate
reproducibility that print brought to learning was a foundation of scientific progress
and a central reason why the Renaissance and Reformation did not fade as had earlier
cultural revivals and "heretical" challenges to the Church. See EISENSTEIN, supra note
4, at 113-26.
Printing also imposed costs on professions whose knowledge previously circulated
in manuscripts and oral tradition. Harold Love found in Coke a reluctance to use
print "partly because it involved a sacrifice of control over power-conferring knowledge and partly because printed law took on a fixed, unnegotiable quality." LOVE, supra note 150, at 163.
In this Part of the Article, I have used Eisenstein's and Love's suggestions as a starting point, and have asked further: How-by what process-did law printing transfer
some measure of guild control over legal knowledge? To whom was power transferred? And with what consequences?
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the reporter in setting down the case the party is much discouraged in
his prosecution.33

Of another case, he said: "[M]y Lord [Coke] may seem to have overrun the law. For the law is in a manner stopped by the printed case,
and the party is disheartened to prosecute his writ of error."3 s What
did Ellesmere mean by his revealing phrases-Coke has "overrun the
law," and the law is "stopped by the printed case"? On the literal
level, he made the nice psychological observation that the publishing
of a judicial decision when so few cases were printed suggests finality
and disheartens appellants, even though technically they may continue their appeal. But he also meant something broader. Through
print, Coke's Reports had "overrun" and "stopped" the law by fixing it
in place before the legal profession had incorporated the results of
the appeal and of subsequent interpretation.33 6 Future readers of
Coke's Reports aside from those "in the know" in the London legal
world would find only Coke's text, frozen in time, without the slowly
changing, collectively generated apparatus of interpretation available
from manuscripts and conversation, without the endnotes and marginalia indicating the results of the appeal, citing to other cases, and
suggesting problems and implications in the analysis.
Printing not only "fixed" the law but allowed the author of a published work, like Coke, to project intellectual power better than the
writer of manuscripts. As often noted, print's celerity, lower cost, and
reproducibility gave it an advantage over manuscript. 37 But so did its
ability to partly dissociate legal knowledge from the interpretive pressure exercised in the London legal world. First, the press reduced
the legal guild's power to set the range of a text's distribution. A
manuscript work spread only if authors allowed borrowing and if
334

Lord Ellesmere, The Lord ChancellorEgerton's Observationsupon the Lord Coke's Re-

ports, reprintedin KNAFLA, supra note 7, at 297, 314-15 (speaking of the Magdalen College Case).
Id., reprintedin KNAFLA, supranote 7, at 314. Coke printed a decision in The Case
of the Mayour and Burgesses of Lynn, 10 Co. Rep. 120r-126r (C.P. 1613), before the case
could be appealed on writ of error to the King's Bench.
uMEllesmere, along with Bacon and other royalists, criticized Coke's consistently
narrow interpretations of the scope of the royal prerogative and of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. In this Part, however, I have chosen to concentrate on the consequences of
Coke's Reports being printed rather than on their political slant (though, of course, the
latter made the former more important).
M In the 1620s, stationers charged about £13 for a 400-leaf volume of manuscript
law reports, at least 10 times the cost of the printed folios of Dyer's or Plowden's Reports. SeeJ.H. BAKER, A CATALOGUE OF ENGLISH LEGAL MANUSCRIPTS IN CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY LIBRARYat xliii (1996).
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readers went to the trouble and expense of copying. Protectiveness
by owners or uninterest by potential readers made a text peripheral,
or even stillborn. Publication reduced the guild's ability to block or
deflect a work by giving a national market of printers, booksellers,
and customers a say in the scope and conditions of the work's dispersion. Second, print reduced the guild's collective influence over the
meaning of texts, which it exercised explicitly through textual
amendment during the process of recopying and compilation and
implicitly through the inculcation of reading conventions. The press
undermined this collective authority by concentrating interpretive
control at two points: the point of production, where the author or
printer shaped what would be printed; and the point of reception,
where the reader made sense of the book. Third, printing diminished the bar's control over the assessment of reputation. Evaluating
the worth of manuscript legal literature was an intramural affair for
lawyers. But readers outside of the London legal world took up
printed works with fewer cues from the guild. Unschooled in lawyers'
conventions for judging authority, how would they know they were
supposed to value the reports of Plowden and Dyer higher than those
of Dalison?5 S Did they know that Ellesmere and Francis Bacon had
criticized Coke's Reports, and if so, could they find the criticisms?
In partly dissociating control of legal knowledge from guild control, the press enhanced the power of the author and printer to shape
the law, granting them a tacit power of governance unexplained by
jurisprudential and constitutional principles. The law printer before
the Civil War enjoyed a royally guaranteed patent giving him the monopoly power to select and decline texts (subject to licensing, censorship, intervention by powerful political and legal figures, and market
demand) . 9 Historians of English legal literature have emphasized
how much the record of the common law owed to printers' choices
about what to publish and what to omit or add to books.mo The
printer's role as midwife in the genealogy of doctrine went along with
s For a reconstruction of these conventions, see JOHN WILLIAM WALLACE, THE
REPORTERS ARRANGED AND CHARACTERIZED WITH INCIDENTAL REMARKS (4th ed. 1882).
S9 The King's printer enjoyed the monopoly right to publish statutes
and proclamations, and the crown could grant a special patent to an author to bring out a given
work.
340See WALLACE, supra note 338; 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4; 2 THE REPORTS OF
SIR JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 20; BAKER, supra note 319, at 435-60; Theodore F.T.
Plucknett, The Genesis of Coke's Reports, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 190 (1942); Graham, supra
note 65, at 6-24.
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a de facto power as law reformer and redactor. The sixteenth-century
publication of the yearbooks and the statutes helped standardize the
corpus by eliminating the textual variation inherent in manuscript
transmission. The yearbook printer Robert Redman interspersed
comments in the cases and attached cross-references, which fooled
Coke, who thought these sixteenth-century additions demonstrated
how lawyers cited cases in the fourteenth century.3'
Statutory
abridgments and compilations, no mechanical reproductions, did
more. They cut out private acts, omitted laws relating to localities, edited or eliminated preambles, and appended explanatory citations to
statutes.
Printers and compilers thus guided the exposition of the
2
lawY3

Headings, notes, marginalia, even typesetting guided legal interpretation. In a debate in the 1610 Parliament over the Crown's power
to impose import duties, for example, royalists and anti-royalists differed over the better reading of the statute 25 Edward I, ch. 7. Commons member James Whitelocke noted the royalist claim that "the
King's restraint from imposing has relation only to staple commodities, viz., cloth, wool and leather, and that the words no such things [in
the statute] have only reference to them." But, he observed, the
"original [manuscript] has no sections (though the printed book be
divided into chapters) but is one entire act," and "such things must
needs be expounded as a relative to the whole plaint. "m Statutory
compilations sometimes added margin references, a star or a pointing
hand, to direct justices of the peace to acts of particular interest. This
practice established an informal canon of "relevant" statutes, a canon
supplementing the one created by justice of the peace manuals." A
1604 edition of Glanvill's Tractatus de Legibus placed a star in the margin by each section where the text paralleled the Regiam Majestatem of
Scotland in order to demonstrate the consonance of ancient Scottish
and English law, a tactic useful in legitimating the new Scottish-born
'4

SeeBAKER, supra note 319, at 443.

342

Compilers of printed abridgments implored readers to consult the unabridged

statutes when needing the full text of an act, but in reality, as all knew, abridgments
typically served as both the starting and ending point. See, e.g., WILLIAM RASTELL, A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE STATUTES (1579 ed.); FERDINANDO PULTON, A COLLECTION
OF SUNDRY STATUTES FREQUENT IN USE (1636 ed.); T.M., Prefaceto EDMUND WINGATE,
EXACT ABRIDGMENT OF ALL STATUTES IN FORCE (1667 ed.).
m James Whitelocke, Speech to the House of Commons, (July 2, 1610), in 2
PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT, supra note 119, at 222.
'4 See A COLLECTION IN ENGLISH OF THE STATUTES Now IN FORCE (1594 ed.);
T.M., Prefaceto WINGATE, supranote 342.
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King of England, James I and his desired union of laws between England and Scotland.-"' The Restoration royalist lawyer Richard Atkyns,
with the benefit of hindsight, underscored the lawmaking power of
printers. Defending the revived patent system, he charged that unlicensed printers might alter
the ancient lawbooks, and cast them into a new model of their own invention; that by degrees the state and truth of the good old laws by

which men hold their lives and estates, should utterly be lost and forgotten, and new laws framed to fit the humors of a new invented govern346
ment.

But more than the organization, the fact of printing was a form of
interstitial lawmaking. To be sure, John Baker has vigorously warned
against overestimating the importance of printed law to barristers
disdainful of the frequent textual corruptions of published works and
reliant on manuscripts and oral lore, which they used to supplement
and correct print.34 7 A point well taken, yet even among barristers,

printed lawbooks provided a convenience, lower cost, and ease of acquisition that the numerous, but unevenly distributed and sometimes
difficult to obtain manuscripts could not offer. Published lawbooks
provided a shared professional starting point 3 8 And for attorneys,
officials and laymen outside the ambit of the Inns of Court, the starting point was very important indeed. The further from the oral and
chirographic resources of the Inns, the more published works set
standards and enjoyed a tacit power of governance. Justice of the
peace manuals and primers on manorial court-keeping tutored amateur officials, furthering uniformity in practice and expectation-and
thus, in a sense, of law-throughout the countryside. m9 Coke's Corn-

See The Printer to the Reader, in GLANVILL, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS at iiir-iiiv (1604 ed.). The previous edition, published in 1555, did not
have this device. The divine Roger Fenton cited the printer's direction as evidence for
the consonance of ancient Scottish and English law. See ROGER FENTON, A TREATISE
OF USURY 72 (1611).
34 RICHARD ATKYS, THE ORIGIN ANDGROWTH OF PRINTING 15(1664).
See BAKER, supra note 319, at 435-60.
3* David Ibbetson's study of citation practices in the late Elizabethan Inns of
Court finds relatively few allusions to private manuscript law reports. The "use of such
precedents was very definitely haphazard rather than systematic .... Careful examination of the arguments in some of the leading cases in the period... reveals an enormous preponderance of reliance on printed materials." David Ibbetson, Law Reporting
in the 1590s, in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 84-85 (Chantal Stebbings ed., 1995).
147

34' See2 SIDNEYWEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT:
FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT:
THE MANOR AND THE

BOROUGH 12 (1908).
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plete Copyholder (1630) downplayed contradictions and gaps in the
common-law cases about copyhold tenure, suggesting a coherence
that eventually became law as the book defined practice among lawyers, stewards, and tenants.
Even the style of publication induced
expectations that helped define constitutional powers. The House of
Commons' Petition of Temporal Grievances presented to King
James I in 1610, for example, tried to stop an impending compilation
of royal proclamations. Commons worried that proclamations, of late
more frequent and ambitious, would by degrees "increase to the
strength and nature of laws," undermining liberty and inviting arbitrary government
And this their fear is the more increased by... the care taken to reduce
all the proclamations made since your Majesty's reign into one volume,
and to print them in such form as acts of parliament formerly have been
and still are used to be, which seems to imply a purpose to give them
more 1reputation and more establishment than heretofore they have
had.3

Printing redistributed law between a published foreground and a
manuscript and oral background, lending typographical salience and
weight to some argumentative possibilities and not to others within
the fluid constitution and common law.3 2 This is only to make explicit one of the reasons that manuscript reports did not attract the
governmental scrutiny that Ellesmere and Bacon leveled at Coke's Reports., s But where did this "authority" come from? Constitutional
and jurisprudential theory gave cases, proclamations, and monographs put in print no more credence 'as the record of custom and
precedent, and as the expression of professionally-shared common
erudition, than those written in manuscript. It was the underspecification (by modern standards) of constitutional authority in early
50See GRAY, supranote 241, at 94.
35 Petition of Temporal Grievances (July 7, 1610), in 2

PROCEEDINGS IN PAR-

supra note 119, at 259. See also Elizabeth Read Foster, Printingthe Petition of
Right, 38 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 81-83 (1974).
LUA.MENT,

By the early seventeenth century, lawyers routinely alluded to the assumed
prominance of printed law, whether or not they approved of the phenomenon.
35

"Ancient terms or years, after the example of Littleton," wrote Coke, "are to be cited

and vouched for confirmation of the law, albeit they were never printed: COKE, FIRST
INSTITUTE, supra note 45, at 249b (1628).
-" See 13 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 82, at 76-82, 85-97 (1872);
Ellesmere, supra note 334, reprinted in KNAFLA, supra note 7, at 297-318. As a contemporary Fleet street doggerel put it "Coke could cook law books/But he couldn't cook
by the books/He could only cook books for Cokes." See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN,
THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 390 (1957).
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modern England and, hence, the relatively larger role played by the
interpretive conventions of lawyers and other political actors in defining the fluctuating constitution that opened space for printers and
authors to insinuate "new invented government" through their shaping of legal texts. 50
The power of authors and printers to set standards and bring selected legal knowledge into the light carried the corollary power of
casting the remaining bulk of common law materials further into the
shadows. Early modem lawyers knew that printed books could quell
debate and suggest a settled uniformity of opinion, killing off inquiry
as readily as furthering it. Francis Bacon, for example, warned that
published scientific works claimed for themselves "'blighting authority [that] precludes fruitful research.' ' , 5 Lawyers who appreciated
Coke's value as an "oracle" also recognized that his reputation dissuaded them from investigating the changing and ambiguous manuscript and oral traditions that he claimed to summarize. William
Prynne, in his post-Restoration incarnation as the Keeper of the Records in the Tower of London, published a critique of Coke's Fourth
Institute, in which he complained that Coke's
quotations (through too much credulity, or supineness) are generally
received, relied on by a mere implicit faith, as infallible oracles, not only
by most young students and professors, but most ancient sages of the law
in their arguments and resolutions; yea by many members of Parliament
in their debates,
conferences, without the least examination of their
5
originals.3

To Prynne, Coke had synthesized and brought to light a complicated
tangle of yearbooks, circulating manuscripts, common erudition, and
oral tradition, but at the cost of embalming what he displayed. Reli-

ance on printed text allowed the original sources themselves to go
unconsulted and slip towards darkness.

34 Restoration royalists implicitly recognized the point in their desire
to crack
down on "undisciplined" law printing. Richard Atkyns followed Hobbes's call for the
concentration of legal promulgation and interpretation in the sovereign. Atkyns understood the laws as the King's "property," not to be published without express permission lest printers introduce innovations and false constructions. See RICHARD

ATEYNS, THE KING'S GRANT OF PRIVILEGE FOR THE SOLE PRINTING OF COMMON LAW
BooKS DEFENDED 9-11 (1669).

ms ELSKY, supra note 184, at 209 (quoting Francis Bacon).
William Prynne, To All Ingenuous Readers, Espedally the Generous Students and Professors of the Common Lawes of England, in BRIEF ANIMADVERSIONS ON, AMENDMENTS OF,
& ADDITIONAL EXPLANATORY RECoRDs TO THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF
THE LAWES OF ENGLAND; CONCERNING THEJURISDICTION OF COURTS (1669).
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Law reformers took advantage of print's unwitting lethality.
Francis Bacon submitted to James I a PropositionTouching the Compiling
and Amendment of the Laws of England (MS, 1616) purporting to leave
the "matter of the laws" alone while reforming "the manner of their
registry, expression and tradition." Bacon pressed for the rationalized
compilation and publication of only the living law, leaving the rest to
wither. He advised reprinting in full or summarizing records, charters, yearbooks, and judicial cases, leaving out overruled cases, frivolous questions, repetitious points, antinomies, and "idle queries,"
which "were better to die than to be put into the books." Reissue the
statutes shorn of all obsolete acts, with concurrent laws reduced to
one uniform enactment, the new books free of Acts "whereas the case
by alteration of time is vanished; as Lombard Jews, Gauls half-pence;
etc." These latter statutes "may nevertheless remain in the libraries
for antiquities, but no reprinting of them.
Bacon's strategy took a
more partisan turn with Robert Cotton's advice to the statutory compiler Ferdinand
Pulton that "some dangerous statutes might not be
5
published."3

The multiplication of late Elizabethan and early Stuart monographs ambitious to impose a structure on the common law underscored the threat and promise of the printer's and author's tacit jurisprudential power.3 9 In response to complaints about the common
law's formlessness, uncertainty, and unwieldy bulk, lawyers followed
the Continental legal humanists in using the analytic categories of
topical logic and rhetoric-the Aristotelian four causes, subject and
accident, genus and species-to reduce their subject to order."'
William Staunford's mid-sixteenth-century monographs on crime and
13 THE WORKS OF FRANcIs BACON, supra note 82, at 61-71; see also BACON, A Memorial Touching the Review of Penal Laws and the Amendment of the Common Law (MS,
1614), in 12 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supranote 82, at 84-86.
37

KEVIN SHARPE, SIR ROBERT COTrON, 1586-1631:

HISTORY AND POLITICS IN

EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 42-43 (1979).
S59 Legal methodizers and reformers of the law's "registry, expression and tradition" liked to insist that they were not imposing a personal or "artificial" template on
the law, but were revealing a structure latently there, as yet hidden, like
Michelangelo's statue already present within the untouched marble and needing only
the creator's hand to uncover it.

See Terry Kevin Shaller, English Law and the Renaissance: The Common Law
and Humanism in the Sixteenth Century 308-09 (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the author); Knafla, The Influence of Continental
Humanists andJurists on English Common Law in the Renaissance supra note 59, at 60-71;
Prest, The DialeticalOigin ofFinch'sLaw, supra note 50, at 326-52.
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prerogative began a proliferating tradition of organizing
"methodically" under "divisions" a given section of the law (e.g., the
law of wills, writs, fines, equity, copyhold, women, and so on).61 By
the early seventeenth century, ambitious writers tried to sketch the
lineaments of the common law as a whole. Prominent examples include John Cowell's Latin InstitutionesJuris Anglicani (1605), Henry

Finch's French Nomotechnia (1613) and its English translation Law, or
a Discourse Thereof (1627), and Edward Coke's four-volume Institutes

(1628-1644). The very lack of a core common law text akin to the civilians' CorpusJurisenhanced both the freedom of writers to impose a
structure and the interest of lawyers in finding one.
The centrality to both law reformers and "methodizers" of eliminating the superfluous and imposing order on the common law made
more salient the devolution of control over legal knowledge from the
guild, and made more plausible the anti-publicists' unease with law
printing.m2 By the early seventeenth century, the guild as a collectivity

m' See, e.g., STAUNFORD, LES PLEES DEL CORON, supra note 218; STAUNFORD, AN
EXPOSITION OF THE KING'S PREROGATIVE, supra note 218; SWINBURNE, supra note 178;
THELOALL, supra note 177; West, supra note 211; CALTHRoPE, supra note 211; COKE,
supra note 211; DODDERIDGE, supra note 211; E[DGAR], supra note 211; PULTON, supra

note 78.
m "Pruning" was the leitmotif of law reformers hoping to trim and recompile the
laws or, less drastically and more typically, the statutes. For decades would-be statutory
redactors worked variants on Elizabeth's Lord Keeper Nicholas Bacon's A Devise How
the Statutes of the Realm Are to Be Orderedand Printed,a plan calling for 20 committees of
four lawyers, led by the judges, to eliminate redundancies and abrogated laws and set
the rest into a printed volume "digested into titles." Nicholas Bacon, A Devise How the
Statutes of the Realm Are to Be Ordered and Printed (British Library, Harleian MS 249, #20,
fol. 117b-118a). Although nothing came of Bacon's scheme, interest in a printed redaction of the statutes under official auspices continued throughout the latter sixteenth century and into the seventeenth century. The Privy Council revived Bacon's
plan in preparation for the Parliament of 1589 and even appointed committees of lawyers, though without ultimate success. See ELTON, supra note 119, at 279 n.4. Committees to redact the penal laws sat in the parliaments of 1584, 1593, and 1621. See
Shaller, supra note 360, at 308-09; 2 COMMoNS DEBATES 72-73 (Wallace Notestein et al.
eds., 1935) (1621) (efforts of a committee of lawyers including Edward Coke, Heneage
Finch, William Noy, and John Davies to rationalize the penal laws on the advice of
Chancellor Francis Bacon); 4 id. at 48 (same). For representative comments in favor
of statutory redaction, see, for example, PULTON, Preface to ABSTRACT, supra note 20;
COKE, supra note 30, at ix-x. For an overview of Elizabethan and early Stuart codification plans, see Shapiro, supra note 90, at 428-47.
James I viewed the common law precedents as well as the statutes as obscure and
riddled with conflicts, needing to be "purged and cleared." All "contraries should be
scraped out of our books," he argued, calling for the law to be "reviewed, and reconciled" with the advice of parliament. JAMES I, Speech of 1609 to Parliament, in THE
POLrrIcAL WORKS OFJAMES I, supra note 311, at 306, 312 (1609).
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had surrendered some power over the content and design of lawbooks to individual authors like Coke, Finch, Plowden, Manwood,
Pulton, and Sheppard. However lacking in formal jurisprudential or
constitutional warrant, authors could transform the law on the
ground through the law in the books in a way "not done" in the midsixteenth century. Touched by the methodizing impulse and facing a
burgeoning readership of law students and lay officials, writers proposed to do just that, not least the would-be reformers and redactors
such as Bacon's proposed commissioners for editing the common and
statute laws.
The guild, again considered as a collective, had fewer resources
for stopping or deflecting methodizing and redacting of which the
majority disapproved. To bring together the points suggested earlier,
the press reinforced the implicit, interstitial lawmaking and political
power of authors and printers and enhanced their ability to project
intellectual authority, especially outside the confines of the Londonbased barristers. Print created a larger, more diverse audience
among whom the guild's conventions of interpretation and assessment of reputation acted as less of a check, or ratification, on authorial lawmaking. And it cast a shadow over unpublished manuscripts
and oral traditions, creating foreground and background distinctions
that undermined, though not eliminated, the bar's collective power
s
to assign weight to different common law texts and arguments. 6
Julian Martin has interpreted Francis Bacon's scattered suggestions for "pruning"
and reordering the law as part of a consistent program of redaction under royal control. Bacon, Martin concludes, wished to transfer a measure of legal ordering-and
hence of interstitial governance-from the profession to Crown appointees. JULIAN
MARTIN, FRANCIS BACON, THE STATE, AND THE REFORM OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 105-

40 (1992).
The Church of England's Canons of 1604 promulgated by Archbishop Richard
Bancroft with James's encouragement provided a lesson in how far a royally sponsored
pruning might go. Bancroft sorted through the fragmentary, ill-defined, and sometimes contradictory sources of "constitutional" authority in the Elizabethan churchroyal injunctions, Episcopal visitation articles, previous canons, correspondence, and
much else-sifting, rejecting, adding, elaborating in order to codify English ecclesiastical practice. In the process of defining doubtful points and closing loopholes for
nonconformity, the Canons curtailed the local diversity of the Elizabethan church,
possible in part because the multiplicity and imprecision of church law sheltered ambiguities. See 1 USHER, RECONSTRUCTION, supranote 244, at 359-402; 2 id. at 273-88.
Print by no means supplanted manuscript and oral tradition as valid repositories of the law. Well into the eighteenth century, lawyers invoked manuscripts or their
memories to amend or overturn printed lawbooks, particularly reporters. See, e.g., THE
MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH

CENTURY 102-05, 183-85 (James Oldham ed., 1992) (setting aside supposedly inaccurate reports). While the press by no means eliminated the bar's ability to draw simul-
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Consider how many points in the anti-publicist critique of print presupposed that the press would diminish the guild's power to guide
and legitimate legal knowledge: the commoning of law; the unveiling
of "mystery" undermining the prestige due the carriers of the national legal heritage; and the exacerbation of faction and disputation
as legal information spread among a laity unable to understand or
judge it and likely to misuse it. If the expansion of legal publishing
furthered the common law's authority in early modem England, it
came with the price of empowering authors, printers, and readers at
the expense of the collective of the guild. The anti-publicists' themes
may have resonated with lawyers unhappy at the price.
IV. WHAT WAS AT STAKE IN THE DEBATE: THE "OWNERSHIP" OF THE

LAW AND THE COMMONING OF THE COMMON LAW

My elaboration of the professional, intellectual, and political conditions that made plausible anti-publicist apprehensions and engendered the debate over legal publication should not obscure a critical
fact: the publicists won. However complicated the foundations of
anti-publicist thought, were their fears mere formulaic complaints
without effect? The anti-publicists, after all, lacked a discernible program of action and an attainable political goal. They did not aim to
eliminate law printing. They did not foresee reversing the growth of
the press. And they did not call for a system of control, for the censors and patentees already had imposed one. Warning and sneering,
grumbling, publishing with apologies, was the anti-publicist critique
anything more than a rearguard action, a local and ineffectual manifestation of the "politique" pessimism about popular tutelage prevalent in latter sixteenth century Europe? In what sense, then, did the
debate over legal publishing matter?
First, and most narrowly, the anti-publicists could have retarded
the legal press. Might the rate of growth and diversification in law
printing from 1580 to 1640 have been higher if anti-publicists had not
censured the press and trimmers concluded that the benefits of publication to professional standing and ego did not make up for the disapproval of colleagues, patrons, and clients? A few lawyers, it is clear,
taneously on print, manuscript, and oral tradition, it concentrated in the hands of
authors and printers a disproportionate power to set argumentative starting points.
In the long term-a long term measured in centuries-print wore away at the legitimacy of manuscripts and oral tradition as normatively valid repositories of law.
Their importance continues to the present day in practice, but they are difficult to legitimate when in conflict with print.
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chose manuscript circulation as a matter of principle. Their aversion
to print was more than a pose acted as inky hands searched for the errata. Hudson's Star Chamber treatise provides a vivid example, as do
Matthew Hales's notes and treatises, bequeathed to Lincoln's Inn
along with a clause forbidding publication: "They are a treasure
worth the having and keeping, which I have been near forty years in
gathering ....They are a treasure not fit for every man's view, nor is
every man capable of making use of them."6 Yet such evidence is
rare next to the overwhelming majority of English legal manuscripts
revealing nothing of their author's opinions about the relative suitability of press and manuscript as media of transmission. The mere
existence of a document in manuscript rather than print provides littie guidance. To what extent did the author's considered distaste for
the press, if any, argue for manuscript circulation? And to what extent did practical reasons-lack of general interest in private collections and jottings, desire to avoid controversy and the labor of preparation, low quality (as judged by the author, colleagues, patrons,
printers, or licensers), or too few expected sales to justify printing
costs?36

From a distance of 400 years, the dampening influence of

anti-publicist sentiment remains difficult to gauge, and while it no
doubt had an effect, the flourishing of law publishing suggests caution.
Second, the debate over legal publishing complicates the story
historians are beginning to tell about the consolidation of lawyers
into a "profession" in Tudor and early Stuart England. In collecting
the multifarious social and institutional reasons for the "rise of the
barristers," Wilfrid Prest noted the emergence in the century before
the Civil War of an ideology of public service and wise counsel to justify lawyers' work, wealth, and power. M. Ethan Katsh called attention
to the role of printing in standardizing and enlarging legal literature,
making the law library a symbol of the specialized knowledge whose
mastery supported the bar's comradeship and its public recognition
as a distinct and privileged order. The press also supplied the same
A CATALOGUE OF THE MANUSCRIPTS IN THE LIBRARY OF THE HONOURABLE

SOCIETY OF LINCOLN'S INN at vii (Joseph Hunter ed., 1838).

I distinguish judgments about whether a given work deserved publication, for
these assumed the propriety of print and manuscript as media.
From the point of view of an author and the legal community, manuscript circulation no more suggests distaste for the press than lack of interest in the fax or the
internet today implies considered dislike of those media. For a discussion of the complex factors behind authors' prudential judgments about whether to seek manuscript
or print circulation, see LOVE, supra note 150, at 3-89.
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books to lawyers in widely separated areas, suggesting readers' ties to
each other wherever located, fostering and coordinating a group
identity beyond the ambit of the personal contact and spoken word of
the Inns of Court.3 67 Yet the debate over legal publishing reveals
anxieties and contentions within the process of professional coalescence that these historians richly depict. As I argued in Part III.C, the
press displaced some measure of control over legal knowledge from
the guild as a collective toward individual authors and printers,
thereby introducing new inequalities of power through the same medium drawing lawyers together into a profession. The printed books
that reinforced a shared identity among lawyers also opened legal literature to lay assessment, assimilation, and evaluation of reputation.
If, as Katsh suggests, the law library stood as a symbol of lawyers' specialized knowledge that inclined laymen to accept the bar's interpretive privilege, the act of printing that built up those libraries and extended the common law more deeply into English culture also
compromised the formerly less extensive, but more autonomous,
realm of guild interpretation. Finally, the persistent skepticism over
whether legal publishing hurt laymen in the guise of helping them
suggests an important fissure within the ideology of public service
that Tudor lawyers articulated.
Third, the debate over legal printing offers a corrective to another story of consolidation advanced in early Stuart historiography:
the flourishing of the "common law mind." That phrase, of course,
was made popular byJ.G.A. Pocock's seminal The Ancient Constitution
and the Feudal Law. Later scholars have shown that the "ancient constitution" that Pocock saw at the heart of political discourse was in its
extreme Cokean version a minority position even among lawyers and
was not a necessary foundation for a customary constitutionalism
rooted in the common law. But they have nonetheless reiterated the
view that the Elizabethan and early Stuart common law provided an
influential language, or set of categories, for discussing national politics.3

Supporters and opponents alike of royal policies, economic

See PREST, supra note 6, at 1-3, 322-26; Wilfrid Prest, Why the History of the Professions is Not Written, in LAW, ECONOMY & SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW, 1750-1914, at 300, 300 (G.R. Rubin & David Sugarman eds., 1984); KATSH, supra
note 4, at 203-17.
M See POCOCK, supra note 6, at 54-55; Brooks, The Place ofMagna Carta,supra note
79, at 57-88; GLENN BURGESS, THE PoLrIcS OF THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1603-1642, at 119 (1993);
SOMMERVILLE, supra note 248, at 86-111; DEREK HIRST, AUTHORITY AND CONFLICT:
ENGLAND, 1603-1658, at 85 (1986).
6
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programs, and church reforms claimed the support of the common
law. Parliamentary speeches, notes on State Trials, advice on legal
strategies, and opinions on the lawfulness of policies spread through
the gentry and increasingly through the "middling sort" via manuscript copying, newsletters, and "separates" (individual transcripts,
pamphlets or accounts). 3 Puritans, for example, sent from London
to the provinces denials of the lawfulness of episcopal deprivation of
nonconformists and of the ex officio procedure of the High Commission, suggesting strategies of resistance. 7 The Catholic controversialist Robert Parsons disputed Coke's defense of the Crown's system of
ecclesiastical discipline in Caudrey's Case, the Jesuit citing yearbooks
and treatises to rebut Coke point by point.3 The Forced Loan provoked a surge of "separates" carrying parliamentary speeches and expositions of statutes denying the propriety of benevolences.3 Invocation of a widely shared "common law mind" explains why disputants
thought the parsing of statutes and precedents a persuasive strategy
within the political nation. But where does the anti-publicist vocabulary of mystery and "commoning" fit into a "common law mind" implicitly recognizing the appropriateness, or at least unavoidability, of
legal tutelage? Read as discomfort with legal explication and dissemination, with legal publicity rather than with print simpliciter, the
anti-publicists suggest that Courtly and professional acceptance of the
common law as a mechanism of governance and source of political
legitimacy could coexist with suspicion of the independent judgment
invited by common law political argument. Awareness of the costs of
appealing to the "common law mind" offers not a denial but another
form of qualification to using that historical construct as evidence of a
fundamental political consensus underneath surface policy disagreements.
Fourth, and most importantly, the debate over legal publishing
signaled a contested transformation underway in the meaning of the
common law, a transformation with significant political implicaSee Richard Cust, News and Politics in Early Seventeenth-Century England, PAST &
PRESENT, Aug. 1986, at 60. See generally F.J. Levy, How Information SpreadAmong the Gentry, 1550-1640,J. BRrr. STUD., Spring 1982, at 11; LOVE, supra note 150, at 9-22 (on parS9

liamentary "separates").

See, e.g., The Puritans'Directionsto Avoid the Proceedings of the Bishops (MS, 1604),
reprintedin 2 USHER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 244, at 362-65.
217 See PERSONS, supra note 246, at 500-42. Coke printed
his opinion in Caudrey's
Case in EDWARD CoKE, REPORTS, pt. 5, at xv-lxxviii (1826) (1605).
370

37 See RIcHARD CUST, THE FORCED LOAN AND ENGUISH POLITICS,
1626-1628, at
150-85 (1987).
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tions. 3's At stake were different answers to the question: in what
sense, and to what purpose, was the common law to be "common"?
Let me bring together strands from earlier parts of this Article to suggest the centrality of the problem. Between the ascension of the Tudors and the Civil War the common law moved along a continuum, in
the realm of perception, from a guild possession towards a national
inheritance. This process went hand-in-hand with the debate over legal publishing. Many of the developments engendering the debate
helped along the redescription of the common law. the growing dissemination of legal knowledge outside the "framings" of government
and the profession; the expansion of lay and professional readerships
for printed lawbooks; the envisioning, even welcoming, of a broader,
nonprofessional audience for those books; the humanist recommendation of law as a desirable attainment of the gentleman; the growing
use of common law categories as a lingua franca of governance and
political debate; and the importance of common law argumentation
in the constitutionalist wing of puritanism, in the resistance to manorial governance, and in the various oppositions to royal policies prevalent after the 1590s, which polemically identified the common law
with the defense of liberty and property and with constitutionalism
itself. Changes in the communication and use of the common law
weakened its late medieval identification as but the course of the
royal courts or a national custom effectively committed to guild custody. For the common law was becoming "commoned" along the two
interlinked dimensions of knowledge (who knew, could know, and
was supposed to know the reasons, fictions, andjudgment of the law?)
and of ideology (to whom did the common law "belong"?).
It is possible to see the anti-publicists as a backward-looking reaction against the implied national proprietorship and weakening collective professional authority over the uses of legal knowledge suggested by commoning. They appear as a protest against the erosion
of guild control over the law, in particular the dignitary loss this entailed, that went hand in hand with the common law's expanding
presence in society and governance. Yet it is also possible to view
them as politically au courant by emphasizing the congruence, at the
level of implicit premises, between themselves and a contrary, absolutist understanding of how the law was to be "common" emerging in
the last decades of Elizabeth's reign and gathering strength among

*I am greatly indebted to Prof. Steven Pincus for suggesting connections between the debate over legal publishing and wider political developments.
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the early Stuarts. The royalist credentials of such anti-publicists as
Julius Caesar, William Hudson, Anthony Benn, and "J.L." (adamant
that rude hands not debase the "flower" of the royal prerogative) suggests the connection. So does their rhetoric of "commoning," mystery, and vulgar misappropriation. Indeed, the very success of Tudor
statebuilding and widening use of the common law as a linguafranca
of governance and political argument invited absolutist ambitions as
it made more pressing the problem of defining the origins, role, and
"ownership" of legal information. As the poet Fulke Greville noted at
the turn of the seventeenth century, legal knowledge brought the
power to " [ r] eform the judge,
correct the advocate/Who knowing law
3 74
alone commands the state?"

Absolutists were great friends of legal publication on their own
terms, dissemination in the voice of command (in proclamations,
statutes, commissions, and assize charges) cultivating order and obedience. They were no legal obscurantists. Let fear of the monarch,
William Willymat preached, make the subject more "attentive and
diligent" to read the king's law that he may "live in the more obedient
subjection, and not through either ignorance or willful obstinateness
to prefer his own will before his lawful magistrate's and higher governor's will, or rather before God's will" expressed by the divine vicegerent, the king. 75 The subordination of the ideal subject's "will" to his
rulers hints at how Willymat differed from the innumerable Tudor
and early Stuart calls for obedience to constituted law that were not
"absolutist." For he contemplated the yielding of will as part of a
broader effacement of the political personality of the subject. To the
magistrates fell the public business of ordering, steering, and reforming the polity. "Private" subjects must not "of their own motion without any calling busy themselves in public affairs, nor intermeddle in
the government," nor "take to themselves authority to redress" complaints or suggest improvements, "having their hands in that respect

374GREVILLE,

s'

supranote 45, verse 262.

WILLIAM WILLYMAT, A LOYAL SUBJECT'S LOOKING GLASS, OR A GOOD SUBJECr'S

DIRECrION 25, 59 (1604) (let subjects learn the prince's laws "for otherwise they must
needs incur the crime of undutifulness through lack of knowledge, for how can they
obey laws which they never saw"). James I called for clearing away the uncertainties
and contradictions of the laws through an Act of Parliament and putting them in the
vernacular "as plain as can be to the people ....
for the conforming themselves thereunto." James I, Speech to Parliament(1609), in THE POLITICAL WORKs OFJAMES I, supra
note 311, at 312 (1609).
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as it were bound behind them."37 6 The divine George Webbe's celebration of quietness as a cardinal social and political value ingeniously
inverted the images of dissemination commonly applied to positive
and natural law, symbolically replacing consciousness of right with aspiration towards retirement. Quietness needs
to be written and made plain upon [t]ables, that who so runs may read
it. And surely, it were to be wished, that this remembrance were often
preached in our Temples, proclaimed in our streets, written upon our
posts, painted upon our walls, or rather engraven with the point of a
[d]iamond upon the [t]ables of our hearts, that we might never forget
it.

Webbe and Willymat meant their aggressive political quietism to
dampen public opposition to royal policies drawing strength from
humanist celebration of the political vita activa and a juristic respect
for the liberties
of the subject and his lawful pursuit of private interest
in public fora 7 8
The absolutist understanding of how the law should be
"common" entailed a vigorous program of legal pedagogy in the voice
of command married uneasily to a suspicious and restrictive bias
against publishing the reasons, fictions, and judgments of the law to
citizens active in the public realm, upholding liberties and interests
through Parliament, courts, and commissions. But keeping legal information from intermeddling subjects in order to bind their hands
behind them was no easy matter when humanist and juristic common
law writers had long celebrated the ideal of legal competency (while
recognizing that only a few, as a practical matter, would attain fluency). "Do not think, Excellent Prince, that all the conquests you are
to make be foreign; you are to conquer here at home the... too
great liberties of your people, the great reverence and formalities
given to your laws and customs," Gray's Inn's Christmas revelers of
" WILLYMAT, supranote 375, at 48. See also SIBTHORPE, supra note 71, at 33 ("The
people must not be busy-bodies to pry into the princes duty, the laity into the clergy's,
or the juror into the judge's, but every one into his own."). In the early seventeenth
century, royalists' denuciations of the "busybody" emphasized his meddling in statecraft and public affairs as well as his snooping into the doing of neighbors, making
more political a traditionally social curiosity. See, e.g., Joseph Hall, The Busy-Body, in

CHARACTERS OF VIRTUES AND VICES, reprintedin 7 THE WORKS OF... JOSEPH HALL 100,

100-01 (Josiah Pratt ed., 1808).
'7

GEORGE WEBBE, THE PRACTICE OF QUIETNESS 8 (3d ed. 1618).

On the centrality to absolutism of constraining political participation and
judgment to the royal court and its authorized agents, see ROBERT ECCLESHALL,
378

ORDER AND REASON IN POLITICS: THEORIES OF ABSOLUTE AND LIMITED MONARCHY IN

EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 1-96 (1978).
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1594 mockingly advised their "Prince of Purpoole" through the
mouth of an absolutist counselor.37 The absolutist style of making
the law common had to answer a troubling question at the heart of
the debate over publishing law. Did not the English subject have a
"right" of access to the inner reasons of his laws?
Familiar absolutist strategies helped explain why not: the assertion of fictive ownership as a basis for control and the transmutation
of right into privilege. Underlying absolutist thought in its idealtypical form, present but compromised in political argument, were
two interlinked images instantiating ambitions at once cultural and
intellectual as well as constitutional: the "free" monarch as unbounded; and the king as the universal font, the prime mover of society and government throughout history and in the present, the soul
animating the otherwise inert politym0 Well-known are James I's lectures to Parliament and his judges casting monarchy as the originator
of the constitution, the principal lawmaker and law interpreter, and
the "fountain" of justice, from which flowed rules, magistrates, and
judicature as so many rivulets directed at the king's prudence.m' The
law, preached James's chaplain John Rawlinson, is "the work of the
prince: the prince is... the image of God digesting and ordering all
things."3 2 The king stood temporally prior to, as in moments of neS79GESTA GRAYORUM

38 (1688) (MS, 1594). James Spedding, the editor of Francis

Bacon's papers, argues on stylistic evidence that Bacon was the author of this speech.
See Spedding, in 3 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supranote 82, at 342.
S0 See, e.g., EDWARD FORSET, A COMPARATIVE DISCOURSE OF THE BODIES
NATURAL
AND POLITIQUE 8, 73-74 (1606); WILLIAM WILKES, A SECOND MEMENTO FOR MAGISTRATES 19, 56 (1608); WILLIAM DICKINSON, THE KING'S RIGHT at Blv-B2r, B3r-v, ClC3, C4r-v, C4v-Dlr (1619); WILLIAM PEMBERTON, THE CHARGE OF GOD AND THE KING
49 (1619); ROGER MAYNWARING, RELIGION AND ALLEGIANCE 9 (1627); VALENTINE, su-

pra note 71, at 17-18; JOHN DAVIES, The Question ConcerningImpositions (MS, c.16101625), in 3 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF SIRJOHN DAVIES supra note 104, at 26, 53.
m' So in the first original of Kings, whereof some had their beginning by
Conquest, and some by election of the people, their wills at that time served
for Law. Yet how soon Kingdoms began to be in civility and policy, then did
Kings set down their minds by Laws, which are properly made by the King
only, but at the rogation of the people, the King's grant being obtained
thereunto.
James I, supra note 375, at 309 (1609). On the centrality of lawgiving andjudicature to
kingship, see also James I, The True Law of Free Monarchies (1598), in The Political
Works ofJames I, supra note 311, at 55. James acknowledged his moral duty to follow
the law in a settled kingdom except in times of emergency.
112JOHNRAWLINSON, VVAT REX: A SERMON PREACHED AT PAULS CROSS ON THE
DAY OF HIS MAJESTIES HAPPY INAUGURATION, MARCH 24, 1614, at 18 (1619); see also

WILKES, supra note 380, at 19, 56; DICKINSON, supra note 380, at B3r-v, C1-C3, C4r-v
(the King as Judge is "to be that majesty and architectonical power, which out of its
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cessity he stood above, the law. The law had not preceded and enabled his power. As the law flowed from the king, so did mores, fashions, prosperity, and peace, as rays radiated from the sun. Absolutists
liked to apply a household model of governance to the polity, the
king as paterfamilias. It suggested the natural provenance as well as
unconstrained lawmaking power of the father-king while emphasizing
his central educative role to his subject-children, forever in their
nonage, absorbing the rays of instruction as they avoided giving offense.?
It reinforced the pervasive sense of unboundedness, the father-king not compelled to account for his actions or reasons to his
own people (one purpose of arcana imperii rhetoric) as he was not
bound to account to foreign monarchs, the Pope, or the Emperor
(one purpose of divine right rhetoric). And it had the further advantage of casting the king as the metaphorical "owner" of the realm as
34
the father owned the household, subjects holding property of him
own absoluteness sets down a law, and appoints a public measure"); MAYNWARING, supra note 380, at 9; Justice Crawley, Ship Money Case (1637), reprinted in 3 A COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON... TO 1783, at

1083 (Howell Thomas Bayly ed., 1768-1815); Anthony Benn, God Before All, andAllAfter
the King (MS, c.1614-1616), at [11] (Bedford Record Office, MS L28/49) (law"is not
so regular and positive as that it binds or gives bounds to sovereign power but submits
itself to the king").
The image of the monarch as "sun" also suggested that subjects avoid undue
scrutiny lest their eyes be seared. The barristerJohn Davies's hymn to Elizabeth entitled, Of the Sun-Beams of Her Mind (MS, 1599), announced: "Great splendor above
measure / Is in the mind, from whence you flow: / No wit may have access to know, /
And view so bright a treasure." THE POEMS OF SIR JOHN DAvIES 79, 79 (Robert
KrueAer ed., 1975).
By the law of nature the king becomes a natural father to all his lieges at
his coronation. And as the father of his fatherly duty is bound to care for the
nourishing, education and virtuous government of his children, even so is the
king bound to care for all his subjects.
James I, supra note 375, at 55.
[The] King is Dominus omnium bonorum, ... the whole subjects being but his

vassals, and from him holding all their lands as their overlord.... And as you
see it manifest, that the King is overlord of the whole land, so is he master
over every person that inhabits the same, having power over the life and
death of every one of them. For although ajust Prince will not take the life of
any of his subjects without a clear law, yet the same laws whereby he takes
them, are made by himself, or by his predecessors, and so the power flows always from himself.
James explicitly noted that his argument applied to England as well as Scotland. See id.
at 62-63, 308 (king, as father of the commonwealth, may dispose of his inheritance as
he chooses, favoring one child and disinheriting another); see also WILLYMAT, supra
note 375, at 24, 58-59, 64; FORsET, supra note 380, at 98-99; USSHER, supra note 99, at
266-75, 301-23, 305-06 (Ussher applied to the English king the glossator's observation
about the Roman Emperor: "Note that the emperor is the father of the law; whereupon the laws also are subject to him.").
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Together, this cluster of absolutist tropes provided a foundation
for anti-publicist appeals. As the fountain and producer of law, the
king owned it as he owned the land. Access to the reason of a law
understood as royal "property," as the product of the king and his
predecessors, meant access to the privacy of the royal mind, an act of
unseemly curiosity, of busyness and meddling. It was the student circumventing the educative plan of the teacher-king, the child demanding more than the father was prepared to tell. The king need not reveal-or more to the point be comfortable with others revealing-the
inner reasons of a law that through origination, guidance, and proprietorship was "his." A touch of this spirit infused the absolutist
campaign against publicity in statecraft and religion as well as law.
"And who sees not what confusion would be brought, as well into a
family as a state," wrote Bishop James Ussher, "if a son or servant
might have liberty to stand upon terms and chop logic with his father,
master, or prince, and refuse to yield obedience to their commands
until he should see some reason for it?"8 For the unbounded royal
fountain and proprietor of the law, disclosure of legal reasons, fictions, and tittles was an act of grace, not an obligation; for the subject
of law, disclosure was a privilege, not a right."
To counter this understanding, publicists conjoined support for
legal dissemination with counterstories of the origination and ownership of law. First, they contested the image of the royal fountain.
Since the thirteenth century, lawyers had described the common law
as simultaneously the custom (or course) of the royal courts and the
custom of the realm. Between St. German's Doctor and Student (1530)
and the early Stuarts, they increasingly subordinated the former to
the latter, celebrating the origins of their law in functionally beneficial popular behavior. John Davies's identification of the "bare memory of man" as the "register of customs" at the heart of the common

8 USSHER, supra note 99, at 349-50. Ussher went on to argue that the law "should
be accepted 'as a voice from God, that should command and not dispute.'" Id.
' This way of thinking animated Restoration royalists justifying the reestablishment of the common-law patent system and its accompanying censorship, a campaign
that brought to the surface assumptions prevalent among pre-war royalists. Richard
Atkyns, for example, distinguished the statutory law devised by the king and people
jointly from the "unwritten" common law that was the king's property. As such, it
"ought not to be published, or numbered, or interpreted but by authority from him;
and the printing thereof is of the king's free pleasure, and not the people's right, and
consequently the privileging some to print the law is the king's grace." RIcHARD
ATKYNs, supranote 354, at 11 (1669). On the intellectual continuities between Restoration and pre-war censorship, see WEBER, supra note 92.
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law gave the fiction a particularly faux populist tilt.3 7 By invoking the
customary roots of the common law, publicists made the law "belong"
to the people in debates over legal information as in constitutional
argument. Second, countering absolutist depictions of the king as
the soul of the commonwealth with the law reposed in the breast
(sciniopectoris) of this "living law." Publicists followed Cicero in identifying the laws themselves as the soul of the commonwealth, suggesting that the soul's animation of the otherwise inert polity required
publication of the laws." s William Lambarde began his charge to the
Quarter Sessions at Maidstone in 1596 with the Ciceronian topos, proceeding in the next sentence to call for the publishing of laws as the
prerequisite for their executon.9 More elaborately, the royalistJohn
Davies defended legal dissemination by mixing this Ciceronian figure
with absolutist conceit of the king as "fountain." Davies cast lawyers as
"conduit pipes" bringing "streams of justice" to the nation from the
king sitting upon God's seat administering judgment. A distinct
"organ" of the body politic, the legal profession had a special role:
insuring that the commonwealth's law be "communicated unto the
people," lest "the law, which is the soul thereof, produce no effect or
operation at all." To the divine "Jupiter" who gave the law, the lawyers were as "Mercury sent with that heavenly gift, to deliver it over
unto mankind." 90 Third, publicists disclaimed royal proprietorship of
law. Edward Coke, Nicholas Fuller, and parliamentary anti-absolutists
around the turn of the seventeenth century liked to depict the common law as the "birthright" or "inheritance" of every Englishman. 9 '
-"' DAvIES, supra note 104, at 252; see also FULBECK, supra note 123, at 173. Thomas
Hobbes, writing in a humanistic vein decades before his conversion in De Cive and Leviathan, located the "esteem and antiquity" of laws in their allowance by the
"j]udgment of the people." Thomas Hobbes, Discourse of Laws (MS, c.1620), in

THREE DIscouRsEs: A CRITICAL MODERN EDITION OF NEWLY IDENTIFIED WORK OF THE

YOUNG HOBBES 100, 119 (Noel B. Reynolds & Arlene W. Saxonhouse eds., 1995).
ss Peter La Primaudaye's widely read The French Academy (4th ed., 1602) was but
one of the many early modem attributions to Cicero of the notion of laws as the
commonwealth's soul. See id. at 560.
-" See WILLIAM LAMBARDE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, His 'EPHEMERIS' AND
TWENTY-NINE CHARGES TO JURIES AND COMMISSIONS 128 (Conyers Read ed., 1962).
Coke anologized the reasonable soul in the natural body to the law, the soul of the
commonwealth, in the political body. See Edward Coke, Speech at the Installation of the
Eleven Serjeants in the Temple Hall (1614), Yale University, Beinecke Library, Osborn
Shelves, MS fb 60, fol. 457r. For an early example of cojoining Cicero's image with a
program of legal dissemination, see STARKEY, supra note 17, at 55.
"0 DAviEs, supra note 104, at 272-76.
"' COKE, Preface to REPORTS, pt 5, supra note 371, at iv; NICHOLAS FULLER,
ARGUMENT IN CASE OF THOMAS LAD R. MAUNSELL 3, 13, 22 (1607); Nicholas Fuller,
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These images recurred in appeals for legal publicity. Coke, for
example, criticized the Council of the North for keeping secret their
instructions, which "were not enrolled in any court, whereunto the
subject might have resort. Sed misera servitus est, ubi jus est vagum, aut
incognitum [But the subject is miserable, where the law is vague and
unknown]." With Coke's evident approval, James I ordered the instructions enrolled "to the end the subject might.., enjoy the benefit
of the laws of the realm, his best birthright."3 92 The anonymous, perhaps puritan, author of The Laws of England (MS, c.1625-1640) ascribed to the people a right "to the laws of the kingdom, not only
those laws which concerned themselves, but likewise those laws which
concerned their king, for both were to be known by the people, and
in both they had an inheritance, as well as in their king."3 93 Contrasting notions of the origination and ownership of law informed the debate within the committee on printing in the Long Parliament of
1642 over whether the law patentee should retain a monopoly right to
publish common law works. According to William Prynne, the patentee claimed that "the king, supreme governor and lawgiver, may
commit the printing of the statutes and of lawbooks to whom he
pleases." For printing was "as inherent a prerogative to the Crown as
coining of money." As opposing counsel, Prynne replied that "not
the king alone, but the king and parliament are the sole law makers,"
and that "private men" compile the treatises of the common law, im-

Speech ofJune 23, 1610 in the House of Commons, in 2 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT, supra
note 119, at 152, 152 (June 23, 1610). Bacon employed this image when he wanted to
restrain too high-flying a royalist. In the first draft of his letter of advice to the Duke of
Buckingham, he remarked:
In the laws we have a native interest, it is our birthright and our inheritance,
and I think the whole kingdom will always continue that mind which once the
two Houses of Parliament publicly professed, Nolumus Legem Angliae Mutare
[we will not change the laws of England]: under a law we must live, and under a known law, and not under an arbitrary law is our happiness that we do
live.
FRANCIS BACON, A Letter ofAdvice (MS, 1616), in 13 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, supra note 82, at 19. Master of many styles of writing, Bacon, for tactical purposes, revealinglyjoined the notion of legal inheritance with the anti-absolutist invocation of
an ancient common law to constrain prerogative.
S2 EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH

PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF

ENGLAND 246 (1644). Coke similarly accused the High Commission of applying a law
"vagum, aut incognitum." Id. at 332. In the next century, Thomas Wood treated Coke's
Latin maxim as a testament to the importance of legal dissemination, placing it on the
title page of his InstituteoftheLaws of England (1722 ed.).
-"'The Laws of England (MS, c.1625-1640), cited inJUDSON, supra note 248, at 336.
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in the Stationers'
plying that the right of publication should reside
94
Company "for the common good of them all."3

By the early seventeenth century, praise of legal dissemination
had migrated into humanist celebrations of the political vita activa,
perhaps brought together by the absolutism inimical to both.
Barnabe Barnes, for example, organized his FourBooks of Offices: Enabling PrivatePersonsfor the Special Service of All Good Princes and Policies
(1606) according to the types of services the active citizen could provide the realm-as treasurers, counselors, judges, and warriors. He
conjoined appeals for royal obedience to constituted law, a roster of
kings famous for the collection and promulgation of laws (St. Edward
the Confessor, Elizabeth, and James), and an honor roll of lawyers
who assembled case reports and treatises (Glanvill, Littleton,
Fitzherbert, Brooke, Dyer, Plowden, and Coke). Closing his chapter
on judging and justice was a reminder of a parliamentary statute in
King Edward III's reign making English rather than French the language of pleading "to the end that the people might the better understand what was spoken for and against them."3 95 Adherents of the
ancient constitution as a check on overbroad prerogative also took up
the cause of law printing. The anonymous author of Books of the Common Laws of This Land Not Published (MS, after 1603) believed that a
vigorous program of legal publication would show the existence of
common law rules and jury trials before the Conquest and demonstrate that William the Conqueror confirmed the "ancient liberties
and customs of England."3 9
The absolutists' picture of the educator father-king owning the
law, along with the suspicion of "publicity" they shared with the episcopal campaign against conformity, transformed the political meaning of the publicist appeal in the process of fostering a significant debate over legal publishing. In its first stage, from around 1520 to

394William Prynne, Brief on the Origin of Printingin England on the Issue of the Printers
Petition to the 1642 Parliamen in Inner Temple MANUSCRIPTS (Petyt Collection, MS
511, vol. 23, fol. 14); Argument Before the Committee on Printingin the 1642 Parliament
March 7-14, 1642, in A True Diurnalof the Passagesin Parliament,reprintedin MAKING THE
NEWS, supranote 92.
s'- BARNABE BARNES, FOUR BOOKS OF OFFcKs 130, 137, 160 (1606).
"6 BOOKS OF THE COMMON LAWS OF THIS LAND NOT PUBLUSHED (MS, after 1603),
Yale University, Beinecke Library, Law School Deposit, MS G R24.1, fols. 185r-186r.
This author's publication program included compilations of British and Saxon laws,

the Leges Henrici Primi, common law monographs by Hengham and Fleta, royal court
and assize reports, and Readings. The document was composed after 1603. It refers
to Robert Cotton, knighted in that year, as "Sir."
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1580, the publicists were an arm and ally of state-building (or kingdom-building). The Crown, in effect, asked itself, "How can we reinforce and disseminate a national law strong enough to keep in check
the many alternative laws operating legitimately in the realm?" The
Henrician program of solidifying the kingdom by strengthening national law (statute, common law, and prerogative tribunals) at the expense of regional, franchise, local, and ecclesiastical rivals helped the
Rastellians suggest that printed law solidified the unity of the kingdom. They put publicity at the service of royalism. By the later years
of Elizabeth's reign the dangers of overmighty subjects and vainglorious seigniorial jurisdictions had faded. The campaign against nonconformity and the stirrings of absolutism brought to the fore a second question, "Whose law was this national law to be?" As this
encouraged the anti-publicists, it made the publicists, not necessarily
by intention, a carrier and agent of a "constitutionalist" politics.
In the shadow of absolutism, legal publishing came to support,
sometimes only tacitly, a view of law as generated by king and subject
together and binding both, as constituting the lineaments of the polity and defining the monarch's place within it (rather than flowing
from him), as setting standards of accountability for the Crown and
its civil and ecclesiastical officials, and as enabling rather than rendering unnecessary the political activity of the community 97 John
Rastell, Richard Taverner, Nicholas Bacon, and the office-seeking William Barlee represented the first, kingdom-building stage of publicism; Nicholas Fuller, Barnabe Barnes, the anonymous author of
Books of the Common Law, and the latter Edward Coke exemplified the
second stage. Through allusion to Roman history, Fulke Greville captured poetically the growing linkage of legal dissemination to constitutionalism:
After the infancy of glorious Rome,
Laws were with Church rites secretly enshrined,
Poor people knowing nothing of their doom,
But that all rights were in the judges' mind;
Flavius revealed this snaring mystery,
Great men repined, but Rome itself grew free.

$97 See Howell A. Lloyd, Constitutionalism,in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL
THOUGHT, 1450-1700, at 254, 254 (J.H. Burns & Mark Goldie eds., 1991); ECCLSHALL,
supra note 378, at 76-125.
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Hard therefore it is for men to decree,
Whether it better were to have no law,
Or laws kept only as a mystery,

In their breast, that revenue from it draw.
Again, laws ordered must be, and set down
So clearly as each may understand,
Crown,
Wherein for him, and wherein for3 the
98
Their rigor or equality does stand.

Torn from unwilling rulers, law made public restrained otherwise unaccountable power. How different this agonistic sensibility from
Rastell's and Barlee's beneficent monarchs and lords smiling over a
legal press imprinting "loving obedience."
The debate over law printing, then, helps recast the received picture of absolutism's legal ambitions and effects. Historians have concentrated, understandably, on the constitutional claims of absolutism
evident in early Stuart politics (such as divine right, nonresistance,
the privilege of taxation outside Parliament, and royal supremacy in
law making and interpretation).!9 The absolutist disparagement of
the popular right to and capacity for knowledge of the law's inner
reasons, fostering as it was expressed in anti-publicist unease with licit
legal printing, reveals another dimension of absolutism's legal
agenda. Perhaps more important, it led to an ironic political denouement. For as the Elizabethan expansion of the common law as a forum for settling disputes, as a lingua franca and resource in governance and politics, and as a symbol of national identity corroded one
of its identities-as the guild's proprietary mystery-the very efforts of
absolutists to articulate their own proprietary title with accompanying
intellectual paternalism evoked in reaction a countervailing appropriation by publicists.4 Defending the right of access to the inner

.. Greville, supra note 45, 11 263, 265, 268. Flavius, a secretary to the censor
Appius Claudius Caecus, stole and published a collection of procedural laws assembled by his master. The Romans later styled these the ius Ravianum. Along with the
Twelve Tables, Flavius's theft was one of the great breaches of the pontifical monopoly
of law and, consequently, a challenge to partrician power. See H.F. JOLOWICZ,
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 88 (1965).
9 ECCLESHALL, supra note 378, at 76-96; J.P. SOMMERVILLE, POLITICS AND
IDEOLOGY IN ENGLAND, 1603-1640, at 9-56, 115-88 (1986); MARGARET A. JUDSON, THE
CRISIS OF THE CONSTITUTION: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT

IN ENGLAND, 1603-1645, at 107-70 (1949).
'0 A reservation and clarification: The common law's identity in the early sixteenth century as the guild's proprietary mystery coexisted with other simultaneous
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reasons of the law, valorizing popular proprietorship and the latent
constitutionalist implications of legal printing, publicists encouraged
an ideological "commoning" of the common law that built upon the
antecedent communications "commoning" of the common law
achieved through more accessible lawbook design and a broadening
of imagined audiences and lay legal literacy. To be sure, the Elizabethan and early Stuart commoning of the common law was, in practice,
a limited affair. The lay audience for law remained but a fraction of
that for theology or history, bounded by constraints of class, gender,
and education. Yet the ideological legacy of the debate over legal
publishing exceeded its immediate practical effects by helping refashion the laws of the realm of England as the laws of Englishmen.

identities, such as the course of the royal courts, the general custom of the realm, and
the legal, hence cultural, legacy of British and Saxon antiquity.
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